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INTRODUCTION 
Substantive criminal law defines the conduct that the state pun­
ishes. Or does it? If the answer is yes, it should be possible, by reading 
criminal codes (perhaps with a few case annotations thrown in), to tell 
what conduct will land you in prison. Most discussions of criminal law, 
whether in law reviews, law school classrooms, or the popular press, 
proceed on the premise that the answer is yes.1 Law reform move­
ments regularly seek to broaden or narrow the scope of some set of 
criminal liability rules, always on the assumption that by doing so they 
will broaden or narrow the range of behavior that is punished. Oppo­
nents of these movements operate on the same assumption - that the 
law determines who goes to prison and who doesn't, that the distribu­
tion of criminal punishment tracks criminal law as it is defined by code 
books and case reports. Of course, participants in these debates un­
derstand that the law does not by itself determine who is and isn't 
punished. Some criminals evade detection, police and prosecutors fre­
quently decline to arrest or charge, and juries sometimes refuse to 
convict. Still, if the literature on criminal law is an accurate gauge, all 
that is just a gloss on the basic picture, a modification but not a nega­
tion of the claim that criminal law drives criminal punishment. 
But criminal law does not drive criminal punishment. It would be 
closer to the truth to say that criminal punishment drives criminal law. 
The definition of crimes and defenses plays a different and much 
smaller role in the allocation of criminal punishment than we usually 
suppose. In general, the role it plays is to empower prosecutors, who 
are the criminal justice system's real lawmakers. Anyone who reads 
1. For a fascinating recent example, see Paul Robinson's comparative study of 
American criminal codes. Paul H. Robinson et al., The Five Worst (and Five Best) American 
Criminal Codes, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (2000). Robinson emphasizes both the 
comprehensiveness and the clarity of criminal codes' descriptions of prohibited conduct, on 
the ground that clearly defined crimes send better signals to the public at large than ambigu­
ously defined crimes. See id. at 6-11; see also Paul H. Robinson, Structuring Criminal Codes 
to Perform Their Function, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2000) [hereinafter Robinson, Struc­
turing Criminal Codes] (defending the use of criminal codes to educate the public as to its 
legal obligations). These criteria make sense only if the codes' descriptions in fact capture 
the conduct that the state punishes. 
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criminal codes in search of a picture of what conduct leads to a prison 
term, or who reads sentencing rules in order to discover how severely 
different sorts of crimes are punished, will be seriously misled. 
The reason is that American criminal law, federal and state, is very 
broad; it covers far more conduct than any jurisdiction could possibly 
punish. The federal code alone has thousands of criminal prohibitions 
covering an enormous range of behavior, from the heinous to the 
trivial. State codes are a little narrower, but not much. And federal 
and state codes alike are filled with overlapping crimes, such that a 
single criminal incident typically violates a half dozen or more prohibi­
tions. Lax double jeopardy doctrine generally permits the government 
to charge all these violations rather than selecting among them. Since 
all change in criminal law seems to push in the same direction - to­
ward more liability - this state of affairs is growing worse: legislatures 
regularly add to criminal codes, but rarely subtract from them. In a 
world like that, lists of crimes in statute books must bear only a slight 
relation to the conduct that leads to a stay in the local house of correc-
tions. 
· 
Of course, criminal law's breadth is old news. It has long been a 
source of academic complaint;2 indeed, it has long been the starting 
point for virtually all the scholarship in this field, which (with the im­
portant exception of sexual assault) consistently argues that existing 
criminal liability rules are too broad and ought to be narrowed. Yet 
the implications of this piece of old news are not well understood. 
Consider two defining features of criminal law's large literature. 
First, it is relentlessly normative. Almost all writing about American 
criminal law argues that some set of criminal liability rules is morally 
wrong or socially destructive, and that a different (usually narrower) 
set of rules would be better.3 Second, these normative arguments al-
2. For the classic treatments, see HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL 
SANCTION 249-364 (1968); John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"? Reflec­
tions on the Disappearing Tort I Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193 
(1991) [hereinafter Coffee, Tort/Crime Distinction); Henry Hart, The Aims of the Criminal 
Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401 (1958); Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcrimi­
nalization, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Ser., Nov. 1967, at 157; Sanford H. Kadish, 
Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economii: Regulations, 30 
U. CHI. L. REV. 423 (1963). 
It is not simply coincidence that most of this literature dates from a generation or more 
ago. The literature just cited argues, for the most part, that particular crimes or classes of 
crimes are inappropriate as a matter of principle. The most commonly invoked principle, 
which dates from John Stuart Mill, holds that harmless wrongdoing is not a proper subject of 
criminalization. As Bernard Harcourt has shown, that argument has mostly collapsed over 
the course of the past generation, as our ideas about "harrn".have become sufficiently capa­
cious to take in almost anything legislators might wish to criminalize. See Bernard E. 
Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109 (1999). 
3. For two recent examples by two of the field's leading lights, see MICHAEL MOORE, 
PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (1997); PAUL H. 
ROBINSON, STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN CRIMINAL LAW (1997). For a recent example of 
normative scholarship concerning sexual assault, where the' conventional academic wisdom 
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most always presuppose that changing the liability rules would change 
the behavior the system punishes - again, the assumption is that 
criminal law drives criminal punishment, not the other way around.4 
Both features are at odds with the way American criminal law ac­
tually works. Normative legal argument makes sense on the assump­
tion that lawmakers care about the merits, that the side with the better 
policy position has a better chance of getting its preferred rule 
adopted. But the legislators who vote on criminal statutes appear to be 
uninterested in normative arguments.5 To take an obvious example: 
for the past generation, virtually everyone who has written about fed­
eral criminal law has bemoaned its expansion.6 But the expansion has 
continued apace, under very different sorts of Congresses and 
Presidents. Normative argument does not seem to have mattered. One 
can put the point more generally: American criminal law's historical 
development has borne no relation to any plausible normative theory 
- unless "more" counts as a normative theory. Criminal law scholars 
may be talking to each other (and to a few judges),7 but they do not 
appear to be talking to anyone else. . 
And changes in criminal liability rules do not necessarily mean 
changes in the scope or nature of behavior the system punishes. In a 
system structured as ours is, the law on the street may remain un­
changed even as the law on the books changes dramatically. Rather, 
broader substantive criminal law chiefly affects the process, the way 
law-on-the-street is made and the way guilt or innocence is deter-
argues for broader liability, see STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE 
OF INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE OF LAW (1998). For a still more recent example fo­
cused on morals crime, see Harcourt, supra note 2. 
4. Erik Luna's work is a rare and welcome exception to this tendency. See Erik Luna, 
Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107 (2000); Erik Luna, Principled Enforcement of 
Penal Codes, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 515 (2000) [hereinafter Luna, Principled Enforcement]. 
In the two articles just cited, Luna notes that enforcement discretion, particularly for vice 
crimes, makes law enforcers into lawmakers; he responds by seeking to develop ways for law 
enforcers to make their lawmaking both more transparent and more regular - that is, more 
lawlike. Luna's focus on law enforcement as the key to understanding how criminal law 
works is welcome, though I doubt that American law enforcement can be regularized in the 
ways he suggests. See infra notes 117-135 and accompanying text. 
5. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that, with rare exceptions, legislators listen 
only to arguments that favor broader liability rules. That would account for, e.g., the (par­
tial) success of the rape reform movement. It also seems consistent with the claim that crimi­
nal law, at least to the extent legislatures define it, adheres to no normative theory save that 
more is always better. 
6. The examples are too many to cite. For the leading (almost the only) exception, see 
Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, The Underfederalization of Crime, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. 
POL'Y 247, 251 & n.19 (1997). And even Stacy and Dayton argue not that federal criminal 
law needs expanding, but that federal criminal law enforcement does. 
7. For reasons explored below, see infra notes 191-227 and accompanying text, judges 
play less of a role in criminal lawmaking than they play in shaping the law in other areas -
even areas that are primarily statutory. Thus, to the extent scholars aim their arguments at 
judges, they are probably hitting the wrong target. 
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mined. As criminal law expands, both lawmaking and adjudication 
pass into the hands of police and prosecutors; law enforcers, not the 
law, determine who goes to prison and for how long. The end point of 
this progression is clear: criminal codes that cover everything and de­
cide nothing, that serve only to. delegate power to district attorneys' 
offices and police departments. We have not reached that point yet; 
substantive criminal law has not wholly ceased to operate. But we are 
closer than we used to be - the movement is very much in that direc­
tion. In a criminal justice system that incarcerates two million people, 
criminal law is becoming a sideshow. It seems like, and is, an un­
healthy state of affairs. 
Which raises an obvious question: How did all this happen? How 
did criminal law come to be a one-way ratchet that makes an ever 
larger slice of the population felons, and that turns real felons into fel­
ons several times over? The conventional answer is politics.8 Voters 
demand harsh treatment of criminals; politicians respond with tougher 
sentences (overlapping crimes are one way to make sentences harsher) 
and more criminal prohibitions. This dynamic has been particularly 
powerful the past two decades, as both major parties have participated 
in a kind of bidding war to see who can, appropriate the label "tough 
on crime." Congress's enactment of the fafl1.ous hundred-to-one crack 
sentencing provision in 19869 is the best-known example - that ratio 
rose steadily as the relevant legislation wound its way through 
Congress, with members vying with one another to see who could 
propose the toughest crack penalties.10 
This explanation has a good deal of power, but it is incomplete. 
Criminal defendants have not always been the political bogey they are 
today, nor has crime always been such a salient national issue. Crimi­
nal law's expansion, though, is a constant, going back (at least) to the 
mid-1800s. And while it is easy to see how public opinion would push 
toward harsher sentences (as with the 1986 drug legislation), it is hard 
to see how it would produce broad criminal codes that cover a range 
of ordinary, fairly innocuous behavior. The i:nore natural assumption is 
that the public would want to criminalize only the kinds of things 
criminals, understood in the ordinary sense of that word, do. Yet con­
temporary criminal codes cover a good deal of marginal middle-class 
misbehavior - a very odd state of affairs, politically speaking. The 
8. Though conventional, this answer has not received much sustained attention in the 
literature. For the best treatment to date, see Sara Sun Beale, What's Law Got to Do With 
It? The Political, Social, Psychological and Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Devel­
opment of (Federal) Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 23 (1997). 
9. The original legislation was the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 
100 Stat. 3207 (1986); the relevant portion is codified at 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(l)(A) (1994). 
10. For the best account, see David A. Sklansky, Cocaine,' Race, and Equal Protection, 
47 STAN. L. REV. 1283 (1995). . . 
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question remains: Why are criminal codes so broad, and why are they 
always getting broader? 
A large part of the answer involves not the politics of ideology and 
public opinion, but the politics of institutional design and incentives. 
Begin with the basic allocation of power over criminal law: legislators 
make it, prosecutors enforce it, and judges interpret it. In this system 
of separated powers, each branch is supposed to check the others. 
That does not happen. Instead, the story of American criminal law is a 
story of tacit cooperation between prosecutors and legislators, each of 
whom benefits from more and broader crimes, and growing marginali­
zation of judges, who alone are likely to opt for narrower liability rules 
rather than broader ones. This dynamic does not arise out of any par­
ticular ideological stance, and does not depend on the partisan tilt of 
the relevant actors. Criminal law seems to expand as much, and as fast, 
under Democrats as under Republicans. Rather, it arises out of the in­
centives of the various actors in the system. Prosecutors are better off 
when criminal law is broad than when it is narrow. Legislators are bet­
ter off when prosecutors are better off. The potential for alliance is 
strong, and obvious. And given legislative supremacy - meaning leg­
islatures control crime definition - and prosecutorial discretion -
meaning prosecutors decide whom to charge, and for what - judges 
cannot separate these natural allies. 
So two kinds of politics drive criminal law. Surface politics, the 
sphere in which public opinion and partisan argument operate, ebb 
and flow, just as crime rates ebb and flow. Usually these conventional 
political forces push toward broader liability, but not always, and not 
always to the same degree. A deeper politics, a politics of institutional 
competition and cooperation, always pushes toward broader liability 
rules, and toward harsher sentences as well. The current tough-on­
crime phase of our national politics will someday end; indeed it seems 
to be ending already, as the current controversies over the death pen­
alty and racial profiling suggest.1' (The war on terrorism may reverse 
this trend.) But the deeper politics of criminal law - the set of institu­
tional arrangements that are steadily making criminal law both larger 
and less relevant - shows no signs of changing. The solution, if there 
is one, lies not in arguing about the merits of different rules, but in 
11. On the death penalty, the key event was the moratorium on executions declared by 
Governor George Ryan of Illinois, a step that would have been politically unimaginable a 
short time ago. See Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, Ryan Suspends Death Penalty; Illinois 
First State to Impose Moratorium on Executions, CHI. TRJB., Jan. 31, 2000, at Al. On racial 
profiling, the change is not neatly captured by any one salient event; rather, the key is the 
"almost universal condemnation" of the practice by political and legal elites. See, e.g. , David 
Rudovsky, Law Enforcement by Stereotypes and Serendipity: Racial Profiling and Stops and 
Searches Without Cause, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 296, 364 (2001) (expressing some cause for 
optimism based on this change) . These phenomena show a willingness on the part of elected 
officials to take stands hostile to the interests of law enforcement - something rarely seen 
during the past two decades. 
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changing the way those rules are defined and enforced. Until such 
changes happen, we are likely to come ever closer to a world in which 
the law on the books makes everyone a felon, and in which prosecu­
tors and the police both define the law on the street and decide who 
has violated it. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I looks briefly at criminal 
law's breadth, past and present. Steady expansion of criminal liability 
is no new thing; on the contrary, criminal codes have continually 
broadened throughout the past century and a half. This broadening 
reflects certain patterns, with state codes growing faster earlier in the 
century and the federal code growing faster more recently, and with 
state legislatures and Congress tending to add different sorts of crimes. 
In state and federal jurisdictions alike, though, the end result is crimi­
nal codes that cover more conduct than anyone really wishes to pun­
ish, and cover core crimes many times over. 
Part II is the heart of the Article; it examines the criminal law­
making process and the incentives that process creates. The central 
idea is that prosecutorial discretion leads legislatures to expand crimi­
nal law's net, and discretion plus legislative supremacy prevents courts 
from reining in that tendency. That tendency will of course be more 
pronounced at some times (and in some areas) than others, but it is 
always present, a necessary feature of any system that allocates power 
among legislators, judges, and prosecutors as our system does. The 
tendency to add crimes is also more pronounced at the federal level 
than in the states. 
Part III asks what steps would be necessary to solve the problems 
that attend criminal lawmaking. There are two sorts of answers. One is 
to abolish enforcement discretion, to require that the crimes legisla­
tures create are actually punished. This solution is as impossible as it is 
familiar. The other answer is to abolish legislative supremacy over 
criminal law, to end legislatures' ability to decide how far criminal 
law's net should extend. This answer in turn breaks down into two 
possible approaches. The first would depoliticize criminal law, leaving 
legislators nominally in control but vesting real lawmaking power in 
other bodies. The Model Penal Code was, in a sense, the product of 
such a process, and it is widely (though not universally, and perhaps 
not correctly) regarded as a great success.12 But so too is the Federal 
Sentencing Commission, whose work is universally criticized.13 Based 
on our experience with expert commissions and sentencing over the 
12. For a good example of the dominant, more favorable reaction, see Sanford H. 
Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal Law: An Opinionated Review, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 943 (1999). 
For an example of the less common, more critical view, see Markus Dirk Dubber, Penal 
Panopticon: The Idea of a Modern Model Penal Code, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 53 (2000). 
13. For the most thorough criticism, see KATE STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF 
JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1998). 
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last twenty years, depoliticizing criminal. law seems at. best unpromis­
ing; it is as likely to aggravate the system's current pathologies as it is 
to mitigate them. 
The second approach would constitutionalize a great deal .of ordi­
nary criminal law, turning its boundaries over to courts rather than 
legislators and prosecutors. That need not mean a vast constitutional 
criminal code (though it could mean that); there are other, less radical 
possibilities. But it would mean a huge addition of power to courts 
that are, in many eyes, already seen as having more power than they 
should. For that reason alone, it seems unlikely that criminal law's 
structural problem will be solved, or even addressed, anytime soon. 
I. CRIMINAL LA W'S BREADTH 
A. Breadth _and Depth 
Criminal law is both broad and deep: a great deal of conduct is 
criminalized, and of that conduct, a large proportion is criminalized 
many times over. I believe these propositions would be· accepted by 
anyone who read an American criminal code, state or federal. Ex­
plaining them might therefore seem like belaboring the obvious. But 
the propositions are perhaps not so obvious as they might seem, since 
American criminal codes are rarely read, even by those who teach, 
litigate, and interpret them. A brief explanation is therefore in order. 
Begin with the proposition that criminal law is not one field but 
two. The first consists of a few core crimes, the sort that are used to 
compile the FBI's crime index - murder, manslaughter, rape, rob­
bery, arson, assault, kidnapping, burglary, larceny, and auto theft.14 
The second consists of everything else. Criminal law courses, criminal 
law literature, and popular conversation about crime focus heavily on 
the first. The second dominates criminal codes. 
These two fields have dramatically different histories. The law that 
defines core crimes derives from the common law of England. Save for 
auto theft, everything in the list of FBI index crimes was a crime in 
Blackstone's day.15 Along with the rest of criminal law, these crimes 
were all codified during the course of the nineteenth century, but their 
basic structure still bears the mark of their common law origins. Thus, 
while definitions of core crimes of violence and theft have changed 
over time, those definitions are not substantially broader today than 
14. E.g. , FBI, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 1998: UNIFORM 
CRIME REPORTS 1 (1999). 
15. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *191-94 
(1769) (manslaughter); id. at *194-201 (murder); id. at *210-12 (rape); id. at *216-17 (as­
sault); id. at *219 (kidnapping); id. at *220-22 (arson); id. at *223-28 (burglary); id. at *229-34 
(larceny); id. at *241-42 (robbery). 
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they were generations or even centuries ago.16 (Rape may be an excep­
tion, depending on how one sees the consequences of the rape reform 
movement of the past two decades.)17 Indeed, some crimes are nar­
rower: changes in the felony murder doctrine have limited the class of 
killings labeled murder,18 and developments in the law of criminal de­
fenses - especially self-defense19 - have had the effect, at some 
times, of reducing the scope of murder, manslaughter, and assault.20 
Given this history, it comes as no surprise that criminal law's litera­
ture, which is almost entirely about crimes of this first sort, paints the 
picture of a field that ebbs and flows, with expansions in the law of de­
fenses here and contractions over there, tougher mens rea standards 
then, more lax ones now. That picture is roughly accurate for a few 
core crimes. But when we turn our attention to the rest of criminal 
law, a very different picture emerges. For the most part, this criminal 
law was the product of legislation, not judicial decision. And the cen­
tral feature of its history is growth. 
Numbers of offenses give some hint of the magnitude of the phe­
nomenon. In 1856, Illinois's criminal code contained 131 separate 
16. Compare, e.g., id. at *220 (defining arson as "the malicious and wilful burning of the 
house or out-house of another man"), with MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.l(l)(a) (1980) (de­
fining arson as "start[ing] a fire or caus[ing] an explosion with the purpose of . . destroying 
a building or occupied structure of another"). The Model Penal Code goes on to add to that 
definition a provision covering the destruction of any structure, even if owned by the of­
fender, for the purpose of collecting insurance - a crime that must have been rare in 
Blackstone's day. Id.§ 220.l(l)(b). 
17. The classical common law definition of rape was "the carnal knowledge of a woman 
forcibly and against her will." 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 15, at *210. In one sense, that 
definition has had a great deal of staying power; in another, it has changed substantially over 
the past generation. For the best and most balanced discussion of developments in the law of 
rape, and of the distance that still needs to be travelled, see SCHULHOFER, supra note 3. For 
the best analysis of the common law definition and its relationship to the broader regulation 
of sex, see Anne M. Coughlin, Sex and Guilt, 84 VA. L. REV. 1 (1998). 
18. Compare FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES§ 997 (5th ed. 1861) (stating that all killings "done in prosecution of a felo­
nious intent" are murder), with CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW§ 150 
(15th ed. 1993) (stating that felony murder rule applies only to homicides committed during 
the course of a rape, arson, kidnapping, burglary, larceny, or robbery). 
19. The most important changes have arisen out of cases in which battered women as­
saulted or killed their batterers. In such cases, a number of courts and a few legislatures have 
permitted defendants to use "battered woman's syndrome" evidence to extend the bounds 
of the classical requirements of an imminent threat to which the defendant reasonably re­
sponded - the two primary hurdles self-defense doctrine places on defendants. For a good 
discussion (though now a bit dated), see Developments in the Law - Legal Responses to 
Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1498, 1580-86 (1993) [hereinafter Domestic Vio­
lence] . 
20. Of course, defenses are transubstantive: they apply to all crimes, not simply to the 
ones mentioned in the text. But as a practical matter, most defenses are specific to a small 
set of crimes - indeed, judging from the case law, it is only a slight exaggeration to say that 
criminal defenses are adjuncts to the law of homicide and assault. 
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crimes.21 In 1874, the number had grown to 220.22 By 1899 it was 305;23 
it reached 460 in 1951 .24 The reform of the state's criminal code in 
1961, influenced by the Model Penal Code project then underway, re­
duced this number substantially.25 But the increases soon began again; 
today the number is back up to 421.26 These figures seriously under­
state the growth in the number of separate offenses because they in­
clude only provisions in the criminal code, do not count as separate 
crimes the long list of prohibited drugs, and count laundry-list crimes 
- sections titled "Prohibitions" or "Offenses" - as each defining a 
single offense. Each of these conventions disproportionately reduces 
the current number of crimes; without them, that number would 
probably double. And Illinois's· numbers are fairly representative. In 
the past century and a half, Virginia's criminal code grew from 170 of­
fenses to 495 (the gap is misleadingly small, since the earlier code in­
cluded a large number of slavery-related crimes that have no analogue 
in today's code);27 Massachusetts went from 214. crimes (in 1860 as to­
day, Massachusetts was a more regulated place than most) to 535.28 
The past century and a quarter has seen even greater increases in 
the number of crimes listed in the relevant title of the federal code. In 
the version of the Revised Statutes passed in December 1873, the title 
on federal crimes included 183 separate offenses.29 By 2000, 643 sepa­
rate sections of Title 18 of the United States Code defined crimes;30 
since some of those sections defined a number of offenses,31 the num­
ber of distinct crimes In Title 18 is almost certainly over one thousand. 
And even that larger number is much less than half the total number 
21. A COMPILATION OF THE STATUTES OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 358-415 (N.H. Pur­
ple ed., 1856). I should offer an explanation as to method. Some statutory sections define 
more than one crime; identifying the right number can be a subjective exercise. In order to 
minimize subjectivity, I counted only separate sections of the criminal code, and excluded 
those sections that did not define any criminal offense. This explanation applies to all the 
crime "counts" cited below, save where otherwise noted. 
22. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 (1874). 
23. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 (1899). 
24. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 (1951). 
25. Illinois's criminal code is divided into two parts: the 1961 Criminal Code, as 
amended, and everything else. As of 1996, the 1961 criminal code contained 263 separate 
offenses, only slightly more than half the number in 1951. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 (1996). 
26. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. (2000). 
27. Compare VA. CODE tit. 54. (Ritchie 1849), with VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2 (1996). 
28. Compare M�ss. GEN. STAT. chs. 158-168 (1860), with MASS. GEN. LAWS chs. 264-
274 (1998). 
29. 70 REV. STAT. (2d ed.1878). 
30. 18 u.s.c. §§ 1-2725 (1997). 
31. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922. Section 922, the centerpiece of the law defining federal gun 
crimes, has twenty-five lettered subsections, most of which are themselves divided into sev­
eral sub-subsections. The great majority of these subsections define separate gun crimes. 
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of federal offenses.32 As with the expansion of state criminal codes, 
these federal crimes cover a wide subject-matter spectrum, though ex­
pansion of federal criminal law generally focused on vice in the first 
third of the twentieth century,33 regulatory crimes and racketeering in 
the second third,34 and violence arid drugs (plus yet more white-collar 
offenses) in the last third. 35 
Of course, these numbers do not prove that criminal law is broad. 
Even if one starts with a given set of behavior that is to be criminal­
ized, there is no obviously right number of criminal offenses: the num­
ber depends on the specificity with which crimes are defined and the 
degree to which they overlap. Still, anyone who studies contemporary 
state or federal criminal codes is likely to be struck by their scope, by 
the sheer amount of conduct they render punishable. 
Consider some scattered examples (all of which involve offenses 
for which incarceration is permissible). Florida criminalizes selling un­
tested sparklers, or altering tested ones;36 it also bans the exhibition of 
deformed animals.37 (Interestingly, Florida repealed its ban on the ex­
hibition of deformed people in 1979;38 one wonders at the policy be-
32. On one recent estimate, the total number of offenses exceeds three thousand. Stacy 
& Dayton, supra note 6, at 251 & n.19. 
33. The two obvious examples are the White Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, ch. 395, 36 Stat. 
825 (1910) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-�424 (1997)), and the Volstead Act, 
ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305 (1919) (repealed 1935). 
34. The New Deal produced a raft of new regulatory crimes, some of which are still in 
widespread use (by prosecutors, that is) today. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 
Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1997)); Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1997)). As for rack­
eteering, one of the major stories in federal criminal law during the forty years following the 
repeal of Prohibition was the focus on classical, Mafia-style organized crime. The major stat­
utes that came out of that focus, in chronological order, were the Anti-Racketeering Act of 
1934, ch. 569, 48 Stat. 979, the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952, 
and RICO, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1964. 
35. The past few decades have seen a steady and substantial increase in the scope of 
federal gun crimes; the trend is summarized in SARAH N. WELLING ET AL., FEDERAL 
CRIMINAL LAW AND RELATED ACTIONS § 11 (1998). More recently, Congress has ex­
panded the number and range of violent crimes covered in the federal code. See, e.g., Anti­
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, .Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214; 
Violent Crime Control and Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796; 
Anti Car Theft Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. i02-519, 106 Stat. 3384. 
With respect to drug crime, change has taken the form of heightened sentences (or, what 
is much the same thing, overlapping crimes that can be used to raise sentences). For a discus­
sion of the most famous example - the 1986 legislation that fixed sentences for crack of­
fenses - see Sklansky, supra note 10. Finally, with respect to white-collar crime, the list of 
regulatory offenses continues to grow, but most of the new crimes have only a slight impact 
on actual criminal litigation. The biggest exception to that rule is the intangible rights stat­
ute, which considerably broadened the scope of federal mail and wire fraud. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1346; see also Coffee, Tort/Crime Distinction, supra note 2. 
36. FLA. STAT. ch. 791.013 (2000). 
37. FLA. STAT. ch. 877.16. 
38. See FLA. STAT. ch. 867.01 (repealed 1979). 
516 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 100:505 
hind retaining the one ban but dispensing with the other.) California 
criminalizes knowingly allowing the carcass of a dead animal "to be 
put, or to remain, within 100 feet of any street, alley, public highway, 
or road . . . .  "39 It also criminalizes the sale of alcohol to any "common 
drunkard"40 and cheating at cards.41 Ohio criminalizes homosexual 
propositions42 and "ethnic intimidation. "43 Texas criminalizes over­
working animals,44 causing two dogs to fight,45 and violation of rules 
concerning recruitment of college athletes.46 Massachusetts criminally 
punishes frightening pigeons away from "beds which have been made 
for the purpose of taking them in nets."47 
Most of these examples sound both trivial and exotic, but state 
codes contain many broad crimes of a more ordinary sort. A number 
of states criminalize negligent assault, which amounts to nothing more 
than an ordinary tort.48 Some states go farther, criminalizing negligent 
endangerment,49 which requires neither injury nor the materialization 
of risk, but only risk creation. Possession of burglars' tools, which may 
mean no more than possession of a screwdriver, is routinely criminal­
ized,50 as is possession of various sorts of "drug paraphernalia" (e.g., 
bowls and spoons) other than the banned drugs themselves.51 As these 
39. CAL. PENAL CODE § 374d (2000). 
40. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE§ 25602 (2000). 
41. CAL. PENAL CODE§ 332. 
42. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.07 (2000). The Ohio legislature amended this statute 
in December 2000 but left the homosexual proposition section untouched. See 2000 OHIO 
LAWS 288. 
43. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2927.12. 
44. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.09 (1999). 
45. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.10. 
46. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.441. 
47. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, § 132 (2000). 
48. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-22 (2000); ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.230 (2000); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.14 (2000). 
49. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN.§ 45-5-208 (2000). 
50. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 466 (West 2000) (specifically defining crowbars and 
screwdrivers as burglars' tools). Convictions have been upheld under more generally worded 
statutes based on combinations of these and other common household implements. See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Calderon, 681 N.E.2d 1246 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997) (screwdrivers, pliers, 
and a knife); Dotson v. State, 260 So. 2d 839 (Miss. 1972) (screwdriver and a large bolt); 
People v. Diaz, 244 N.E.2d 878 (N.Y. 1969) (screwdriver wrapped in a newspaper). As these 
cases suggest, burglars' tools statutes seem in practice to boil down to bans on possessing 
screwdrivers, perhaps with an implicit additional term requiring that the possession seem 
suspicious. 
51. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3415 (West 2000); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 893.145-.147 (West 2000); Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 287A (2000); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 
94C, §§ 1, 321 (2000). Many such statutes expressly define "drug paraphernalia" to include 
"[b]Ienders, bowls, containers, spoons, and mixing devices used, intended for use, or de­
signed for use in compounding controlled substances." E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 893.145(8). 
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examples show, criminal law is in many respects broader than tort law 
- the opposite of the usual picture. 
The preceding examples all come from state codes. The natural as­
sumption would be that the federal criminal code is much narrower. 
After all, federal criminal law has limited jurisdiction, and crime con­
trol is primarily the business of state and local govetnments,s2 so there 
is presumably little need for broad criminal liability rules at the federal 
level. The reality is otherwise. Federal criminal law probably covers 
more conduct - and a good deal more innocuous conduct - than any 
state criminal code. A host of federal crimes involve breaches of minor 
regulatory norms - a famous example is the ban on the unauthorized 
use of the image of "Woodsy Owl," one of the most commonly cited 
instances of a trivial federal crime.s3 But the more practically impor­
tant examples come from the federal law of fraud and misrepresenta­
tion. Federal mail and wire fraud cover fraudulent deprivations of "the 
intangible right of honest services."s4 Such "intangible rights" fraud 
requires neither misrepresentation nor reliance and covers a great 
many mere breaches of fiduciary duty.ss And the federal criminal code 
includes 100 separate misrepresentation offenses,s6 some of which 
criminalize not only lying but concealing or misleading as well,s7 and 
many of which do not require that the dishonesty be about a matter of 
any importance.ss Taken together, these misrepresentation crimes 
cover most lies (and, as just noted, almost-but-not-quite-lies) one 
might tell dl,lring the course of any financial transaction or transaction 
involving the government. It is often said that ordinary lying is not a 
crime - a comment usually made by way of explaining the narrow-
52. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (noting that states have 
"historically been sovereign" in criminal law enforcement). 
53. 18 U.S.C. § 711a (1994). The leading competition is tearing the tag off a mattress. 
For a discussion of that offense and its limits, see Stuart P. Green, Why It's a Crime to Tear 
the Tag Off a Mattress: Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 
46 EMORY L. J. 1533, 1610 & n.264 (1997). For a strong defense of that and other, similar 
regulatory crimes, see id. passim. 
54. 18 u.s.c. § 1346. 
55. For a case that nicely captures the breadth of mail fraud liability, see United States v. 
Frost, 125 F.3d 346 (6th Cir. 1997). In Frost, the lead defendant, an engineering professor at 
the University of Tennessee, awarded graduate degrees to students who did sloppy, and 
sometimes plagiarized, work. That was enough fora mail fraud conviction; the idea was that 
Frost breached his duty, owed to the University, to grade students fairly and honestly. 
56. This was Justice Stevens's count, current as of four years ago. United States v. Wells, 
519 U.S. 482, 505 (1997). Presumably the list is longer now. · 
57. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (covering anyone who, "in any matter within the jurisdic­
tion of any department or agency of the United States, knowingly and willfully falsifies, con­
ceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact . . . .  "). 
58. In Justice Stevens's dissent in Wells, he counts 54 (out of "at least 100") federal mis­
representation statutes that have no materiality requirement. Wells, 519 U.S. at 505-06 & nn. 
8-10. 
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ness of the definition of perjury - but the statement is wrong: a good 
deal of ordinary lying fits within the definition of one or another fed­
eral felony. One odd consequence is that criminal law treats dishon­
esty in court proceedings (perjury requires a material false state­
ment59) less harshly than dishonesty in a wide range of other situations 
(many misrepresentation statutes cover immaterial statements and 
statements that are misleading but not false60). 
As the sheer number of federal misrepresentation crimes illus­
trates, criminal codes are deep as well as broad: that which they cover, 
they cover repeatedly. Separate criminal offenses are rarely com­
pletely separate; the more common pattern is a few general offenses 
with a host of more targeted crimes, and the targeted crimes them­
selves overlap. Thus, the federal criminal code has a generic false 
statements statute that bans lies told in the course of any matter that 
falls, directly or indirectly, within the jurisdiction of a federal agency.61 
The code also has a seemingly endless list of statutes banning lies or 
concealment in particular settings.62 Prosecutors can and do charge 
both false statements and one or more of the specific prohibitions.63 
State codes are similar in this respect, though not quite as extreme. Il­
linois has ten kidnapping offenses,64 thirty sex offenses,65 and a stag­
gering forty-eight separate assault crimes.66 Virginia has twelve distinct 
forms of arson and attempted arson,67 sixteen forms of larceny and re­
ce1vmg stolen goods,68 and seventeen trespass crimes.69 In 
Massachusetts, the section of the code labeled "Crimes Against Prop­
erty" contains 169 separate offenses.70 
59. On the materiality requirement, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1994). On the require­
ment of a false statement - a false implication is not enough - see Bronston v. United 
States, 409 U.S. 352 (1973). 
60. See supra notes 57-58. 
61. 18 u.s.c. § 1001. 
62. According to Jeffrey Standen, there are 325 separate prohibitions of fraud, misrep­
resentation, or both in the federal code. Jeffrey Standen, An Economic Perspective on Fed­
eral Criminal Law Reform, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 249, 289 (1998). For a recent criticism of 
this congressional tendency toward both repetition and excessive specificity, see Ellen S. 
Podgor, Do We Need a "Beanie Baby" Fraud Statute?, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 1031 (2000). 
63. See, e.g. United States v. Woodward, 469 U.S. 105 (1985) (per curiam). 
64. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10 (2000). 
65. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11 (2000). 
66. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12 (2000). Compare the Model Penal Code, which contains 
four separate assault crimes. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211 (1999). For an intermediate exam­
ple, see Erik Luna's discussion of assault crimes in the New York Penal Law. Luna, Princi­
pled Enforcement, supra note 4, at 527 & nn. 46-51. 
67. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-77 to -88 (Michie 2000). 
68. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN.§§ 18.2-95, -96, -98, -108, -108.l, -109, -111, -111.1, -152.3. 
69. VA. CODE ANN.§§ 18.2-119 to -136.1. 
70. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266 (2000). 
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Few of these separate offenses are lesser-included versions of each 
other. Criminal codes do, of course, contain a healthy number of 
greater and lesser-included offenses, like murder and manslaughter or 
aggravated assault and simple assault. But the examples cited in the 
preceding paragraph are mostly crimes that overlap without either 
being a subset of the other. To put this pattern in geometric terms, 
criminal codes consist of a great many more sets of overlapping circles 
than concentric circles. Which is to say that defendants who commit 
what is, in ordinary terminology, a single crime can be treated as 
though they committed many different crimes - and that state of af­
fairs is not the exception, but the rule.71 
B.  The Consequences of Breadth and Depth 
These features of criminal codes have at least three important con­
sequences. First, they shift lawmaking from courts to law enforcers. 
Because criminal law is broad, prosecutors cannot possibly enforce the 
law as written: there are too many violators. Broad criminal law thus 
means that the law as enforced will differ from the law on the books. 
And the former will be defined by law enforcers, by prosecutors' deci­
sions to prosecute and police decisions to arrest. 
Second, they give prosecutors the power to adjudicate. Suppose a 
given criminal statute contains elements ABC; suppose further that C 
is hard to prove, but prosecutors believe they know when it exists. 
Legislatures can make it easier to convict offenders by adding new 
crime AB, leaving it to prosecutors to decide when C is present and 
when it is not. Or, legislatures can create new crime DEF, where those 
elements correlate with ABC but are substantially easier to prove. 
Prosecutors can continue to enforce the original crime, but more 
cheaply, by enforcing the substitutes. When they do this, prosecutors 
are engaging in informal adjudication: they are not so much redefining 
criminal law (the real crime remains ABC) as deciding whether its re­
quirements are met, case by case.72 
This second effect - this transfer of adjudication from courts to 
prosecutors - also flows from criminal law's depth, from its tendency 
to cover the same conduct many times over. Suppose a given criminal 
episode can be charged as assault, robbery, kidnapping, auto theft, or 
any combination of the four. By threatening all four charges, prosecu­
tors can, even in discretionary sentencing systems, significantly raise 
71. The reference is to the familiar double jeopardy rule that a defendant may be con­
victed of two overlapping crimes for a given criminal incident, but may not be convicted of 
greater- and lesser-included offenses for the same incident. See United States v. Dixon, 509 
U.S. 688 (1993). 
72. For elaboration of this argument, see William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the 
Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGALlSSUES 1 (1996). 
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the defendant's maximum sentence, and often raise the minimum sen­
tence as well. The higher threatened sentence can then be used as a 
bargaining chip, an inducement to plead guilty. The odds of conviction 
are therefore higher if the four charges can be brought together than if 
prosecutors must cho'ose a single 'charge and stick with it - even 
though the odds that the defendant did any or all of the four crimes 
may be the same. This gain (from the government's point of view) ex­
ists whenever overlapping criminal prohibitions cover a single chain of 
events. 
For both these reasons, adding new crimes lowers the cost of con­
victing criminal defendants. Substituting an easy-to-prove crime for 
one that is harder to establish obviously makes criminal litigation 
cheaper for the government. And the cost saving is large, since guilty 
pleas are much cheaper than trials, and defendants often respond to 
easily proved charges by pleading guilty. Charge-stacking, the process 
of charging defendants with several crimes for a single criminal epi­
sode, likewise induces guilty pleas, not by raising the odds of convic­
tion at trial but by raising the threatened sentence. Again, the effect is 
to make convictions cheaper. 
Transferring lawmaking and adjudication to prosecutors leads to 
the third consequence, which may be the most important of all. The 
past few years have seen a growing interest in the expressive potential 
of criminal law __:_ the use of the· criminal justice system not primarily 
to make and carry out threats, but to send signals.73 On one increas­
ingly widely held view, this signal-sending is the most important thing 
criminal law does. It communicates with the regulated population (and 
particularly with those portions of the population who are most in-
73. This scholarly trend grows out of the larger trend of exploring expressive theories of 
law more generally. For a sampling of the leading efforts, see ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND 
SOCIAL NORMS (2000); Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of 
Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000); Lawrence Lessig, The Regula­
tion of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995); Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal 
Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339 (2000); Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are 
Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL 
STUDIES 725 (1998); and Cass R. Sunstein, On' the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. 
REV. 2021 (1996). 
The leading figure in the turn toward expressivism in criminal law theory is Dan Kahan. 
See Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413 (1999) 
[hereinafter Kahan, Secret Ambition]; Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and 
Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349 (1997); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions 
Mean?, 63 U .. CHI. L. REV. 59i (1996). For an interesting discussion of what that turn means 
for criminal law scholarship, see Bernard E. Harcourt, After the "Social Meaning Turn": Im­
plications for Research Design and Methods of Proof in Contemporary Criminal Law Policy 
Analysis, 34 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 179 (2000). For a classic discussion of expressivism and its 
significance for criminal law and punishment, see JOEL FEINBERG, The Expressive Function 
of Punishment, in DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 95 
(1970). . 
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clined to do things the rest of us find bad or dangerous), and thereby 
seeks to reinforce good conduct norms and attack bad ones.74 
If that is criminal law's primary job, its breadth and depth ensure 
that the job will be done badly. As any parent knows, sending mes­
sages requires consistency. The signal must be the same today as it was 
yesterday, and the same coming from one parent as from the other. 
Broad criminal codes ensure inconsistency. Broad codes cannot be en­
forced as written; thus, the definition of the law-on-the-street neces­
sarily differs, and may differ a lot, from the law-on-the-books. Expres­
sive theories of criminal law have not yet taken good account of this 
problem, and the problem is severe, maybe devastating. What, after 
all, does expressive criminal law express? Is the message the law that 
the legislature passes? Or is it the sum of the arrest and prosecution 
decisions of individual police officers and prosecutors? 
In practice, the second message will often undermine the first. On 
the one hand, the criminal provisions of the Violence Against Women 
Act75 might send a message to would-be batterers that our society 
takes domestic violence very seriously, much more so than it used to. 
On the other hand, the tiny number of prosecutions under the Act 
(only a handful per year nationwide )76 might send precisely the oppo­
site message: that domestic violence is a subject for political posturing, 
the sort of thing politicians decry but prosecutors do not punish. At 
the least, the absence of prosecution must indicate that the federal 
government is not really interested in the subject, which would seem 
to take away much of the expressive benefit of having the Act in the 
first place. 
· 
This is bound to be a recurring problem when it comes to carrying 
out criminal law's expressive function. Legislators speak, but police 
and prosecutors control the volume. Or perhaps a better way to put it 
is this: once legislators speak, once a crime is formally defined, police 
and prosecutors face the following choice - reinforce the message by 
enforcing the new law, negate the message by leaving the law unen-
74. For a good example of this view of criminal law and its implications for some major 
substantive debates, see Kahan, Secret Ambition, supra note 73. 
75. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.); see also Victims of Trafficking and Violence 
Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-386, §§ 1001-1603, 114 Stat. 1464 (incorporating the 
Violence Against Women Act of 2000 ("VA WA'')). The Supreme Court invalidated the 
civil provisions of VA WA in United States v. Morrison, 120 S.Ct. 1740 (2000), but did not 
address the Act's criminal provisions. See id. at 1743-44. All of the Circuits that have ad­
dressed the issue have found the criminal provisions constitutional. See, e.g., United States v. 
Lankford, 196 F.3d 563, 572 (5th Cir. 1999); United States v. Page, 167 F.3d 325, 334 (6th Cir. 
1999); United States v. Bailey, 112 F.3d 758, 766 (4th Cir. 1997); United States v. Wright, 128 
F.3d 1274, 1276 (8th Cir. 1997). 
76. In fiscal year 1997 only five defendants were sentenced under VA WA's provisions. 
TASK FORCE ON FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 
REPORT ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 21 (1998). 
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forced, or revise the message by enforcing it only in certain kinds of 
cases or against certain kinds of defendants; The first option is usually 
impossible: How can a new criminal statute be enforced across the 
board when so many existing statutes go unenforced? Which means 
that, with rare exceptions, the · legislative message cannot make it 
through the enforcement filter unscathed. 
And there is another problem for criminal law's expressive func­
tion. Good expression is worthless if no one can hear it. Or to use the 
visual metaphor, a signal that cannot be seen is a very poor signal. 
Law-on-the-street, the sum of millions of arrest and prosecution deci­
sions by thousands of police officers and prosecutors, seems designed 
to minimize visibility. Those of us who try to find out how different 
sorts of crimes are enforced are familiar with this phenomenon: no 
one knows how any given criminal statute is enforced in any given 
state. Even in a single locality, only a few cops and a handful of prose­
cutors may know. (Or may not: any given police officer may know 
only what happens in her precinct.) The recent report on stops and 
frisks by New York City police77 has already received a lot of attention 
in the literature, precisely because it is an almost unheard-of example 
of data about what crimes police are enforcing and how serious the en­
forcement is. Comparable information about local prosecutors -
which statutes lead to prosecutions, in what sorts of cases, with what 
results - does not exist anywhere.78 The absence of the kind of 
record-keeping and reporting requirements that would change this 
state of affairs makes sending signals through decisions to arrest and 
prosecute very costly indeed.79 And the decentralization of prosecu­
tion and police, both of which are controlled locally, not at the state 
level, ensures that such signals will be surrounded by what statisticians 
call "noise": variations from place to place that make it costly or im­
possible to hear what the legal system is trying to say. 
77. CIVIL RIGHTS BUREAU, OFFICE OF THE ATIORNEY GEN. OF THE STATE OF N.Y., 
THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT'S "STOP & FRISK" PRACTICES: A REPORT TO 
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (1999). 
78. Blanket statements of negative propositions are dangerous. Perhaps I should say, 
comparable information does not exist anywhere that I have been able to find. Federal 
prosecution is different, at least to some degree, because of the detail of the annual publica­
tion by the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts. Even so, there is no source (again, no 
source of which I am aware) that tracks federal prosecutions by statute rather than by cate­
gory, much less a source that allows one to determine what fact patterns do and do not lead 
to prosecution. 
79. The point is not so much that the reports themselves would serve as a signal to 
would-be criminals, though some of that might happen: one can easily imagine news cover­
age of major changes in the pattern of enforcing, say, gun or drug laws. Rather, the point is 
that such reports would likely lead to convergence, and convergence would strengthen the 
signal. As law enforcers discover the enforcement patters in neighboring jurisdictions, their 
own enforcement patterns are likely to conform more closely to their neighbors' patterns. 
That convergence in turn makes it easier for would-be criminals to "hear" the message being 
sent by the enforcement patterns, because it eliminates much of the background noise. 
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In short, some combination of two things is true about a world 
where criminal law-as-written differs substantially from criminal 
law-as-enforced. First, the law's messages are likely to be very differ­
ent from the messages one would infer from a look at the statute 
books.80 That alone ought to alarm expressivists, but the second possi­
bility is worse: the law's messages are likely to be buried, swamped by 
local variation and hard-to-discern arrest patterns, by low-visibility 
guilty pleas and even lower-visibility decisions to decline prosecution. 
If expressive criminal law is an ideal, the ideal is at odds with the sys­
tem of law and law enforcement we now have. 
II. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CRIME DEFINITION 
A. Surface Politics and Deep Politics 
Formal, written-down criminal law is shaped by a variety of forces. 
Ideological conviction matters: Prohibition arose out of a moral cru­
sade, not out of self-interested lobbying by groups with a large finan­
cial stake in the outcome.81 (Those groups opposed criminalizing alco­
hol.82) Public opinion obviously matters, too: the public cared more 
about crime in the 1990s than it did in the 1950s,83 which is partly why 
criminal codes seemed to expand more rapidly in the later decade than 
in the earlier one. Changes in the incidence of crime matter, if only 
80. Not only different, but perhaps contradictory. For an argument that large chunks of 
criminal law - vice crimes, much of white-collar crime, and morals offenses - may actually 
send messages that undermine the law's own norms, see William J. Stuntz, Self-Defeating 
Crimes, 86 VA. L. REV. 1871 (2000). 
81. The best discussion of the movement that led to Prohibition appears in RICHARD F. 
HAMM, SHAPING THE EIGHTEENTH AMENDMENT: TEMPERANCE REFORM, LEGAL 
CULTURE, AND THE POLITY, 1880-1920 (1995). 
82. The most obvious interest group with a large financial stake in retaining legal alco­
hol sales was the alcoholic beverage industry. But, as Donald Boudreaux and Adam 
Pritchard point out, there was another, equally important financial interest hostile to Prohi­
bition: Congress stood to lose a great deal of federal revenue if Prohibition passed. Donald J. 
Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Rewriting the Constitution: An Economic Analysis of the Con­
stitutional Amendment Process, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 111,  148-49 (1993). That interest 
shrank in importance after World War I, when the enormous revenue potential of the in­
come tax had become clear. Id. Fourteen years later, when the Depression had caused a 
steep drop in income tax revenues, Prohibition must have seemed much more costly to 
Congress; Boudreaux and Pritchard argue that this Depression-prompted revenue loss 
helped produce Prohibition's repeal. Id. at 149-50. 
83. In October 1951, only one percent of respondents thought crime was the most im­
portant issue facing the United States. In April 1954, the number was two percent. By con­
trast, in January 1994, forty-nine percent of respondents ranked crime the most important 
noneconomic problem facing the United States. (Economic issues were treated separately in 
the latter poll; for what it's worth, the most important issue in both the 1951 and 1954 polls 
were noneconomic - specifically, the Cold War.) The percentage had declined to twenty­
three percent by January 1997 - still a good deal higher than the level of concern expressed 
in 1951 or 1954. Search of Gallup Poll Public Opinion Database, Scholarly Resources, 
Wilmington, DE (Mar. 31, 2001). 
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because crime rates may tend to drive public opinion. Crime was a 
low-level political issue in the 1950s in part because crime rates ·were 
low; crime rates skyrocketed in the 1960s84 and crime became a major 
feature of state and even national political campaigns.85 On most is­
sues, one or another of these forces plays a large role in shaping crimi­
nal law's development. 
Thus, one needs no theory to explain why criminal codes are ex­
panding - we have an abundance of explanations already. But these 
explanations are weaker than they appear at first blush. Consider the 
federal mail and wire fraud statutes. Those statutes criminalize, basi­
cally, all serious breaches of fiduciary duty.86 Given the inevitable dis­
agreement about what is and isn't serious, that means federal fraud 
statutes criminalize an enormous amount of wrongful but not para­
digmaticaliy criminal behavior. Professors who award degrees based 
on plagiarized work, and the students who do the work, are guilty.87 
College applicants who lie on their applications are guilty.88 Political 
powerbrokers who use their influence to get government jobs for 
friends are guilty, even if the powerbrokers are not themselves gov­
ernment employees.89 These are cases of marginal middle-class dis­
honesty; they are hardly the sorts of cases that generate public outrage 
or provide fodder for ideological crusades. And in ordinary political 
terms, one would think borderline dishonesty by middle-class offend­
ers would be the last · thing any popularly elected legislature would 
84. To say that crime rates were low or high assumes a baseline, of course, and no obvi­
ous baseline exists. Still, it seems clear enough that crime was vastly higher after the 1960s 
than before. In 1960, the FBI reported 2,019,600 index crimes; by 1972 the number was 
5,891,924. FBI, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 1972: UNIFORM 
CRIME REPORTS 61 tbl.1 (1973). 
85. A good measure of the changing role crime played in American politics in the 1960s 
is the treatment of crime in Theodore H. White's series of books about presidential elections 
in that decade. In White's book about the 1960 election, "crime" does not even appear in the 
index; nothing in the book suggests that it played any role at all in that campaign. See 
THEODORE H. WHITE, THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT: 1960 (1961). In the 1968 book, 
there is an entire chapter on Richard Nixon's and George Wallace's successful use of the 
crime issue, which was central to that election. See THEODORE H. WHITE, THE MAKING OF 
THE PRESIDENT: 1968, at 188-223 (1969). 
86. The best discussions, though now a little dated, appear in a pair of articles by John 
Coffee. See Coffee, Tort/Crime Distinction, supra note 2; John C. Coffee, Jr., From Tort to 
Crime: Reflections on the Criminalization of Fiduciary Duties and the Problematic Line Be­
tween Law and Ethics, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 117 (1981). 
87. United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346 (6th Cir. 1997). 
88. This statement extrapolates from the rule that employees are criminally liable for 
lying on their job applications. See United States v. Granberry, 908 F.2d 278 (8th Cir. 1990). 
89. See United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1982). For an insightful (and 
critical) discussion of this case, see John C. Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Con­
struction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 234-42 (1985). 
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want to criminalize. Yet Congress did criminalize it, and did so with­
out any apparent opposition.90 
More broadly, consider where criminal law expanded most 
through the 1970s and 1980s. During this time, federal criminal law 
expanded much faster than its state counterparts. The areas of biggest 
expansion involved white-collar crime and organized crime: ·the en­
actment of RIC0,91 designed to target the Mafia, and the expansion of 
federal fraud doctrine,92 designed to target political corruption, were 
the leading examples. In ordinary political terms this seems strange. 
The 1960s saw a huge increase in both street crime and drug crime, 
and that increase prompted a strong public demand for some kind of 
action by political leaders. But street crime and drugs are dealt with 
largely by local police and prosecutors under state law; if criminal li­
ability rules were to change, the changes should have been in state 
codes, not the federal code. And the changes should have involved 
robbery and heroin trafficking, not mail fraud and the Mafia. "Law 
and order" politics ought to have produced a different mix of changes 
in criminal codes than the ones we actually saw. · 
And "law and order" politics cannot easily explain the consistent 
expansion of criminal codes over time. The contemporary politics of 
crime dates to the mid-1960s. Before that, crime's role in electoral 
politics fluctuated. But ·expansion of criminal lia}?ility, state and fed­
eral, is a constant, going back for a c.en�ury and a half.93 
Finally, it is not clear why "law and order" politics should produce 
concern with the content of criminal law in the first place. Public con­
cern about crime and public demand that something be done about it 
are natural. There are two natural legislative responses: harsher pun­
ishment and larger law enforcement budgets. One can readily imagine 
why legislatures are slow to seize on the second of these options - it 
costs money. (The deeper reason has to do with institutional structure. 
90. As one Fifth Circuit panel noted, the legislative history of the intangible rights stat­
ute is spare, because the bill was added to omnibus drug legislation on the same day the lat­
ter legislation was passed. See United States v. Brumley, 79 F.3d 1430, 1434 (5th Cir. 1996). 
The speed with which Congress acted - the. legislation was passed only a year after McNally 
v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987), the decision it overruled - suggests an absence of 
strong opposition. 
91. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2000). For much the best discussion of RICO's origin and 
early development, see Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, 87 COLUM. 
L. REV. 661, 664-713 (1987). 
92. The key statutory development was the passage of is U.S.C. § 1346 (2000). 
93. There are only two major exceptions. Repealing Prohibition is one, and that is an 
instance of electoral politics forcing a reduction in the scope of criminal law. The Model Pe­
nal Code (or, rather, the widespread adoption of large portions of the Code's general provi­
sions) is the other. There, the reduction in liability came through a process that was, rela­
tively speaking, apolitical and technocratic. Neither exception supports the proposition that 
expanding criminal codes are primarily a consequepce of contemporary public concern with 
street crime. 
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Police and prosecutors work for local governments, and consequently 
are mostly paid for by local governments. State legislators are more 
likely to expand state law enforcement bureaucracies, over which they 
have some control and for which they can more easily take credit, than 
they are to expand local police departments and district attorneys' of­
fices.94) Which leaves harsher punishment, always a politically popular 
stance in times of great public concern about crime. Notice that legis­
lators can take this approach without having to pay for it, by raising 
nominal sentences but not building the prisons needed to house more 
inmates - roughly the tack many state legislatures took in the 1970s 
and early 1980s.95 
Expanding criminal liability is not a natural response. Again, pub­
lic concern about crime has largely focused on street crime - theft 
plus street violence - and drugs. Save for a few items that needed to 
be added to the controlled substances list, all the relevant behavior 
was already criminalized by the late 1960s; indeed, most of it had been 
criminalized for centuries. There was (and is) no obvious need for 
more murder statutes, or auto theft prohibitions, or laws criminalizing 
the sale of heroin. And criminalizing other conduct seems an odd way 
to reduce the amount of conduct that is already criminal. 
To see the point, imagine that criminal law had been largely stable 
for the past thirty years, save for the occasional addition of some new 
drugs to the prohibited list. Imagine further that other developments 
- the rise in street crime and drugs between 1960 and 1990, the rise in 
sentencing levels of the 1980s and 1990s - had still taken place. No 
one would find this combination surprising. Times of rising crime of 
course tend to generate increased political activity in the sphere of 
crime control. But that political activity ought to focus on the front 
and back ends of the criminal justice system - on policing and pun­
ishment - because those are the places that leave the most room for 
innovation, and those are the places where discretion plays the largest 
role. Even in a world where crime is a major political issue, criminal 
law shouldn't be, or so one might think. 
94. There is some evidence for this proposition. Between 1971 and 1990 - a period of 
great expansion in the criminal justice system, as dockets and prison populations grew 
sharply -state expenditures on criminal justice rose 848 % in nominal dollars, 193 % in infla­
tion-adjusted dollars. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS - 1993, at 3 tb. 1.3 (Kathleen Maguire & 
Ann L. Pastore eds., 1994); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STA TES 1996, at 483 (1996) (showing that inflation 
during the relevant period was 223%). During the same period, local expenditures rose 
497% in nominal dollars, and only 85% in constant dollars BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
supra, at 3 tbl.1.3; BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra, at 483. 
95. The strength of this pattern is reflected in what was, until recently, the standard line 
about tougher sentencing statutes: no matter what legislatures did with sentencing law, ac­
tual sentences remained fairly constant. For a good example, see MICHAEL TONRY, 
SENTENCING MATTERS 147-48 (1996). 
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None of this is to say that criminal law. is somehow apolitical by na­
ture; that could hardly be farther from the truth.96 Nor is it to say that 
there is something surprising in the periodic left-right battles that 
break out over issues like rape reform97 or the insanity defense,98 or in 
the public interest in substantive issues raised by high-profile prosecu­
tions like Jack Kevorkian's99 or Louise Woodward's.100 Criminal law 
involves choices about what conduct is bad or harmful enough to de­
serve punishment. Voters will often feel strongly about those choices, 
and politicians will naturally tend to respond to those feelings. Too, 
politicians and voters alike - not to mention prosecutors and judges 
- will have their own ideological convictions, both about particular 
crimes and about the enterprise of defining crime more generally, and 
those convictions surely affect how criminal statutes are drafted, in­
terpreted, and enforced. 
Still, two things are true about both public opinion and ideological 
commitments. First, they are likely to push in different directions on 
different issues at different times and places. U ordinary politics drives 
criminal law, it will drive it toward more liability here and less there, 
more liability now but less then. One sees some of that variability in 
the history of American criminal law, but not much. The more accu­
rate generalization is that criminal law expands in different areas at 
96. This is an important point in favor of those who defend legislative supremacy over 
criminal law: If criminal law is inescapably political, both in the sense that it rests on contest­
able value judgments and in the sense that it embodies tradeoffs between different values, it 
seems natural to assign responsibility for it to the most politically accountable actors. For the 
best argument along these lines see Louis D. Bilionis, Process, the Constitution, a:id Sub­
stantive Criminal Law, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1269 (1998). · 
My response to that argument is not to deny its premise. Rather, I seek to show that 
legislators' political incentives are to criminalize too much - with "too much" defined by 
the preferences of the very constituents whose wishes legislators are supposed to represent. 
Once one understands those incentives, one may conclude that courts are more likely than 
legislatures to capture social value judgments accurately. · 
97. "Rape reform" generally means broader definitions of criminal sexual assault. For 
the most developed argument in favor of rape reform, see SCHULHOFER, supra note 3. For 
an interesting argument in favor of something closer to the status quo, see Donald A.· 
Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference Between the Presence of Force and the Ab­
sence of Consent, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1780 (1992). 
98. For a good argument for a broader insanity defense, see Peter Arenella, Convicting 
the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the Relationship Between Legal and Moral Accountabil­
ity, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1 511 (1992). For the classic argument against a broad version of the 
defense, see Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Behavior, Law, and Science: An Analysis of Mental 
Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527 (1978). 
99. Kevorkian, who acknowledged assisting dozens of patients to commit suicide, was 
convicted of second-degree murder after· a series of failed prosecutions. For a good account 
of the saga, see Neil M. Gorsuch, The Right to Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia, 23 HARV. J. 
L. & PuB. POL'Y 599 (2000). 
1 00. Woodward, an English teenager serving an American couple as an au pair, was 
charged with murdering an infant left in her care. For a good account of the case and the 
ideological issues it raised, see Diane Purkiss, The Children of Medea: Euripides, Louise 
Woodward, and Deborah Eappen, 11 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LITERATURE 53 (1999). 
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different times and places, but it always expands. Second, public 
opinion and ideological commitments ought to operate at the margins 
of the criminal justice system, not at its core. Of the universe of crimes 
for which people are in prison today, the large majority involve be­
havior that was criminal in Blackstone's day. The most natural expec­
tation is that political attention would focus on areas where the rele­
vant behavior changes more rapidly - policing, or perhaps sentencing 
- leaving crime definition fairly stable. 
All of which suggests that, beneath the currents of ordinary poli­
tics, other, deeper forces are at work. Criminal law is not just the 
product of politics; it is the product of a political system, a set of insti­
tutional arrangements by which power over the law and its application 
is dispersed among a set of actors with varying degrees of political ac­
countability. 101 Those institutional arrangements give those actors cer­
tain baseline incentives. One need not believe all politicians are at all 
times seeking to please the median voter, or get campaign contribu­
tions, or add to their power, to believe that those incentives are likely 
to have some effect on behavior. 
At least that is so if the incentives of the system's key players -
legislators, prosecutors, and appellate judges - push in a particular 
direction. They do. Legislators gain when they write criminal statutes 
in ways that benefit prosecutors. Prosecutors gain from statutes that 
enable them more easily to induce guilty pleas. Appellate courts lack 
the doctrinal tools to combat those tendencies. 
To see why, one must examine the relationships among criminal 
law's three lawmakers. The most important is the relationship be­
tween prosecutors and legislatures: discretionary enforcement frees 
legislators .from having to worry about criminalizing too much, since 
not everything that is criminalized will be prosecuted; likewise, legisla­
tive power liberates prosecutors, widening their range of charging op­
portunities. Next is the relationship between legislatures and courts: 
the accumulation of criminal statutes constrains courts, both by taking 
away lawmaking opportunities and by blunting the effect of judicial 
tools like vagueness doctrine and the rule of lenity. Last comes the 
relationship between prosecutors and courts: prosecutors keep courts 
at bay by using the charging opportunities legislators give them to 
generate guilty pleas. Guilty pleas, of course, avoid adjudication alto­
gether; they leave courts very little role to play. Notice the nature of 
these relationships: prosecutorial and legislative power reinforce each 
other, and together both these powers push courts to the periphery. 
If this account is correct, criminal law will always be broader than 
ordinary majoritarian politics would suggest, and the tendency will al­
ways - or at least until something in the lawmaking process changes 
101. For a rare and insightful discussion of this point, see Bilionis, supra note 96, at 
1299-309 (characterizing criminal law as "a process," not a set of substantive principles). 
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- be toward more breadth. It seems a useful exercise, then, to see 
whether the account is correct - to look at the baseline incentives the 
current institutional arrangements create and see whether, at least in 
rough outline, the behavior of the relevant actors seems to correspond 
with those incentives. 
B .  Lawmakers' Incentives 
It is best to begin with a simple account of what the system's three 
major players seek to do. This account is no more than a baseline, and 
a rough one at that. Ideological differences, public-interested goals, 
the reigning institutional culture - all these things powerfully affect, 
sometimes dominate, the behavior of legislators, prosecutors, and 
judges. Still, the baseline matters; political and institutional incentives 
have real world effects. All of us tend to pursue selfish goals along 
with more high-minded ones, and all of us tend to respond to price 
changes: we do more of something when it becomes cheaper and less 
when it becomes more expensive. And when trying to understand a 
system inhabited by people whose ideologies and cultural back­
grounds differ, it is helpful to understand the incentives those people 
share. 
1. Legislators 
Legislators presumably want to stay in office, and perhaps to posi­
tion themselves for higher office. To do those things, legislators must 
please their constituents. The presence and distribution of concen­
trated interest groups changes this incentive somewhat, but for most of 
criminal law, the effect of private interest groups is small: the most 
important interest groups are usually other government actors, chiefly 
police and prosecutors.102 Consequently, for most of criminal law, no 
private intermediaries are well positioned to monitor the law's content 
and mobilize interested voters on one or another side of contested is­
sues . .  Here more than most places, politicians (legislators, elected 
prosecutors, or both) deal with voters directly. And crime is one of 
those matters about which most voters care a great deal. Today it is 
regularly a major issue in elections at all levels of government, and it 
has been an issue in local elections for more than a century.103 If there 
102. The role of interest groups in criminal lawmaking has not been the subject of much 
study. What literature there is focuses on federal criminal law - and, especially, on federal 
criminal law enforcement - and on the power of law enforcement agencies. See, e.g., Dan M. 
Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 469 (1996); 
Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement Dis­
cretion, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 757 (1999). 
103. The literature on the contemporary politics of crime, see infra note 105, suggests 
that politicians took an interest in crime only in the 1960s. See, e.g., STUART A. 
SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF LAW AND ORDER: STREET CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY 37-
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is any sphere in which politicians would have an incentive simply to 
please the majority of voters, it's criminal law. 
For legislators, pleasing voters might mean producing rules the 
voters want. But this requires that the rules be simple and understand­
able, the sort of thing politicians can use in campaign speeches and ad­
vertisements. Sentencing offers some examples. Mandatory minimum 
sentences for drug or gun crimes and "three strikes" laws are simple 
rules that voters can comprehend and politicians can use in stump 
speeches. Criminal law, however, contains few such rules. Variations 
in actus reus elements or mens rea standards are sufficiently compli­
cated that they make poor applause lines in political speeches. Which 
explains why legislative candidates frequently refer to sentencing pol­
icy in their campaigns - a broader death penalty, more prison time 
for drug dealers - but rarely take such public positions on issues of 
crime definition.104 · 
When defining crimes and defenses, appealing to the median voter 
is more likely to mean some combination of two things: generating 
outcomes (not rules) the median voter wants, and taking symbolic 
stands the median voter finds attractive. Take these two legislative 
goals one at a time. 
Voters may know little about criminal law doctrine, but they pre­
sumably have some idea of the set of results they would like to see: 
conviction and punishment of people who commit the kinds of of­
fenses that voters fear. Legislators, one can fairly hypothesize, have an 
interest in producing those results (or at least taking credit for them), 
so that voters will continue to support them.105 At first blush, changing 
the contours of substantive criminal law would seem irrelevant to this 
57 (1984). But crime was central to urban politics as early as Reconstruction. For a good ex­
ample, see Joel Best, Keeping the Peace in St. Paul: Crime, Vice, and Police Work, 1869-1874, 
in 5 CRIME AND JUSTICE IN AMERICAN HISTORY: POLICING AND CRIME CONTROL, pt. 1, at 
60 (Eric H. Monkkonen ed., 1992). For a more general discussion, see ERIC H. 
MONKKONEN, POLICE IN URBAN AMERICA, 1860-1920 (1981). As the titles of the preceding 
two works suggest, the politics of crime historically had more to do with policing than with 
criminal legislation. 
104. The most obvious recent exception to this pattern - hate crime laws - is really 
not an exception after all. Hate crime statutes cover conduct that is already criminalized; 
their only practical consequence is to enhance sentences for covered crimes, much the same 
as mandatory minima and three strikes laws. 
105. The literature on the politics of criminal legislation is, to put it mildly, underdevel­
oped. For the leading pieces, see LORD WINDLESHAM, POLITICS, PUNISHMENT, AND 
POPULISM (1998); Beale, supra note 8. Because both of the works just cited deal with federal 
criminal legislation, their accounts of legislative incentives do not apply to legislatures gen­
erally, and I do not rely heavily on them in this discussion. 
The proposition in the text, though, emerges clearly enough from the large literature on 
the politics of crime more generally. That literature tends to be both descriptive and some­
what journalistic; it also focuses primarily on policing and sentencing initiatives, and pays 
less attention to crime definition. For the best of these accounts, see KATHERINE BECKETT, 
MAKING CRIME PAY (1997); WILLIAM J. CHAMBLISS, POWER, POLITICS AND CRIME (1999); 
SCHEINGOLD, supra note 103. 
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goal. Those crimes voters care most about have long been covered by 
criminal codes; adding new crimes thus has nothing to do with con­
victing rapists, burglars, or drug dealers - or so one would think. 
The truth is more complicated. Legislatures can raise the odds of 
conviction - and lower the cost of getting one - by changing crimi­
nal liability rules, even for conduct long since criminalized. Recall the 
algebraic example from the last section: a given crime is defined by 
elements ABC; A and B are easy to prove, but C is much harder. 
Criminalizing AB, with the understanding that prosecutors will deter­
mine for themselves whether C is satisfied, raises the odds of convic­
tion and reduces enforcement costs. The same result holds if the leg­
islature creates new crime DEF, where those elements tend to follow 
ABC but are easier to establish in court. Or if the legislature creates 
new crimes ABD, ABE, and ABF, again assuming elements D ,  E, and 
F correlate with ABC. The last strategy works even if D, E, and F are 
themselves hard to prove. In that event, prosecutors can charge all 
four offenses (double jeopardy doctrine permits charging of overlap­
ping crimes106), thereby raising the potential sentence if the defendant 
is convicted. Raising the threatened sentence raises the cost of going 
to trial just as effectively as raising the likelihood of conviction. 
Whenever the state increases either or both of those factors, it in­
creases the threat value of trial, which in tum increases the incentive 
for the defendant to plead guilty. And guilty pleas raise the likelihood 
of conviction to one hundred percent. 
Now consider the second legislative goal: taking popular symbolic 
stands. Sometimes a new crime problem emerges, but legislatures can 
do little about it. In 1992, a Maryland woman and her one-year-old 
daughter had their car hijacked; the mother was killed in the course of 
the theft.107 The story made national headlines and created the (mis­
taken) impression that these "carjacking" cases were common.108 The 
public demanded that politicians solve this new problem, notwith­
standing that existing criminal laws - auto theft, robbery, assault, 
kidnapping, and homicide - already covered the relevant behavior. 
Given any combination of those crimes, offenders could be both con-
106. As long as each offense requires proof of a fact the other does not, the government 
may charge, and punish, both offenses. E.g., United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993). 
This is so even if the evidence used to prove the two offenses is identical. 
107. E.g. , Don Terry, Carjacking: New Name for Old Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1992, 
at A18. 
108. It is at least as plausible to suppose that carjacking became more common as a re­
sult of the publicity surrounding the Maryland case. See id. (discussing "wave" of carjacking 
cases occurring since Pamela Basu's murder). Either such cases were a regular occurrence 
but had attracted no notice, or "thrill-seeking youths," prompted by the Basu story, were 
engaging in copycat crimes. See Charles D. Bonner, Comment, The Federalization of Crime: 
Too Much of a Good Thing?, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 905, 915 (1998). The latter seems as likely 
as the former. 
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victed and given very severe sentences. In. such cases, legislat�res tend 
to create new crimes not to solve the problem, but to give voters the 
sense that they are doing something about it. This happened with car­
jacking at both the state and federal levels;109 the result was a series of 
new criminal statutes that are almost never invoked, but that served as 
means of making politically valuable symbolic statements to voters.1 10 
Two significant patterns emerge from these sorts of symbolic 
crimes. First, they tend to arise more often as crime becomes more of 
a public concern. Such offenses have mushroomed in the past few dec­
ades, a natural response to the sharp rise in crime rates of the 1960s, 
early 1970s, and late 1980s. Rising crime generates demands from vot­
ers for legislative action, and often there is little in the way of legisla­
tive action that would be productive in the near term. Symbolic crimi­
nalization is an obvious, and cheap, political response. Second, though 
such crimes exist at all levels of government, they are especially com­
mon in the federal system. Generating political returns from symbolic 
legislation depends in part on the ability to generate media interest, 
and that is easier for members of Congress than for state legislators. 
This second pattern is longstanding: the first great wave of expansion 
of federal criminal liability was inaugurated by the Mann Act,1 1 1  which 
was basically Congress's attempt to be seen as acting on the "white 
slave" traffic, the great public crime concern of the day.112 And it con­
tinues today: the criminal portion of the Violence Against Women Act 
109. The federal statute appears at 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (2000). For examples of state stat­
utes, see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 812.133 (2000); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:64.2 (2000); MICH. 
STAT. ANN. 28.797(a) (2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:15-2 (2000). Like the federal statute, 
these state laws simply re-criminalized conduct already covered elsewhere in their criminal 
codes. Louisiana went farther, specifically authorizing victims of carjackings to kill perpetra­
tors. See Susan Michelle Gerling, Note, Louisiana's New "Kill the Carjacker" Statute: Self­
Defense or Instant Injustice?, 55 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 109 (1999). 
110. There is a less cynical explanatfon for statutes like those that criminalized carjack­
ing. It may be that where legislatures lack the capacity to take concrete anti-crime action, 
they can still signal a change in social norms. Such signals might have some effect on the be­
havior of either criminals, law enforcement officials, or both. Carjacking laws might be a 
means of saying to local police and prosecutors that these crimes deserve an extra measure 
of law enforcement attention (and of saying"to potential carjackers, your odds of apprehen­
sion will be higher in the future than they have been in the past). Whether or not this is true 
of carjacking (I'm skeptical), it probably is true of some other kinds of symbolic criminal 
legislation. One possible example might be the Violence Against Women Act, which coin­
cides with and perhaps accelerated a widespread change in posture by police agencies to­
ward domestic violence. For an argument that this signaling strategy is likely to fail, see su­
pra notes 73-80 and accompanying text. 
111. 18 u.s.c. §§ 2421-2424 (2000). 
112. For a brilliant analysis and comparison of the arguments that led to the Mann Act 
and, much more recently, to the Violence Against Women Act, see Anne M. Coughlin, Of 
White Slaves and Domestic Hostages, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 109 (1997). 
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is a prominent recent example;113 pending federal hate crime legisla­
tion is another.1 14 
Put these two patterns together, and one sees an explanation for an 
odd phenomenon. Crime has not simply played a larger role in elec­
toral politics over the last generation. Crime's politics have become 
increasingly nationalized, with an ever greater focus on federal law­
making.U5 Meanwhile, measured as a percentage of arrests and convic­
tions, law enforcement has grown increasingly local; the federal share 
is falling, not rising.116 Those two trends sound strange, but they are 
natural responses to growing demand for (1) symbolic legislative ac­
tion, which is more easily supplied by the federal government than by 
the states, and (2) more law enforcement on the streets, which, under 
current institutional arrangements, is best supplied by local govern­
ments. 
2 .  Prosecutors (and the Police) 
Like legislators, local prosecutors are likely to seek to produce the 
range of outcomes the public desires. The large majority of local dis­
trict attorneys are elected.1 17  Elected district attorneys, like legislators, 
presumably wish to keep their jobs, move up to higher office, or both. 
Insofar as that is true, their incentive is to generate the level and dis­
tribution of prosecutions the public wants, subject to the resource con­
straints of their offices.118 
113. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text. 
114. As of spring 2001, there were at least three pending hate crime bills in Congress: 
the Hate Crime Prevention Act, H.R. 74 (introduced Jan. 3, 2001); the Protecting Civil 
Rights for All Americans Act, S. 19 (introduced Jan. 22, 2001); and the Local Law Enforce­
ment Enhancement Act of 2001, S. 625 (introduced Mar. 27, 2001). Eric Holder's testimony 
in support of similar hate crime legislation in an earlier Congress nicely captures the sym­
bolic nature of these bills. Holder, then Deputy Attorney General for the Justice Depart­
ment's Criminal Division, noted that the most closely analogous federal crime yields "an av­
erage of fewer than six" federal prosecutions per year. He added: "We predict that the 
enactment of [the hate crime bill] would result in only a modest increase in the number of 
hate crimes prosecutions brought each year by the Federal Government." The Hate Crimes 
Prevention Act of 1998: Hearing on S. 1529 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th 
Cong. 4-19 (1999) (statement of Eric Holder, Deputy Att'y Gen.). 
115. See generally Beale, supra note 8; NANCY E. MARION, A HISTORY OF FEDERAL 
CRIME CONTROL INITIATIVES: 1960-1993 (1994) (hereinafter MARION, CRIME CONTROL] . 
For a discussion of the way federal officials respond to this kind of politics, see Nancy E. 
Marion, Symbolic Policies in Clinton's Crime Agenda, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 67 (1997). 
116. Stacy & Dayton, supra note 6. 
117. More than ninety-five percent, according to one government report. See John M. 
Dawson et al. , U.S. Dep't of Justice, Prosecutors in State Courts - 1992, at 2 (1993). 
118. This is, of course, an oversimplification. Prosecutors and legislators alike engage in 
a variety of tasks, some of which are highly visible to the public, and many of which are not. 
The incentive to please voters must operate much more powerfully on the more visible tasks 
than on the less visible ones. Thus, legislators are more likely to mirror voter preferences 
when voting on a much-publicized piece of legislation than when engaged in backroom ne-
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Presumably the public seeks not only prosecutions, but convic­
tions; if so, prosecutors have a substantial incentive to win the cases 
they bring. One piece of evidence for this fairly obvious proposition is 
the frequency with which elected prosecutors cite conviction rates in 
their campaigns. This political need is no doubt reinforced by a kind of 
consumption preference - all litigators prefer winning to losing, and 
one must assume prosecutors share that preference.119 
Thus, it seems reasonable to begin with the hypothesis that prose­
cutors wish (1) to prosecute the range of cases the public wants prose­
cuted, and (2) to win the cases they bring. Notice that these goals are 
essentially the same as the goals legislators are likely to have. Legisla­
tive and prosecutorial incentives do diverge in some respects. Legisla­
tors will sometimes want to use criminal law to make symbolic state­
ments, for reasons discussed above, and prosecutors will want to save 
themselves time and effort, about which more below. But at the most 
basic level, elected legislators and elected prosecutors are natural al­
lies. Both need to please voters in order to survive, and for both, 
pleasing voters means essentially the same thing: punishing people 
voters want to see punished. 
That natural alliance should make prosecutors (along with police) 
a very powerful lobby on criminal law issues. If police and prosecutors 
want some new criminal prohibition, they likely want it because it 
would advance their goals. Advancing police and prosecutors' goals 
usually means advancing legislators' goals as well. Thus, legislators 
have good reason to listen when prosecutors urge some statutory 
change. This point is worth emphasizing, for it may be the single most 
important feature of the existing system for defining criminal law. 
Lawmaking and law enforcement are given to different institutions, in 
part to diffuse power, but the institutions are usually seeking the same 
gotiations over the language of an obscure bill. And prosecutors are more likely to care 
about the public's wishes when pursuing high-profile cases - the kind that attract heavy 
media attention - than when plea bargaining with low-level (and unknown) defendants. 
Notice that this qualification applies to both prosecutors and legislators - that is, both 
must please voters in some general sense, and for both, that need is felt more keenly in some 
contexts than in others. 
119. This preference for victory is likely to vary depending on some basic characteristics 
of the criminal process. If criminal trials are frequent and cheap, prosecutors are likely to 
tolerate a fairly high level of acquittals. When defeats are common, as they probably will be 
if trials are frequent enough, no one defeat is terribly salient, either to the losing prosecutor 
or to the public. And where trials are cheap, the opportunity cost of any given trial is low. 
On the other hand, if trials are rare and expensive, the preference for victory is likely to be 
fairly strong. When defeats are less common, any one defeat is more likely to attract notice. 
And when trials are expensive, any one case taken to trial may represent a large number of 
guilty pleas forgone. If this account is correct, the preference for victory may be significantly 
stronger today than, say, a half-century ago. Changes in the law of criminal procedure, com­
bined with the spread of appointed defense counsel, have made criminal trials much more 
elaborate affairs, and hence much more costly to prosecutors. That change plus growth in 
crime rates (which gives prosecutors more cases to choose from than they used to have) 
means the opportunity cost of a single blown trial is much higher than it used to be. 
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ends. Since the institutions can also communicate - prosecutors can 
tell legislatures what legislation they need - the separation of crime 
definition and enforcement is less important, and less substantial, than 
one would think.120 
Of course, there is some separation, some divergence of interest. 
The largest divergence flows from the fact that while most heads of 
prosecutors' offices are elected, most prosecutors are not. Nearly 
ninety percent of prosecutors in local district attorneys' offices work 
for elected district attorneys, but do not run for election themselves.121 
The distinction matters. District attorneys are politicians. Line prose­
cutors are a combination of bureaucrats and litigators (but a peculiar 
brand of litigators, since they basically have no clients122). District at­
torneys are likely to seek to manage their offices in ways that win 
them public support. To some degree, line prosecutors will seek to do 
that too, because that is their bosses' goal, and they must satisfy their 
bosses in order to keep their jobs. But line prosecutors, like other em­
ployees, are likely also to seek to order their jobs in ways that make 
those jobs more pleasant. 
That means pursuing something that may cut against the goal of 
punishing people the voters want punished: cost reduction. Like most 
of us, line prosecutors are likely to seek to make their jobs easier, to 
reduce or limit their workload where possible.123 That inclination 
means two things: limiting the number of cases on their dockets, and 
limiting the cost of the process per case. 
That prosecutors (and police) have some incentive to keep a low 
ceiling on their dockets follows naturally from the way they are paid. 
Prosecutors and police are paid salary; their paychecks do not rise, at 
least not directly, with the number of arrests made or convictions ob­
tained. This is surely a good thing; were it otherwise, prosecutors and 
police would find it in their interest to trump up charges in order to in­
flate their pay. But note the problem it creates. Because prosecutors 
are not paid by the case, they can work less - or fail to work more 
120. For a contrary argument, suggesting that there is more divergence than meets the 
eye, see Richman, supra note 102. 
121. See Dawson et al., supra note 117. 
122. In a truly wonderful essay, then-Professor, now-Judge Lynch emphasizes the way 
this absence of a client makes prosecutors into a mix of litigants and adjudicators. See 
Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117 
(1998). I use "bureaucrats" to capture the point, which Lynch also emphasizes, that the ad­
judication is quite different from the kind courts do. 
123. A recent doctoral dissertation finds substantial evidence of this effect; the author 
associates it with a rise in the number of career prosecutors. See Todd Ryan Lochner, Di­
lemmas of Accountability: Prosecutorial Agenda-Setting in United States Attorneys' Offices 
141-46 (2001) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Cal. at Berkeley) (on file with 
author). 
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where circumstances seem to demand doing so - while keeping pay 
constant. 
In the current environment, where prosecutors are generally seen 
as a hard-working lot, this point may seem hard to credit. But it may 
have had a substantial impact on the course of criminal law enforce­
ment in recent decades. Crime levels rose dramatically in the 1960s. 
The number of arrests during that time rose, but much more slowly 
than crime levels.124 And the prison population - a good, albeit lag­
ging, indicator of the number of felony prosecutions - did not rise at 
all; it actually fell twelve percent during the 1960s.125 By the late 1970s, 
that' had changed; felony prosecutions were then rising steeply126 -
much faster than growth in personnel in prosecutors' offices,127 and 
much faster than growth in crime rates (by the late 1970s, crime rates 
were holding steady).128 The natural explanation is that public demand 
for more law enforcement caught up with the prosecutors' offices. But 
the catching up took time. The incentive to keep workloads low de­
layed the inevitable rise in felony prosecutions, perhaps for as much as 
a decade and a half. 
In the end, political incentives won out. But there is more than one 
way to hold costs down: if the number of cases cannot be reduced, the 
incentive is to reduce the time and energy spent on each case. The best 
way to do that is to convert potential trials into guilty pleas. Hence the 
rise in the felony plea rate as the number of felony prosecutions in­
creased.129 Guilty pleas are not simply cheaper than trials; they are 
124. "For the period 1960-1970, police arrests for all criminal acts, except traffic of­
fenses, increased 31 percent." FBI, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 
1970: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 35 (1971). The number of index crimes nearly tripled dur­
ing the same period. See supra note 84. 
125. In 1960, federal and state prisons housed 226,344 inmates; in 1970 the number was 
198,831. MARGARET WERNER CAHALAN, HISTORICAL CORRECTIONS STATISTICS IN THE 
UNITED STATES, 1850-1984, at 29 tbl.3-2 (1986). If one includes inmates of local jails, the 
figures are 346,015 inmates in 1960 and 328,020 in 1970 - a decline of five percent. Id. at 29 
tbl.3-2, 76 tbl.4-1. 
126. State court felony filings increased thirty-six percent between 1978 and 1984. NAT'L 
CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT 1984, 
at 189-90 tbl.35 (1986). The increase accelerated in the 1980s: Between 1985 and 1991, felony 
filings rose by more than fifty percent. NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT 
CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT 1991, at 37 tbl.1.25 (1993). 
127. The number of state and local assistant prosecutors rose from 17,000 in 1974 to 
20,000 in 1990 - a  gain of only eighteen percent. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. 
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 1990, at 1-2 (1992). During roughly 
the same period, the number of felony prosecutions more than doubled. See supra note 126. 
128. On this point, the FBl's Uniform Crime Reports and the National Victimization 
Survey are in agreement. See FBI, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 
1981: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 39 tbl.2; BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF 
JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 1973-90 TRENDS 9 tbl.1 
(1992). 
129. In the mid-1970s, the guilty plea rate was in the neighborhood of eighty percent. 
See DAVID A. JONES, CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT 44 tbl.4-1 (1979). By 1992, the plea 
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enormously cheaper. And prosecutors' bargaining strategies tend to 
ensure that this remains so. The literature on plea bargaining suggests 
that most prosecutors insist on bargains very early in the process, and 
punish defendants who resist settlement until shortly before trial.130 
So prosecutors have some incentive to keep costs down, which 
they can do either by limiting the number of cases filed or by limiting 
the amount of time and energy expended per case. In this choice be­
tween greater efficiency and lower output, line prosecutors may have 
no strong preference, but legislators and elected district attorneys will 
prefer efficiency - more prosecutions and convictions are, from vot­
ers' standpoint, a good thing, and elected officials will want to please 
the voters. Recall that legislatures can push toward greater efficiency 
by expanding criminal law, thereby making it easier for prosecutors to 
obtain guilty pleas. If crimes are defined in ways that make guilt hard 
to prove, the threat of trial will be less serious to many defendants, 
and the inducements to plead will be accordingly less substantial. If, 
on the other hand, crimes are defined so as to make conviction easy, 
the threat value of trial is increased. And if prosecutors are able to 
threaten defendants who take their cases to trial with a range of over­
lapping charges that produce a severe sentence, the ability to induce a 
plea is magnified still more. 
Legislators can help prosecutors pursue guilty pleas, then, both by 
creating new crimes and by creating overlapping crimes that allow for 
charge-stacking. To the extent those things help prosecutors charge 
and convict people at lower cost, that is to legislators' advantage. Re­
ducing the cost of policing and prosecution means getting more law 
enforcement for the dollar, something that legislators should find po­
litically rewarding. 
So prosecutors are likely to seek (and legislatures likely to sup­
port) two sorts of criminal legislation. The first is legislation that per­
mits them to punish whom they want - meaning, usually, punishing 
those whom the public wants punished, since local prosecutors must 
satisfy local public demands. If undercover "stings" can't generate 
convictions (because criminal attempt is too hard to prove), solicita­
tion statutes may be a solution.131 The second type of legislation makes 
rate in felony cases was ninety-two percent. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF 
JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS - 1995, at 498 tbl.5.47 (Kathleen 
Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 1996). 
130. See, e.g., MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF 
PROSECUTORS, JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 61-69 (1978). 
131. On the historical link between attempt and solicitation, see Herbert Wechsler et al., 
The Treatment of Inchoate Crimes in the Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute: 
Attempt, Solicitation, and Conspiracy, Part I, 61 'COLUM. L. REV. 571, 621-628 (1961). 
Though Wechsler. noted that general solicitation statutes are not common, id. at 623, they 
were hardly unknown in 1961, see id. at 623 n.301 (citing eight such statutes), and have be­
come more common since. And the statutes that do exist seem to have arisen out of judicial 
hostility to broader attempt liability. See id. at 623-25. 
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it cheaper for prosecutors to do their job. Proving burglaries may be 
costly; proving possession of burglars' tools will be much easier (and 
the latter charge will therefore tend to generate more guilty pleas ).132 
Local prosecutors have too many cases and too little time; anything 
that converts contested trials into guilty pleas is valuable to them. 
The first kind of legislation converts defeats into victories; the sec­
ond makes the victories cheaper. The two goals tend to merge. Any­
thing that broadens criminal liability adds to the range of cases prose­
cutors can win. Likewise, broadening criminal liability makes it easier, 
across a range of cases, to induce a guilty plea - precisely because the 
prosecution is so likely to win if the case goes to trial. And more 
prosecutorial victories at lower cost advances not only prosecutors' 
welfare, but legislators' as well. 
What about the interests of the police? To some degree, they are 
likely to be congruent with prosecutors' interest, and thus are cap­
tured, at least roughly, by the preceding discussion. But only to some 
degree. Police differ from prosecutors in (at least) two critical ways. 
Their focus is on a different stage of criminal proceedings. With some 
qualifications, prosecutors maximize convictions; police are more 
likely to maximize arrests.133 And they are more culturally distinct 
from the rest of the population than are prosecutors, so that depart­
mental culture is a more powerful force in police conduct than it is in 
prosecutorial behavior.134 Add to these differences a key complication: 
132. On the ease of proving possession of burglars' tools, see supra note 50 and accom­
panying text. 
133. Of course, the police utility function is not as simple as maximizing arrests. Some 
officers seek arrests more than others, and all officers seek arrests more for some crimes 
than for others. See, e.g., William F. Walsh, Patrol Officer Arrest Rates: A Study of the Social 
Organization of Police Work, in THINKING ABOUT POLICE 352-64 (Carl B. Klockars & 
Stephen D. Mastrofski eds., 2d ed. 1991). Rather, the point is that arrests, not convictions, 
are the most obvious objective measure of police performance, because arrests are within 
police control, while convictions are not. For a good, though dated, discussion of the implica­
tions of using arrests to measure police performance, see JAMES Q. WILSON, VARIETIES OF 
POLICE BEHAVIOR 172-99, 291-92 (2d ed. 1978) (discussing and evaluating what Wilson 
called "legalistic" police departments - that is, departments that emphasized arrest rates). 
For examples of how the focus on arrests pervades not only police departments but also the 
policing literature, see Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk, The Specific Deterrent 
Effects of Arrest for Domestic Assault, in WHAT WORKS IN POLICING 227-45 (David H. 
Bayley ed., 1998); Walsh, supra. 
Good accounts of what police do maximize are hard to come by. For the best discussion 
in the literature to date, see DAVID H. BAYLEY, POLICE FOR THE FUTURE 1 5-75 (1994). 
134. For a good discussion of the way departmental cultures affect the level of police 
violence, see PAUL CHEVIGNY, EDGE OF THE KNIFE: POLICE VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAS 
(1995). 
The distinctiveness of police culture has large implications for the way police are regu­
lated. In particular, it suggests that the American legal system's focus on incident-specific 
litigation may be misplaced - that a focus on identifying and correcting bad departments 
would be more productive than identifying and correcting bad officers. The best legal tool 
for regulation at the department level is neither the exclusionary rule nor damages - the 
two remedies whose merits are so extensively debated in the law reviews - but injunctions. 
That is why the passage of 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (1 994), which authorizes the Justice Depart-
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it is difficult, maybe impossible, to determine how much influence po­
lice have over prosecutors' case selection.135 
But these complications do not alter the basic picture. Prosecutors 
benefit from broader criminal liability rules. So do police - though 
the benefit is isolated in a particular area of criminal law. To the ex­
tent that police seek to make arrests, or to exercise coercive power 
short of arrest, they need criminal law to enable them to do those 
things. The Fourth Amendment requires that arrests be supported by 
probable cause to believe the arrestee has committed a crime.136 Street 
stops must be supported by reasonable suspicion of crime.137 In both 
instances, the operative word is "crime." If that word includes enough 
behavior, if crime is defined broadly enough, police can stop or arrest 
whomever they wish. 
Thus, police benefit from laws that criminalize street behavior that 
no one wishes actually to punish, solely as a means of empowering 
them to seize suspects. This is the force that drives much of the current 
movement to expand the range of so-called "quality of life" of­
fenses,138 crimes that cover low-level street behavior that will only 
rarely be prosecuted, but that often serve as a convenient basis for an 
arrest and, perhaps, a search.139 Such crimes make policing cheaper, 
because they permit searches and arrests with less investigative work. 
Just as cheaper prosecution helps not only prosecutors but legislators 
too, cheaper policing should be a boon to police and legislators alike. 
ment to seek injunctive relief against departments with a pattern of unconstitutional con­
duct, may be more significant, in the long run, than Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), 
which mandated the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
For a good discussion of the early litigation under § 14141, see Debra Livingston, Police Re­
form and the Department of Justice: An Essay on Accountability, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 815, 
842 (1999). 
135. No good work has been done on police officers' effect on local prosecutors' case 
selection. The scholarship on the parallel phenomenon at the federal level is thin; by far the 
best piece is Richman, supra note 102, which maintains that federal agents have a great deal 
of power over the cases Assistant United States Attorneys prosecute. 
136. E.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976). 
137. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985). 
138. For the best discussion of that movement, see Debra Livingston, Police Discretion 
and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 
COLUM. L. REV. 551 (1997). 
139. For example, before it was held to be unconstitutional, police made over 42,000 
arrests for violations of Chicago's gang loitering ordinance. Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 
49 n.7 (1999). I am unaware of data on the number of prosecutions under the ordinance, but 
it is surely a small fraction of 42,000. 
This is not to say that police discretion of the sort seen in Morales is a bad thing. For a 
strong and persuasive argument to the contrary, see Debra Livingston, Gang Loitering, the 
Court, and Some Realism About Police Patrol, 1999 SUP. Cr. REV. 141. It is only to say that 
the discretion derives its legal authority from criminal statutes that the legislature probably 
does not intend to be the subject of criminal punishment. 
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3. Appellate Judges 
Appellate judges are the other significant player in criminal law­
making, and their institutional incentives are hardest to categorize. In 
most jurisdictions these judges are elected, and hence are likely to be 
responsive to the popular will.140 But even elected judges are much less 
politically accountable than legislators or elected prosecutors. Con­
tested judicial elections are less common than contested elections for 
legislative seats, and bar associations and other professional groups 
typically play a large role in judicial nominations, at least by custom.141 
And the public is less likely to ,blame judges for local crime rates 
than to blame either of the other two actors. Political constraints 
probably work powerfully in a few high-publicity cases - after Rose 
Bird, a good many appellate judges may calculate their reversal rate in 
capital murder cases142 - but that is a small slice of the criminal 
docket.143 That leaves judges much more free to respond to their own 
ideological leanings, or to the pull of the legal culture in which they 
find themselves. That last point may be especially significant. Though 
judges, even elected ones, may not have the same need to please a set 
of voters that legislators and prosecutors have, it does not follow that 
judges have no constituency. Rather, their constituency is more com­
plicated, and more tilted toward the profesl"ional community in which 
140. More than eighty percent of state judges stand for election of some kind. Kathryn 
Abrams, Some Realism About Electoralism: Rethinking Judicial Campaign Finance, 72 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 505, 512 (1999). The result, at least on some accounts, is judges who "be­
have . . .  like politicians." Note, Federal Court Involvement in Redistricting Litigation, 114 
HARV. L. REV. 878, 887 (2001). I do not mean to contest that point, save to suggest that poli­
tician-like behavior comes in many. forms, and that judges are not - at least not yet - the 
political equivalent of elected legislators or district attorneys. 
141. On the low salience of judicial elections, see, for example, Richard L. Hasen, "High 
Court Wrongly Elected": A Public Choice Model of Judging and its Implications for the Vot­
ing Rights Act, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1305, 1315-20 (1997). 
142. For a good account of the use of the death penalty issue in judicial elections, in­
cluding the famous Rose Bird election in. California, see Scott D. Wiener, Note, Popular 
Justice: State Judicial Elections and Procedural Due Process, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
187 (1996). 
. 
143. There is another, indirect sense in which political constraints may matter to appel­
late judging in criminal cases. In states where appellate judges are elected, they must collect 
campaign contributions. Naturally, lawyers' groups often dominate that market. Plaintiffs' 
lawyers' incomes probably vary more based on the content of common law rules than the 
incomes of other classes of lawyers. Consequently, the plaintiffs' bar has become the leading 
contributor in judicial elections in a number of states. 
Historically, there is a substantial relationship between the civil plaintiffs' bar and the 
criminal defense bar. Until recently, criminal defense was a very unusual specialty; the near­
universal norm until the past generation or so was for criminal defense lawyers to be general 
litigators, typically at the lower end of the legal services market. That tended to mean doing 
a wide range of plaintiffs' work in addition to sporadic criminal defense work. In some places 
that pattern still holds. Thus, there may be ·a natural tendency toward pro-defendant stands 
in criminal cases by judges prone to take pro-plaintiff stands in, say, personal injury litiga­
tion. 
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the judges work. Appellate judges produce opinions; lawyers and 
other judges read those opinions, and the readers form opinions, good 
or bad, about the opinions they read. The desire for that kind of pro­
fessional esteem is likely to be as strong a force working on appellate 
judges as raw politics.144 
Which means that appellate judges are much more likely than leg­
islators or prosecutors to take the interests of defendants into account. 
Their decisionmaking process reinforces this natural tendency. Prose­
cutors are free to charge without listening and responding to defen­
dants' arguments.145 Legislators are free to legislate without seeking 
the views of the legislation's opponents. But appellate judges can 
make law only in the context of cases, and, with rare exceptions, they 
decide cases - at least the sort of cases that involve published opin­
ions - only after hearing (and reading) arguments from both sides. 
So appellate judges, relative to legislators and prosecutors, are 
likely to tilt somewhat in defendants' favor. The importance of that tilt 
is limited by two other factors. First, appellate judges cannot easily set 
their own agenda; they are more reactive than the other two groups. 
Legislators can define new crimes when they wish. Prosecutors can 
choose which cases to pursue and how aggressively to pursue them. 
Certiorari jurisdiction gives the highest appellate courts some of the 
same leeway, but most reported criminal cases are decided by appel­
late courts that must hear criminal appeals. The range of cases those 
courts see is determined not by the courts themselves, but by the laws 
legislators write and the cases prosecutors bring. 
Second, judges dislike reversal. The reasons for this phenomenon 
are complicated (and the relevant scholarship is thin), but its existence 
is fairly clear.146 Judges perceive the overturning of their decisions as a 
public declaration of error, so that reversals tend to be stigmatizing to 
the one whose decision is reversed. And to the extent that judges seek 
to enshrine their own policy preferences in doctrine, reversal must 
represent a salient failure. For these and other reasons, most courts on 
144. For a rare discussion of how judicial reputations are made and how much some 
judges may value them, see RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 
(1990). Though Cardozo was an elected state judge for much of his career, and though he 
actively sought judicial appointments that were in the hands of elected politicians, the best 
biography of him suggests his ambitions were more for reputation than for political status or 
office. See generally ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO (1998). 
145. See Lynch, supra note 122, at 2124. Of course, as Lynch notes, prosecutors have 
some incentive to listen to arguments defense counsel wish to raise. Id. at 2125-27. 
146. Anyone who knows trial judges knows that the phenomenon exists. In the litera­
ture, its existence is generally assumed, and only occasionally examined. For a rare (and 
brief) examination, see Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking 
Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEXAS L. REV. 1, 77-78 (1994). For an even 
rarer discussion of why the phenomenon exists (along with a dismissal of some wrong expla­
nations), see Richard S. Higgins & Paul H. Rubin, Judicial Discretion, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 129 
(1980). 
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most issues will behave in ways that minimize the likelihood that supe­
rior legal authorities will reject their decisions. 
This point is usually made with respect to trial judges' risk of re­
versal by appellate courts, but it applies more broadly. William 
Eskridge's study of congressional overrides of Supreme Court statu­
tory interpretation decisions suggests strongly that Supreme Court jus­
tices try to avoid having their decisions overruled by legislation;147 the 
same is presumably true of lower federal courts, and of state appellate 
judges' relationships with their .state legislatures. Of course, appellate 
courts are more than wet fingers testing legislative winds. But if two 
competing interpretations of criminal statutes are at issue, and one is 
much more likely to attract hostile legislative attention than the other, 
Eskridge's work suggests, unsurprisingly, that appellate judges will 
tend to avoid conflict and follow the (perceived) legislative will. 
4. A Special Case: Federal Prosecutors and Congress 
To this point, the discussion has been generic, with no distinctions 
drawn between local prosecutors and their federal counterparts, or be­
tween state legislators and Congress. Much of the picture painted 
above applies to all of the actors just mentioned. But it applies differ­
ently to federal officials. A brief detour is in order. 
Begin with federal prosecutors' incentives. United States Attor­
neys are appointed, not elected, and the appointment process is not 
designed to make them. politically accountable to the local population 
in the way district attorneys are.148 That means local community priori­
ties are not likely to translate into federal enforcement priorities. And 
federal prosecutors are not responsible for ordinary criminal law en­
forcement; they are backstops in a system where the primary enforc­
ers, district attorneys and local police, work for another sovereign. If a 
given murder or robbery goes unpunished, no federal official's neck is 
on the line. There are a few important offenses over which federal 
prosecutors have exclusive jurisdiction, but those offenses are a small 
portion of federal criminal dockets.149 
147. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation 
Decis'ions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 390 (1991). One of Eskridge's major claims is that the Court 
interprets statutes in light of.the (perceived) intent of the current Congress, not the enacting 
Congress. See id. at 390-404. That is the obviously right approach if one's goal is to avoid 
congressional overrides. 
148. See Lochner, supra note 123, at 109-18. As Lochner emphasizes, U.S. Attorneys are 
selected through a political process, but the process does not emphasize their local constitu­
ency. And the fact that they are accountable to competing masters - the Justice Depart­
ment and their states' Senators - gives them considerable independence. 
149. In 1998, federal prosecutors filed 47,277 cases, out of which 31,851 fell into one of 
the following categories: assimilative crimes (i.e., state-law crimes being tried in federal 
court), theft offenses, drug offenses, violent crimes, and fraud-type crimes. Virtually all of 
these are crimes at the federal and state levels alike. Of the remaining 15,426 offenses, more 
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To put the point more simply, there is an enormous amount that 
federal prosecutors can do - the federal criminal code covers most of 
the ground state criminal codes cover - but very little that they must 
do. Far more than is true of local prosecutors, United States Attor­
neys' offices, together with enforcement agencies like the FBI, have 
the power to set their own agendas, to decide what cases they wish to 
spend time on and what cases they wish to ignore. 
Couple that agenda control with the absence of direct political ac­
countability, and one can see why federal prosecutors are likely, rela­
tive to their local counterparts, to care less about pleasing the elector­
ate and more about personal and professional gain and growth.150 
Personal gain does not, in this setting, mean corruption. More com­
monly, it means prosecutions that further the prosecutor's own profes­
sional development, or prosecutions that are especially interesting or 
fun. Local prosecutors have less leeway to indulge these preferences 
because their dockets tend to be filled with politically necessary cases. 
The electorate would not tolerate a district attorney's office that lets 
murder cases slide in order to pursue an interesting fraud investiga­
tion. But federal agents and federal prosecutors are free to indulge 
such preferences, both because there is no electorate to vote them out 
of office, and because murder cases (and robberies, and burglaries, 
and assaults, and drug deals) are universally assumed to be primarily 
the job of local officials. 
The data confirm the intuition that federal prosecutors pursue a 
different agenda than do local prosecutors, and that federal prosecu­
tors' agenda is consistent with the pursuit of professional advance­
ment. Start with the reasonable assumption that local prosecutors pur­
sue the mix of cases the public would choose, given their constrained 
resources. If federal prosecutors pursue the same goal, their dockets 
should look similar. That isn't the case. Relative to state-court crimi­
nal defendants, " [f]ederal criminals are more likely to be white, mar­
ried, richer, better educated, more likely to hire an attorney, less likely 
to break the rules, and less likely to have prior offenses."151 These ten­
dencies do not fit the pattern of seeking to maximize victories and 
minimize cost, a pattern that seems to explain a great deal of behavior 
by local prosecutors. Nor do they follow from public preferences -
the public's priority is violent crime, but such crimes are a smal� mi­
nority of federal cases. But they do fit two other patterns: attaining 
valuable litigation experience and advancing professional reputation. 
than 10,000 were immigration cases. Nonimmigration crimes that might plausibly be exclu­
sively federal constituted only eleven percent of all federal criminal cases. See BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
STATISTICS - 1998, at 387-88 tbl.5.6 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 1999). 
150. See Lochner, supra note 123, at 131-46. 
151. Edward L. Glaeser et al., What Do Prosecutors Maximize? An Analysis of the Fed­
eralization of Drug Crimes, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 259, 273 (2000). 
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So while local prosecutors gain from prosecuting those the public 
wants prosecuted, federal prosecutors gain from prosecuting those 
whose cases are professionally rewarding. Frauds by the rich and fa­
mous may take precedence over robberies, even if the public cares 
more about the robberies. 
At first blush, that would seem to undermine the power of federal 
agents and prosecutors as lobbyists. Why, after all, should Congress 
care about advancing the careers of federal prosecutors? Yet federal 
agents and federal prosecutors are powerful forces in federal criminal 
legislation; federal criminal legislation often begins with the Justice 
Department and responds to pressure from that department and from 
U.S. Attorneys' offices.152 Why does Congress so often yield to that 
pressure? 
The answer may lie in the charging patterns of local prosecutors. 
Local district attorneys charge murders and rapes and robberies and 
drug deals because the local population demands it. If they charge a 
range of other crimes - small-time frauds, for example - it seems 
safe to assume that the public at least approves of, and perhaps de­
mands, that as well. In short, defendants in ordinary local prosecutions 
are likely to be the sort of people a majority of the citizenry thinks 
ought to be defendants. (If that ceases to be true, the local district at­
torney risks being out of a job.) Naturally, then, being charged with a 
crime is stigmatizing - every local criminal defendant is, simply by 
being a defendant, singled out as the sort of person the citizenry as a 
whole thinks ought to be punished. 
That may not apply to federal prosecutions, but then federal 
prosecutions are less than five percent of total prosecutions.153 The 
public is likely to generalize - if most criminal defendants are seri­
ously bad actors, all must be. "All" is likely to include federal and lo­
cal defendants alike; the cost to the public of differentiating between 
federal and state cases outweighs the gains. Indeed, the public may 
think federal defendants are worse. In other fields, federal interven­
tion often signals that a case is particularly important; hence the com­
mon locution that to "make a federal case" of something is to puff up 
its importance. It would be natural for the public to think that, if the 
federal government prosecutes five percent of all felonies, they are 
probably the worst five percent. That inference is quite wrong: federal 
prosecutors' incentives being what they are, federal defendants may 
well be, on average, less culpable than local defendants. But the public 
impression matters. It means that if the Justice Department says fed-
152. For an otherwise good account that tends to overlook the role of the U.S. Attor­
neys' offices in lobbying for legislation, see MARION, CRIME CONTROL, supra note 115. 
153. In 1996, 47,889 criminal cases were filed in federal court. 1998 SOURCEBOOK, supra 
note 149, at 388 tbl.5.7. The same year, there were 997,970 felony convictions in state court; 
the number of criminal cases must have been much greater. Id. at 431 tbl.5.40. 
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eral prosecutors need a given statute in order to punish serious crimi­
nals, the claim will have immediate credibility with the public - more 
credibility than it deserves. Just as a state legislature risks being seen 
as soft on drug dealers if it refuses to pass new drug laws that are 
strongly supported by police and prosecutors, Congress bears the 
same risk if it too readily spurns Justice Department requests for new 
crimes. And this is so even if the Justice Department's requests are lit­
tle more than efforts to increase the range of high-profile cases federal 
prosecutors can charge. · · 
Thus, oddly, Congress is likely to give great weight to the demands 
of federal prosecutors, even though those demands may not advance 
goals the public cares about. Consider a pair of examples. · In . 1970 
Congress passed the RICO statute, in part due to pressure from the 
Justice Department.154 RICO was designed to target the Mafia and 
Mafia-like organizations. It passed at a time when the Mafia was in 
decline,155 but serious thefts and violent crimes were rising steeply. 
Anti-Mafia legislation in this climate made little political sense -
which is why state legislatures were not passing RICO-like legislation; 
their focus was much more 9n drugs and sheet crime, which were the 
focus of public concern. But RI.CO responded to a strong demand 
from the federal law enfon;ement bureaucracy. Something similar oc­
curred in 1987 with the passage of the "intangible rights" statute.156 
That statute reinstated a broad theory of liability under federal fraud 
statutes; it was passed barely a year after the Supreme Court decision 
that rejected that theory.157 And Congress passed it at a .time when 
crack-related violence was sweeping large cities across the country and 
was the focus of intense public concern.158 Like RICO, the intangible 
rights statute seemed politically strange; like RICO, it had no parallels 
in contemporaneous state legislation; and like RICO, it was prompted 
154. See MARION, CRIME CONTROL, supra note 115, at 83-84. Gerard Lynch's treat­
ment of RICO's history emphasizes the role of the President's Crime Commission rather 
than the Justice Department. See Lynch, supra note 91, at 666-73 (noting, however, that the 
Commission did not itself recommend a RICO-like statute). 
155. There is no good detailed history of the Mafia's. rise and fall. Most contemporary 
discussions credit government prosecutions in the 1980s and 1990s for its recent sharp de­
cline. For the best of these, see James B. Jacobs & Lauryn P. Gouldin, Casa Nostra: The Fi­
nal Chapter?, in 25 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 129 (Michael Tonry ed., 
1999). But two other developments must have played a large role as well: the decline of. in­
dustrial labor unions and the rise of small, widely dispersed drug dealing organizations. Both 
developments were already well underway by the time RICO was passed. · · 
156. 18 u.s.c. § 1346 (1994). 
157. See McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987); supra notes 86-90 and accompa­
nying text. 
158. Of course, Congress reacted to the rise of crack as· well. See Sklansky, supra note 
10, for the best account. My point is only that the political returns from passing the intangi­
ble rights statute seem, at first glance, low - especially when compared with legislation con-
cerning other, more salient crime issues. 
· 
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by the demands of the Justice Department and U.S. Attorneys' of­
fices.1s9 
Note what this means for congressional incentives, and for the 
broader picture of federal criminal law. When making criminal law, 
Congress has the same two incentives as state legislatures - to pay at­
tention to the needs and wants of prosecutors and the police, and to 
make popular symbolic statements. As I have already noted, Congress 
will tend to do more of the second than state legislatures, since 
Congress can more readily generate publicity, without which symbolic 
statements are · politically worthless. Unsurprisingly, then, federal 
criminal law is filled with examples of what one might call the "car­
jacking strategy" - superfluous statutes that criminalize some outra­
geous conduct that caught the public eye at some particular time. Also 
unsurprisingly, since these federal crimes are symbolic, they generate 
very few federal prosecutions. 
The other large part of the federal criminal code, the part that does 
generate prosecutions, consists mostly of crimes that law enforcers 
want.160 These need not involve outrageous conduct - indeed, they 
may involve conduct that is close to innocuous, as with the broad 
reach of current federal fraud statutes. This part of federal criminal 
law is likely to be very broad in part because federal prosecutors will 
want it to be so, in order to help them go after high-profile or other­
wise professionally rewarding cases. And federal prosecutors' voice 
will carry great weight in Congress largely because of public attitudes 
toward anyone whom prosecutors target - that such people must de­
serve punishment. Those attitudes in turn flow from the politics of lo­
cal prosecution. 
C. Lawmakers '  Relationships 
1 .  Legislators and Prosecutors 
With this brief tour of the relevant actors' incentives in mind, con­
sider the basic horizontal relationships that shape criminal law and 
criminal sentencing. The most important of those relationships is not 
159. On the source and progress of the intangible rights bill, see infra note 182. 
160. Federal drug prohibitions may belong in a third category. In a sense they are sym­
bolic - an effort by Congress to appropriate the political gains that go to elected officials 
who are tough on drugs. But unlike classic symbolic crimes, federal drug laws do generate 
lots of prosecutions. The reason is not that federal prosecutors like drug cases - often they 
don't. The more likely reason is that federal prosecutors, even though they are not as politi­
cally accountable as local district attorneys, nevertheless are subject to some political pres­
sures. Drugs have been so politically important that if U.S. Attorneys in large cities ignored 
them, the Administration might pay a political price. Thus, U.S. Attorneys must make them 
a priority to get and keep their jobs - something that is not true of carjacking cases, or 
prosecutions under the Violence Against Women Act, or other cases arising under classi­
cally symbolic federal crimes. 
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between legislators and judges (the one law professors usually focus 
on), but between legislators and prosecutors. Enforcement discretion 
dramatically changes the trade-offs legislators face when defining 
crimes. Indeed, it almost eliminates trade-offs. Where prosecutors can 
be selective, legislators will tend to see criminal law as a one-way 
ratchet. 
There are three basic reasons why this is so. First, prosecutorial 
discretion makes the risks from crime definition one-sided, and 
thereby pushes legislators to err on the side of too much rather than 
too little. Second, prosecutorial discretion creates agency costs that 
legislators can reduce by adding crimes. Third, prosecutorial discretion 
tends to alter the interest-group forces at work in criminal lawmaking; 
the biggest effect is probably to disable groups that might push against 
broader criminalization. 
a. The Political Imbalance. Legislators define crimes prospectively. 
Consequently, they do not know the precise mix of cases that will be 
brought under a given statute at the time they must vote on that stat­
ute. They also cannot be certain how courts will construe particular 
statutory terms. The upshot is that, in criminal law as elsewhere, leg­
islatures are constantly trading off risks: a given piece of legislation 
may cover either too much or too little; the legislature cannot count on 
its coverage turning out to be exactly right. 
To make those risks concrete, imagine a legislature that must de­
cide between two versions of a criminal fraud statute. One would 
cover something like classical common law fraud with a substantial 
threshold loss requirement.161 Everyone whom the government could 
prove guilty under this statute would deserve punishment, for com­
mon law fraud is fairly narrowly defined; it is hard to imagine satisfy­
ing its elements unless one is behaving very badly. But this version has 
an important downside. By their nature, frauds are often subtle, and 
some kinds of serious dishonesty do not satisfy the elements of com­
mon law fraud, so some seriously bad actors would not be covered by 
this version of the statute. The second version fixes this problem - it 
covers all the bad actors a sensible legislature might want to punish. 
But it does so by covering, potentially, a lot of only marginally bad ac­
tors whom neither the legislature nor the public would wish to see 
punished. 
The first version of the statute risks letting off some subtle frauds 
who deserve worse. The second version risks punishing some trivially 
dishonest defendants who deserve better. Each, one might suppose, 
161. The elements of classical common law crime of fraud or false pretenses were: "(1) a 
false representation of a material present or past fact (2) which causes the victim (3) to pass 
title to ( 4) his property to the wrongdoer, (5) who (a) knows his representation to be false 
and (b) intends thereby to defraud the victim." 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN w. SCOTI, 
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 8.7, at 382-83 (1986). 
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creates a politically troubling scenario for legislators. If the first ver­
sion is passed, legislators might fear the cheat who is . exposed but un­
convictable; more precisely, they might fear the prosecutor's press 
conference blaming the legislature for not providing the legal tools 
necessary to send such an obvious cheat to prison. If the second ver­
sion is passed, legislators might fear the trivially dishonest but sympa­
thetic defendant whose plight captures the public's imagination. 
Which scenario is likely to seem more troubling? 
In a world where prosecutors have the freedom not to prosecute, 
the second risk, the risk of the sympathetic defendant, disappears. 
That risk can materialize only if the prosecutor decides to file charges, 
which, if the defendant is sympathetic (or is likely to become so), the 
prosecutor has every incentive not to do. At least that is so for local 
prosecutors, who are both politically accountable and constrained by 
limited budgets (meaning that the opportunity cost of an unpopular 
prosecution is high), and local prosecutors bring the huge majority of 
criminal prosecutions.162 This is not to say that politically accountable 
prosecutors will never charge sympathetic defendants - only that they 
will not do so often. And because prosecutors will rarely charge sym­
pathetic defendants, when they do, and when the case becomes known 
to the public, the public is likely to blame not the overbroad statute 
but the overaggressive prosecutor. That would seem to be the lesson 
to draw from the public's reaction to Kenneth .Starr's investigation of 
President Clinton, which produced a good deal of hostility toward 
Starr but none at all toward Congress for the scope of federal perjury 
and obstruction of justice laws.163 (Hostility toward Congress for im­
peachment is consjstent with this story: the public turned on Congress 
only when Congress took over the prosecutor's role.) Nor can the 
prosecutor shift blame to legislators: the public seems to understand 
that Starr could have chosen to leave Lewinsky and the President 
alone. So sympathetic defendants will be rare, and blaming legislators 
for them will be even rarer. 
The first risk - the cheat who falls through the cracks of the care­
fully drawn fraud statute - seems at least slightly more serious. From 
legislators' point of view, politically accountable prosecutors make 
162. To get a sense of how huge that majority is, see supra note 153 (showing that the 
number of state court felony convictions is more than twenty times the total number of 
criminal cases filed in federal court). · 
163. In September 1998, at what may h�ve been Clinton's most vulnerable moment, a 
CBS/New York Times poll found that sixty-four percent of the population believed Starr's 
investigation was partisan. Richard L. Berke & Janet Elder, Poll Finds Clinton in Strong Re­
bound Since Video Airing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1998, at Al. I am aware of no polling data 
on the public view of the laws Starr's team was seeking to enforce; in this case, the absence 
of data probably stems from the assumption that while many people saw the prosecution as 
problematic, almost no one saw the substantive law as problematic. Disapproval of the inde­
pendent counsel statute is, of course, consistent with this proposition. 
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that risk worse. If an obvious cheat is getting away with his cheating in 
a way the public does not like, the prosecutor has good reason to try to 
blame someone else. The most logical target is the legislature, which 
failed to give the prosecutor the law he needed to nail the cheat. 
Though the public blamed Starr for overaggressively pursuing Clinton, 
they might well have blamed Congress if they thought Clinton de­
served punishment but escaped it because the federal criminal code 
did not cover his conduct.164 
Notice two aspects of this balance. First, lawmakers' incentives are 
weak in both directions. Crime definition usually carries low political 
returns; it is hardly a surprise that legislators spend relatively little 
time on it. For most issues most of the time, the political gains from 
legislating cannot overcome even mild legislative inertia. That point is 
important; it explains why many proposed criminal statutes do not 
pass. Second, once an issue is over the threshold that must be reached 
to prompt legislative action, too little criminalization tends to be risk­
ier than too much. The political cost of the narrower fraud statute is 
low, but the political cost of the broader statute approaches zero. 
If so, there is no reason to suppose that any given crime definition 
accurately reflects majoritarian preferences. The public may wish to 
punish "core" fraud, and legislators and prosecutors may share that 
preference, yet the statute books may (and do) criminalize a great deal 
more. This is at once obvious and easily overlooked. The imbalance of 
legislative incentives does not only mean that criminal legislation will 
tend to be tilted in the government's favor. That would hardly be sur­
prising; the public often demands criminal legislation tilted in the gov­
ernment's favor. The imbalance means that criminal legislation will 
tend to be more tilted than the public would demand. Criminal law­
makers, or most of them, are elected officials, and there is every rea­
son to believe that they take voters' preferences seriously. But crimi­
nal law is not democratic. 
b. Agency Costs. Criminal statutes are a grant of power to police 
and prosecutors, who can choose how aggressively and in what cases 
to exercise that power. Anytime a principal grants power to an agent, 
there is a risk that the agent will not use the power in the way the 
principal would like. That risk is plainly present in criminal lawmak­
ing, for prosecutors may charge differently than legislators would wish. 
If the difference is large enough, the legislature presumably will find it 
worthwhile to narrow prosecutors' discretion - to narrow the scope 
of criminal liability rather than to broaden it. 
164. On the other hand,, the public might take the position that if the law was not vio­
lated, the cheat was not really a cheat; that is, public opinion might equate wrongdoing with 
illegality. In this event, the risk from unde�criminalizing also disappears. 
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Yet in this setting, agency costs actually push in the other direc­
tion.165 Consider the ways in which prosecutors' charging decisions are 
likely to diverge from legislative preferences. One obvious possibility 
is that prosecutors will charge defendants whom legislators would pre­
fer be left alone. This risk is likely to be small, for the pair of reasons 
explored above. First, the same political forces that lead legislators to 
prefer a given defendant be left alone also work on prosecutors - at 
least on local prosecutors. (Much less so for U.S. Attorneys, and still 
less for independent counsels.166) Second, public displeasure toward 
overaggressive prosecution is more likely to be visited on the prosecu­
torial agent than on the legislative principal. 
The more serious risk is that, from legislators' point of view, prose­
cutors will simply prosecute too little. Prosecutors, remember, are paid 
salary, not by the case; while they have good reason to want to satisfy 
the public's desires, they also have good reason to want to limit their 
workload. They can do so in either of two ways - by reducing the 
number of cases they handle, or by reducing the cost of handling each 
case. Prosecutors may actually prefer the first strategy. Like other liti­
gators, prosecutors enjoy trying cases; courtroom work is more fun 
than the more bureaucratic work of handling guilty pleas and dismiss­
als. But legislators would surely prefer the second. Cheaper case proc­
essing means a higher volume of criminal convictions; to the extent the 
public wants more convictions rather than fewer, legislatures are likely 
to have the same preference. 
How can legislators combat the tendency toward underenforce­
ment, and how can they steer prosecutors toward cheaper case proc­
essing and away from smaller dockets? Given current institutional ar­
rangements, direct supervision is very hard. State legislatures have no 
supervisory authority over local district attorneys' offices, which 
makes ordinary monitoring somewhere between difficult and impossi­
ble. Congress would seem better positioned in that regard, · but con­
gressional oversight of U.S. Attorneys' offices is slight at best. As 
Daniel Richman has noted, federal prosecutors have found it easy to 
thwart most efforts at congressional oversight by characterizing over­
sight as improper interference with the criminal process.167 
If supervision fails, the next best option is to reduce the cost of en­
forcement. The idea is simple: if the risk is that prosecutors will prose­
cute too little, making prosecution cheaper will tend to reduce the risk. 
165. The argument in the next few paragraphs is drawn from Stuntz, supra note 72, at 
15-19. 
166. Which is why abusive prosecution is probably a greater risk in the federal system 
than in the states. For the link between this argument and the need for greater regulation of 
the subpoena power, see William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsub­
stantive Fourth Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 842, 861-69 (2001). 
167. Richman, supra note 102, at 776-78. 
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Broadening criminal liability and raising nominal sentences make 
prosecution cheaper. Burglary is sometimes hard to prove; proving 
possession of burglars' tools or stolen goods is easier. The possession 
offense allows cheaper prosecution of burglars. Proving the elements 
of traditional fraud is likewise hard, and those elements rule out some 
important kinds of dishonesty. Satisfying the muddier "intangible 
rights" standard that applies to federal fraud statutes is usually easier. 
Consent is often contested in sexual assault litigation. If sodomy is a 
crime, some sexual assaults that are otherwise hard cases become 
enormously easier for the government. Each of these examples is of a 
criminal statute that nominally authorizes the government to punish 
an additional category of conduct, and the statutes may sometimes be 
so used. But their primary effect is probably to reduce the cost of 
punishing conduct that is already a crime by removing a contested is­
sue from the offense. 
Broader liability rules lower enforcement costs in another way. 
Suppose police and prosecutors have good reason to believe a given 
suspect has committed a given crime or series of crimes; suppose fur­
ther that regardless of the details of how those crimes are defined, the 
government is unlikely to be able to prove the suspect guilty save at 
great expense. A capacious criminal code is a great help in such cases. 
If an Al Capone cannot be convicted of homicide or large-scale liquor 
law violations, tax evasion offers a useful alternative. And while tax 
evasion may be the sort of crime for which people other than Al 
Capone are prosecuted, that need not always be the case, as Justice 
Ginsburg's concurrence in Brogan v. United States168 emphasizes. 
Ginsburg's summary of the facts in Brogan makes the point: 
Two federal investigators paid an unannounced visit one evening to 
James Brogan's home. The investigators already possessed records indi­
cating that Brogan, a union officer, had received cash from a company 
that employed members of the union Brogan served. (The agents gave 
no advance warning, one later testified, because they wanted to retain 
the element of surprise . . . .  ) When the agents asked Brogan whether he 
had received any money or gifts from the company, Brogan responded 
"No." The agents asked no further questions. After Brogan just said 
"No," however, the agents told him: (1) the Government had in hand the 
records indicating that his answer was false; and (2) lying to federal 
agents in the course of an investigation is a crime . . . .  [W]hen the inter­
view ended, a federal offense had been completed - even though, for all 
we can tell, Brogan's unadorned denial misled no one.169 
Brogan could be, and was, charged with illegally accepting the 
money, but that crime required proof that the money fell outside the 
long list of permissible payments to union officials provided by federal 
168. 522 U.S. 398 (1998). 
169. Id. at 409-10 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
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statute.170 It was quite a convenience, then, to be able to charge him 
with a violation of the federal false statements statute171 based on his 
"unadorned denial" in a brief, noncustodial conversation. Indeed, as 
Ginsburg noted, quoting the Solicitor General's oral argument in 
Brogan, the false statements statute "could even be used to 'escalate 
completely innocent conduct into a felony.' "172 
Such crimes can make criminal trials low-risk affairs for the gov­
ernment. At the same time (and for the same reason), they substan­
tially enhance prosecutors' ability to induce guilty pleas. That is the 
heart of the cost saving from broader liability rules. It is also a saving 
legislatures can obtain by raising nominal sentences. Suppose prosecu­
tors and legislators believe five years is the right sentence for a given 
crime. The best way to achieve that sentence may be to threaten fif­
teen years if the defendant takes his case to trial and offer five years in 
return for a guilty plea. That is part of the attraction to legislatures of 
three-strikes laws: they give prosecutors an extra card to play in bar­
gaining with defendants.173 But legislatures can do the same thing by 
creating a laundry list of overlapping crimes. Even under the federal 
sentencing guidelines, which purport to base sentences on "real of­
fense" factors rather than purely on the crimes charged, varying the 
charges has an enormous effect on the sentencing range.174 The false 
statement charge in Brogan raised the odds of conviction; the effect 
would have been the same had it instead raised the sentence Brogan 
would suffer if he lost. Both factors tend to push the Brogans of the 
world to plead. 
The point can be generalized. Broader criminal liability rules raise 
the threat value of trial, by raising both the odds the government will 
win and the sentence the defendant might receive if he loses. That al­
lows .the government · to get more guilty pleas. Making guilty pleas 
easier to obtain in tum lowers the cost of prosecution. And lowering 
the cost of prosecution is, from legislators' perspective, a useful coun­
ter to prosecutors' tendency to prosecute too little. 
c. Interest Groups. One standard way to account for legislative 
output is to focus on the strength of the private interest groups ar­
rayed on either side of a given issue. In some areas of criminal law, 
170. See 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (1994). 
171. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994), which covers anyone who, "in any matter within the juris­
diction of any department or agency of the United States, knowingly and willfully falsifies, 
conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact . . . .  " 
172. Brogan; 522 U.S. at 411 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
173. For an analysis of the way overbroad recidivist statutes can be used to achieve plea 
bargains that prosecutors might otherwise be unable to get, see Robert E. Scott & William J. 
Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1962-66 (1992)., 
174. For a nice demonstration of this point, see Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the 
Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1471, 1506-08 (1993). 
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that approach seems helpful: the power of gun owners over gun­
related criminal statutes is famous, or infamous.175 But in criminal law, 
interest groups tend to operate only on one side. A variety of groups 
may seek to broaden criminal liability, to add new crimes or expand 
the reach of old ones. But organized interest group pressure to narrow 
criminal liability is rare. The result is that interest group pressure only 
aggravates the tendency toward ever broader liability rules. 
Begin with groups that favor new crimes. Sometimes market actors 
will seek to criminalize their competitors. Paul Mahoney has shown 
that something like this may have happened with the passage of fed­
eral securities laws in the 1930s.176 Sometimes political actors wish to 
criminalize opposition to their cause; laws forbidding some kinds of 
abortion protest may fit this category. Ideologically motivated groups 
may find criminal law a useful means of enforcing their views; the 
criminal portions of environmental law come naturally to mind. And, 
of course, various groups may wish to gain the government's symbolic 
embrace in the form of a new criminal statute. 
This last category is particularly important in criminal lawmaking. 
To see why, consider a recent example of the phenomenon: the pas­
sage of hate crime statutes in most states and its likely passage in 
Congress.177 These statutes typically criminalize violent offenses com­
mitted because of animus toward some population group. Some laws 
go farther, covering all violent offenses in which the victim was se­
lected because of his or her race, sex, religion, and the like.178 (Crimi­
nals may pay attention to victims' demographics for reasons other 
than animus. For instance, a black victim in a white neighborhood or a 
white victim in a black neighborhood may seem vulnerable to would­
be robbers, less able to call on help from nearby residents or pedestri­
ans. Likewise, women may be selected for .victimization because they 
are less likely than men to carry weapons. The "because of" formula­
tion captures these crimes as well as more conventional hate crimes.) 
A wave of these statutes have been enacted during the course of the 
past decade; Congress is currently considering a federal version that 
adopts the broader "because of" formulation.179 
175. For a good treatment, see OSHA GREY DAVIDSON, UNDER FIRE: THE NRA AND 
THE BA TILE FOR GUN CONTROL (1998). 
176. See Paul G. Mahoney, The Political.Economy of the Securities Act of 1933, 30 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1 (2001). 
177. For the two leading works on this phenomenon - one decrying it, the other ap­
plauding it - see JAMES B. JACOBS & KIMBERLY POTIER, HATE CRIMES: CRIMINAL LAW 
AND IDENTITY POLITICS (1998); FREDERICK M. LAWRENCE, PUNISHING HATE: BIAS 
CRIMES UNDER AMERICAN LAW (1999). 
178. For a state-by-state breakdown, see LA WREN CE, supra note 177, at 178-89. 
179. All three of the bills pending in the 107th Congre.ss use the "because of' formula­
tion. Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2001, H.R. 74, 107th Cong. § 4 (2001); Protecting Civil 
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Hate crime laws have attracted a good deal of support from civil 
rights groups, women's groups, and, at the federal level, gay rights 
groups.1so That support does not stem from the laws' concrete effects. 
In Senate testimony concerning the federal hate crime bill, representa­
tives of the Justice Department testified that there would be only a 
handful of prosecutions per year under the bill if it were passed.1s1 
Rather, the groups supporting hate crime laws seek symbolic victories, 
legislative affirmations of their groups' importance and protected 
status. These symbolic victories may be valuable in themselves; they 
also may be valuable opportunities for lobbies to trumpet their legisla­
tive clout to their membership, which may be unaware of the limited 
practical effect of the laws. 
Criminal statutes are a perfect vehicle for that kind of lobbying 
strategy, because the victories tend to be cheap, relative to other sorts 
of legislation. Legislative inertia is famously powerful; in other areas it 
can be very costly to achieve even symbolic legislative victories, be­
cause powerful groups so often have some stake in preserving the 
status quo. Inertia matters in criminal legislation as well - remember 
that the returns from criminal legislation are usually low, so a little in­
ertia can go a long way - but it probably matters less than elsewhere. 
A few criminal defendants aside, hate crime statutes impose tangible 
costs on no one. Police and prosecutors are likely either to be indiffer­
ent to their existence or to find them a mild convenience. And there 
may be no organized interest group on the other side: no one is likely 
to lobby against a statute that ratchets up sentences for violent bigots. 
Actually, the point is even stronger. Recall that in any regime in 
which politically accountable prosecutors can pick their cases, their 
primary political incentive is to charge people the public wants 
charged. Of course, prosecutors might also charge people for other 
reasons - to harass them, to settle scores, to impose costs on political 
opponents. But those sorts of charging decisions become more costly 
as prosecutorial budgets become more constrained. It is one thing to 
settle a personal score when the opportunity cost of the prosecution is 
leisure, quite another when score settling means dropping robbery or 
drug cases from the docket because there are not enough prosecutors 
Rights for All Americans Act, S. 19, 107th Cong. § 107 (2001); Local Law Enforcement En­
hancement Act of2001, S. 625, 107th Cong. § 7 (2001). 
180. The three pending bills cited in the preceding note all cover acts of violence com­
mitted because of the actual or perceived sexual orientation of the victims. 
181. See supra note 114 (citing, and quoting, testimony of Eric Holder, then Deputy At­
torney General for the Criminal Division, at a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing in July 
1998). Infrequency of prosecution aside, there is some evidence that the hate crime phe­
nomenon is both small and declining. See JACOBS & POTIER, supra note 177; Christopher 
Chorba, Note, The Danger of Federalizing Hate Crimes: Congressional Misconceptions and 
the Unintended Consequences of the Hate Crimes Prevention Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 319, 341 
(2001). 
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to handle all the serious crimes that come to them. Local responsibility 
for prosecution means that budget constraints will be severe when 
crime rates are high, as they have been for the past generation. 
It follows that being charged with crime will tend to be stigmatiz­
ing. But if being charged with crime is stigmatizing, it is difficult for in­
terest groups opposed to criminal statutes to organize. Their very exis­
tence harms their members' reputations. One who seeks to lobby 
against expanded mail fraud liability is identifying herself (or her cli­
ent) as one who fears indictment, which, if indictment is stigmatizing, 
significantly raises the cost of lobbying. This might explain why there 
was so little lobbying activity when the intangible rights statute, which 
dramatically expanded federal mail and wire fraud liability, was en­
acted in the late 1980s.182 That statute poses large risks for a wide vari­
ety of white-collar personnel, including, importantly, politicians. One 
would expect these groups to have substantial power in Congress. But 
organizing and advocating their position would have large reputa­
tional costs: who wants to be the Congressman famous for arguing that 
federal law should give dishonest politicians a wider berth?183 
All this would be very different in a world where prosecutors had 
to prosecute, where enforcement was in some sense mandatory. Were 
that the case, becoming a defendant might be less stigmatizing, so lob­
bying on both sides might be more common. And law enforcement 
groups would themselves tend to appear on both sides of criminal li-
182. It might also explain why the opposition worked behind the scenes; public opposi­
tion was notably absent. Consider Adam Kurland's account of the passage of the intangible 
rights bill: 
Anti-Corruption legislation intended to overrule McNal/y was originally introduced in the 
Senate as a separate bill on June 17, 1988 . . . .  This bill only covered official corruption and 
was virtually identical to the Justice Department proposal set forth by [the then-Assistant 
Attorney General] . . .  With virtually no public debate, this version of S. 2793 passed the 
Senate on October 14, 1988 as part of a package of amendments to a highly publicized drug 
bill . . . .  [T]he House leadership apparently balked at approving such a broad bill without 
giving the new provisions adequate consideration. The final form of the anti-corruption pro­
visions, much more limited than its original form (but still part of an amendment to the elec­
tion year drug bill), emerged as a product of eleventh hour reconciliation deliberations with 
House and Senate leaders. 
Adam H. Kurland, The Guarantee Clause as a Basis for Federal Prosecutions of State and 
Local Officials, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 367, 488 n. 450 (1989). 
183. For a partial exception that tends to prove the rule, consider the McDade Amend­
ment, 28 U.S.C. § 530B (1998). The McDade Amendment does not narrow criminal liability, 
but it does something almost as surprising: it restricts the ability of prosecutors to get infor­
mation from suspects, by banning prosecutors from having contact with represented parties 
outside the presence of counsel. It seems much more than coincidence that the author (and, 
in Robert Weisberg's words, the "poster child") of the McDade Amendment, Representa­
tive Joseph McDade of Pennsylvania, was charged with (and acquitted of) bribery. See 
Robert Weisberg, Foreword: A New Agenda for Criminal Procedure, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 
367, 382-84 (1999). Having already been stigmatized by the law enforcement bureaucracy, 
the marginal cost to McDade of opposing the interests of that bureaucracy must have been 
small, and perhaps negative: pushing for corrective legislation tends to validate claims of 
past victimization. For the many members of Congress who have, unlike McDade, managed 
to avoid indictment, the cost structure is very different. 
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ability issues; indeed, those groups might actually have a tendency to 
argue for narrower liability rules, because broader rules would mean 
more work. Given enforcement 'discretion, broader liability rules give 
prosecutors more options, not more work. Given budget constraints 
and politically accountable prosecutors, opposing such rules tends to 
harm the one doing the opposing. 
This dynamic makes criminal statutes not only more numerous, but 
longer-lived as well. The same factors that make it hard for interest 
groups to organize in opposition to new criminal legislation also make 
it hard to organize in support of narrowing or repealing existing stat­
utes. The result is that once crimes are in place, they tend to be per­
manent. 
Every American criminal code is filled with evidence of this phe­
nomenon. Though it sounds odd to twenty-first century ears, in mid­
to late-nineteenth century cities, juggling was associated with fraud 
and street disorder. As recently as 1972, the Supreme Court dealt with 
a statute that targeted jugglers;184 scattered local ordinances probably 
still criminalize such behavior. Just as crimes associated with cars -
auto theft, joyriding, and carjacking - are among the most salient and 
feared crimes in a society that relies so heavily on the automobile, a 
century ago crimes associated with railroads were a source of great 
public concern. Today, Virginia's criminal code has a substantial sepa­
rate section (among the code's largest) devoted to railroad crime,185 
though one suspects the problems that prompted that section of the 
code are long forgotten.186 
Anti-juggling laws and railroad offenses are likely to be historical 
curiosities only; they generate almost · no prosecutions and figure in 
very few plea bargains. That is not so of other statutes that outlive the 
forces that spawned them. Sodomy remains a crime in about a third of 
the states. 187 A few of those states have civil statutes protecting gays 
against discrimination in various settings188 - a fairly clear signal that 
184. The vagrancy law at issue in Papachristou v. · City of Jacksonville included a ban on 
"persons who use juggling or [other] unlawful games or plays . . . .  " 405 U.S. 156, 156 n.1 
(1972). 
185. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-153 to 18.2-167.1 (Michie 1996). 
186. See, e.g., § 18.2-156 (criminalizing taking or removing waste or packing from jour­
nal boxes). 
187. As of early 2000, sodomy was a crime in nineteen states. Alvin C. Lin, Note, Sexual 
Orientation Antidiscrimina.tion Laws and the Religious Liberty Protection Act: The Pitfalls of 
the Compelling State Interest Inquiry, 89 GEO. L.J. 719, 737 n.129 (2001). That number is de­
clining: a half-decade earlier, it was twenty-eight. See RICHARD A. POSNER & KATHARINE 
B. SILBAUGH, A GUIDE TO AMERICA'S SEX LAWS 66-71 (1996). 
188. Compare FLA. STAT. ch. 800.02 (2000) (criminalizing indecent acts, including sod­
omy), Mo. CODE ANN. art. 27, §§ 553-554 (1996) (criminalizing sodomy), and MASS. GEN. 
LA ws ch. 272, § 34 (2000) (criminalizing qimes against. nature, including sodomy), with FLA. 
STAT. ch. 641 .3007 (2000) (proscribing discrimination by Health Maintenance Organizations 
on the basis of sexual orientation), Mo. CODE ANN., HEALTH Occ. § 19-311 (2000) (penal-
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criminal sodomy laws no longer have majority support. The statutes 
have nevertheless survived, in large part because gay rights groups 
have found it easier to lobby for favorable civil regulation than for 
narrower criminal liability. And the survival of sodomy statutes is no 
mere curiosity. Those statutes are used as a device for obtaining guilty 
pleas in sexual assault cases,189 presumably where the government ei­
ther has a weak case or wishes to avoid trial for other reasons. 
One should not overstate the point. Sodomy statutes have been 
repealed in most states.190 But repeal has come slowly, and the groups 
that are most inclined to favor it have often sought other legislative 
favors instead. This highlights an important feature of criminal law. 
Legislative inertia is always a powerful force, but when it comes to 
adding crimes it is probably less powerful than elsewhere, because in­
terest groups have a substantial disincentive to oppose extensions of 
liability. When the issue is subtracting crimes rather than adding them, 
legislative inertia is probably stronger in criminal law than elsewhere, 
since even groups with good reason to seek decriminalization hesitate 
to do so. 
2. Legislators and Judges 
Given prosecutorial discretion, legislatures have a natural bias to­
ward overcriminalization. Courts are a good deal less prone to that 
bias. One can see this in the two areas of criminal law that are still 
largely judge-made: the law of mens rea and the law of defenses. In 
these areas, doctrinal development sometimes works to defendants' 
advantage, and when that happens, courts are almost always the doc­
trine's authors. For a number of white-collar offenses, federal courts 
have defined mens rea standards so as to require the government to 
prove knowledge of illegality.191 Congress has ignored some of these 
izing licensed social workers who deny services based on sexual orientation), and MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4 (2000) (banning employment discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation). 
189. See POSNER & SILBAUGH, supra note 187, at 66; Developments in the Law: - Sex­
ual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1508, 1520 (1989). 
190. According to the Supreme Court, all fifty states criminalized sodomy in 1961. 
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 193 (1986). By 2000, only nineteen states still did so. Lin, 
supra note 187, at 737 n.129. 
191. For a sampling of the relevant cases, see Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184 (1998) 
(unlicensed sale of firearms); Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994) (evading currency 
reporting requirements); Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985) (unauthorized sale of 
food stamps); United States v. Nofziger, 878 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (election law viola­
tions). 
There is a mushrooming literature on these cases. For the best discussions, see J. Kelly 
Strader, The Judicial Politics of White Collar Crime, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1199 (1999); John 
Shepard Wiley, Jr., Not Guilty by Reason of Blamelessness: Culpability in Federal Criminal 
Interpretation, 85 VA. L. REV. 1021 (1999). 
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decisions and overturned others;192 to my knowledge, it has embraced 
none and enacted no comparable rules on its own. Before 1981, fed­
eral and state court decisions alike drove toward a broader (more pro­
defendant) definition of insanity;193 after John Hinckley's acquittal,194 
Congress and a number of state legislatures intervened to cabin the 
defense,195 and a few legislatures abolished it.196 More recently, argu­
ments for a broadening of self-defense in cases where battered women 
killed their batterers won significant successes in the courts.197 Those 
arguments were notably less successful in state legislatures (though 
there were a few victories there), and most of the favorable legislation 
simply ratified previous court decisions.198 Meanwhile, in the realm of 
legislatively defined crime, change is almost entirely one-directional. 
New crimes are regularly added to criminal codes. Old ones are rarely 
taken away, and legislatures almost never change definitions of of­
fenses in ways that make violations harder to prove. 
So it is natural to see legislative crime definition as something in 
need of restraint, and it is natural to see courts as good candidates for 
doing the restraining. But the degree of restraint is limited by the 
range of tools courts have. And the tools themselves are limited by the 
system's two central commitments: to legislative supremacy in crime 
definition, and to prosecutorial power over charging decisions. The 
commitment to legislative supremacy rules out aggressive constitu­
tional review of criminal statutes. The commitment to prosecutorial 
discretion rules out aggressive equal protection review of charging de­
cisions, the kind of review that would seek out and correct enforce­
ment disparities among different population groups and would bar ir­
regular and sporadic enforcement altogether. 
192. For the leading example of congressional overruling, see Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. 135, 
overruled in a matter of months by Section 411 of the Riegle Community Development and 
Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2160 (1994). The Act 
amended 31 U.S.C. § 5321, removing "willfully" from the definition of the anti-structuring 
crime at issue in Ratzlaf 
193. For a good recent account, see Christopher Slobogin, An End to Insanity: Recasting 
the Role of Mental Disability in Criminal Cases, 86 VA. L. REV. 1199, 1210-14 (2000). 
194. Hinckley attempted to assassinate President Reagan; he was charged with at­
tempted murder, pied not guilty by reason of insanity, and was acquitted. His trial is ex­
cerpted and discussed in PETER w. LOW ET AL., THE TRIAL OF JOHN w. HINCKLEY, JR.: A 
CASE STUDY IN THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1986). 
195. See 18 U.S.C. § 17 (1994) (doing away with the "control prong" of the test for in­
sanity, and placing the burden of proof on the defendant). For a good survey of post­
Hinckley developments in state law, see Lisa Callahan et al., Insanity Defense Reform in the 
United States - Post-Hinckley, 11 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 54 (1987). 
196. See IDAHO CODE § 18-207 (Michie 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3220 (1995); NEV. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 174.035 (Michie 2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 (1999). 
197. See Domestic Violence, supra note 19, at 1579-85. 
198. See id. at 1585-86 (noting that such legislation "primarily codified the courtroom 
victories won by battered women's advocates and defense attorneys"). 
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Two major judicial tools remain. The first is vagueness doctrine, a 
requirement that legislatures specify crimes rather than simply dele­
gate their definition. The second is a close cousin of vagueness doc­
trine - the rule of lenity, which authorizes courts to resolve statutory 
uncertainties in defendants' favor, seemingly a useful corrective to 
legislatures' tendency to err on the government's side when defining 
crimes. Neither of these tools, though, can accomplish much, for both 
are easily evaded. Indeed, it is possible that each makes overcriminali­
zation worse rather than better. 
a. Vagueness Doctrine. Vagueness doctrine requires that legisla­
tures be reasonably specific when defining crimes. (Actually, the doc­
trine goes beyond criminal law, but its primary use has been there.) It 
thus prevents legislatures from creating all-encompassing crimes like 
the infamous vagrancy ordinance in Papachristou v. Jacksonville,199 or 
the not-so-infamous gang loitering law in Chicago v. Morales.200 The 
clear goal is to prevent the state from criminalizing everything, and 
thereby delegating the real work of defining crimes to prosecutors. 
But vagueness doctrine cannot accomplish that goal, for legisla­
tures can achieve breadth and specificity at the same time. The history 
of the post-Papachristou law of street disorder proves the point. Old­
style loitering and vagrancy statutes used language broad enough to 
encompass almost anything people (or at least people whom the police 
perceive as troublesome) might do in public. Papachristou itself is a 
good example; in that case the ostensibly criminal conduct consisted of 
two mixed-race couples driving down one of Jacksonville's main thor­
oughfares.201 Courts invalidated most of those loitering and vagrancy 
statutes in the late 1960s and early 1970s.202 Ever since, legislatures, 
199. 405 U.S. 156 (1972). The ordinance read: 
Rogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go about begging, common gamblers, per­
sons who use juggling or unlawful games or plays, common drunkards, common night walk­
ers, thieves, pilferers or pickpockets, traders in stolen property, lewd, wanton and lascivious 
persons, keepers of gambling places, common railers and brawlers, persons wandering or 
strolling around from place to place without any lawful purpose or object, habitual loafers, 
disorderly persons, persons neglecting all lawful business and habitually spending their time 
by frequenting houses of ill fame, gaming houses, or places where alcoholic beverages are 
sold or served, persons able to work but habitually living upon the earnings of their wives or 
minor children shall be deemed vagrants and, upon conviction in the Municipal Court shall 
be punished as provided for Class D offenses. 
Id. at 156-57 n.l (quoting JACKSONVILLE, FLA., ORDINANCE CODE § 26-57 (1965)). 
200. 527 U.S. 41 (1999). The law provided, in part: 
Whenever a police officer observes a person whom he reasonably believes to be a criminal 
street gang member loitering in any public place with one or more other persons, he shall 
order all such persons to disperse and remove themselves from the area. Any person who 
does not promptly obey such an order is in violation of this section. 
Id. (quoting CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 8-4-015(a) (1992)). 
201. Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 158-59. 
202. For the best account, see Livingston, supra note 138, at 595-608: 
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state and local, have been replacing them with a series of more care­
fully defined offenses: anti-cruising ordinances, anti-noise ordinances, 
loitering-with-intent statutes, and youth curfew laws are all exam­
ples.203 At the same time, police have been reviving small-scale (and 
specific) prohibitions that had been dormant. A well-known case from 
Illinois, People v. Kail,204 involved a suspected prostitute arrested for 
riding a bicycle without a bell, under an explicit police department 
policy requiring officers to enforce any prohibitions they could find 
against vice suspects.205 
Kail and contemporary street disorder statutes show why 
Papachristou could not eliminate catch-all crimes. The real problem 
with old-style vagrancy and loitering laws was not their vagueness, but 
their breadth. Barring vague statutes does little about breadth. And 
breadth is much harder for courts to regulate, for it is a function not of 
particular criminal statutes but of the whole criminal code. The prob­
lem with Kail is not the unfairness of barring bell-less bicycles, but the 
unfairness of barring that plus a couple dozen other sorts of ordinary 
street behavior, which, taken together, criminalize everything and 
everyone the police and prosecutors might wish to punish. 
Vagueness doctrine may still have a non-trivial impact on the 
shape of criminal law, though the impact is not the one the doctrine 
seeks. Vagueness doctrine rules out enacting all-encompassing crimes, 
but it permits the creation of many smaller, more tightly defined of­
fenses. It thus pushes legislatures to expand criminal law by accumula­
tion, by adding ever more distinct acts to the criminal code. 
To some degree, of course, legislatures already have some incen­
tive to prefer many specific crimes to a few general ones. A legislature 
seeking credit for doing something about carjacking will want a fairly 
targeted statute - like the federal carjacking law, which requires 
proof of intent to cause death or serious bodily injury and a taking ac­
companied by violence or intimidation.206 General theft or assault 
crimes would be harder to use to make the appropriate symbolic 
statement (not to mention that those crimes already exist). But there 
are forces pushing the other way, toward generality rather than speci­
ficity. Police and prosecutors, the interest group that most commonly 
pushes for criminal legislation, gain from minimizing the limits on 
criminal liability; fewer specific elements means fewer limits. In the 
absence of some constraint like vagueness doctrine (along with the 
rule of lenity, which raises the risk that broad and undefined prohibi-
203. For a survey of these laws and courts' treatment of them, along with a discussion of 
how vagueness cases like Papachristou generated them, see id. at 608-34. 
204. 501 N.E.2d 979 (1986). 
205. See id. at 981. 
206. 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994 & Supp. 1997). 
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tions will be construed to defendants' advantage), criminal law might 
well contain fewer targeted, carjacking�style crimes, and more RICO­
style omnibus offenses. That kind of omnibus legislation is, after all, 
common outside the criminal sphere. Vagueness doctrine makes that 
path at least somewhat risky in criminal law, while posing no risks at 
all for targeted new criminal acts. As a relative matter, then, it makes 
targeted new crimes cheaper. . . 
In other words, vagueness doctrine. actually accents the tendency 
to create more crimes. Creating more criines, in turn, makes it harder 
for courts to play a significant role in criminal lawmaking. An omnibus 
crime like RICO will require substantial judicial interpretation (as 
RICO has).207 Carjacking statutes will not. More to the point, if prose­
cutors can choose among carjacking, auto theft, assault, armed rob­
bery, and kidnapping, they will find it easy to avoid presenting courts 
with interpretive issues. In any given case, some of those crimes will be 
easier to establish than others, and prosecutors can simply gravitate 
toward the easier ones. The more criminal law consists of a long list of 
overlapping, reasonably specific prohibitions, the less law courts will 
be called on to make. If vagueness doctrine is designed to rein in leg­
islatures, it fails. Its real effect, if it has an effe�t, is to add slightly to 
the proliferation of crimes, which in turn restricts not legislatures, but 
courts.208 
b. The Rule of Lenity. The second source of judicial restraint is the 
rule of lenity, which appears to require one-sided interpretation of 
criminal statutes, with ambiguities resolved in the defendant's favor.209 
This seems a perfect antidote to overbroad criminal laws, since it 
authorizes courts to rewrite such laws. to make them narrower. 
But like its cousin. vagueness doctrine, the rule of lenity might 
cause more overcriminaliZation than it prevents. If a strong rule of 
lenity existed (it doesn't),210 legislators :would know about it, and 
207. Though, as Dan Kahan rightly notes, courts have been slow to seize the authority 
to limit RICO's scope. See Dan M. Kahan, Reallocating Interpretive Criminal-Lawmaking 
Power Within the Executive Branch, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 51-52 (1998). 
208. Perhaps this means vagueness doctrine succeeds: it causes legislatures to define 
crimes more specifically than they might otherwise do. There is a good deal of truth to this 
more optimistic claim. Its problem lies in the value of the "success." Put simply, it is not clear 
why we should value specificity. Its chief effect, after all, is to shift lawmaking power from 
courts (the system's resolvers of statutory ambiguity) to legislatures, and, for reasons ex­
plored above, there is every reason to suppose that legislatures are the system's worst law­
makers. Unlike courts, legislatures are not likely to consider the interests of those likely to 
be prosecuted. Unlike prosecutors, legislatures do not have good information about the 
range of cases the system deals with. In a system with these features, ·empowering legisla­
tures is a strange goal. 
209. For the two best discussions (both fairly critical of the rule), see Jeffries, supra note 
89; Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. Cr. REV. 345. 
210. As both the sources cited in the preceding note demonstrate, the "rule" is followed 
only occasionally. 
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would therefore take it into account when drafting criminal statutes. 
Far from giving courts power to resolve contested issues of crime defi­
nition, a strong rule of lenity raises the incentive for legislators to re­
solve those issues - to eliminate doubts about the crime's coverage in 
advance. Doubts are likely to be resolved in the government's favor. 
There is a more basic problem with the rule of lenity as a device 
for reining in overbroad crimes. Narrowing judicial interpretations, 
once made, can be overturned. And just as trial courts dislike being 
reversed on appeal, appellate courts dislike having their decisions 
overturned by statute.211 As Eskridge has shown, that creates a natural 
tendency for courts to internalize legislative preferences when con­
struing statutes.212 And legislatures tend to prefer broader rather than 
narrower criminal liability rules. 
That might not be a problem if legislatures rarely overruled nar­
rowing interpretations of criminal statutes. But the best study of the 
issue (unfortunately limited to Congress) showed that interpretations 
of criminal statutes were overruled frequently - more so, by a large 
margin, than any other class of statutory decisions.213 The same study 
showed that these legislative overrulings were virtually all on one side: 
only interpretations that favored defendants prompted legislative ac­
tion.214 This stands to reason, given the interest group configuration 
discussed earlier. Groups wishing to overturn some objectionable 
statutory interpretation rarely face much opposition, and an unfavor­
able court decision provides a salient opportunity for legislative 
change. The upshot is that the rule of lenity is likely to exist only in 
occasional spurts; when courts become too aggressive, legislatures 
should find it easy to restrain them. 
Roughly speaking, that seems to describe the much-studied rela­
tionship between Congress and the Supreme Court in writing and con­
struing federal criminal statutes.215 The past three decades have seen 
211. See supra notes 146-147 and accompanying text. 
212. See Eskridge, supra note 147, at 390-404. 
213. Eskridge found that between 1967 and 1990, Congress overrode eighteen Supreme 
Court decisions interpreting federal criminal statutes; this represented fifteen percent of the 
statutory overrides during that period. Id. at 344 tbl.4. 
214. The criminal cases in Eskridge's study largely explain why the United States was 
the most common beneficiary of congressional overrides (twenty-five percent of the cases), 
while criminal defendants were among the least common beneficiaries (two percent of the 
cases). See id. at 348 tbl.7. Another measure of the one-sidedness of congressional supervi­
sion of federal criminal law is this: between 1978 and 1984, the Supreme Court decided 
thirty-four cases interpreting criminal statutes unfavorably to criminal defendants. Congress 
overturned only one of those cases. See id. at 351 tbl.9. Meanwhile, during the same period, 
Congress overturned five of twenty-four decisions unfavorable to the federal government. 
Id. 
215. Most of the literature focuses on the Court's side of the relationship. For the best 
pieces in this vein, see Strader, supra note 191, and Wiley, supra note 191. On Congress's 
side, the best work - though it covers much more than federal criminal law - remains 
Eskridge, supra note 147. 
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enormous growth in the number and scope of federal crimes. Pre­
dictably, the Court has, on occasion, reached out to cabin some of the 
broader offenses. Equally predictably, Congress has, on occasion, 
slapped it down. In 1987, McNally v. United States invalidated the "in­
tangible rights" theory of mail fraud, which had extended federal 
fraud statutes to cover breaches of fiduciary duties that caused no tan­
gible injury to their victims.216 In 1994, Ratzlaf v. United States required 
the government to prove knowledge of illegality in a currency restruc­
turing case;217 the defendant in Ratzlaf had broken up a large cash de­
posit into smaller chunks in order to avoid having banks report the 
transactions.218 Congress overruled both McNally and Ratzlaf - each 
within a year, each with virtually no opposition.219 
McNally and Ratzlaf nicely capture what the rule of lenity would 
mean in practice were it taken seriously. The problem in McNally was 
a vague actus reus; the intangible rights theory permitted the govern­
ment to prosecute behavior that might seem fairly innocuous to the 
relevant actors. In Ratzlaf, the criminal act was clear enough, but in­
tent was not. And if the currency restructuring statute's intent term 
were construed as the government argued · it should be, defendants 
could be convicted for purposely altering their behavior to comply 
with the government's reporting requirements - not the sort of thing 
one would expect would lead to a prison sentence. In both cases, the 
Court resolved the ambiguity in a way that limited the government's 
ability to charge and convict people who might not realize that their 
conduct could subject them to serious sanctions. In both cases, the end 
result was to enshrine the government's argument in the federal crimi­
nal code. 
Incidents like these might be expected to send a fairly strong sig­
nal.220 A Court attentive to legislative preference in statutory construc­
tion cases might be expected to respond by moderating its stance, 
giving a little more ground to the government in close cases. 
Generally speaking, that is what the Court has done. Decisions like 
McNally and Ratzlaf have not spawned a sustained judicial effort to 
rein in overbroad federal crimes. Rather, the pattern has been judicial 
acquiescence punctuated by occasional conflict, with the conflicts 
ending in a legislative victory for the government. 
216. 483 U.S. 350, 356-61 (1987). 
217. 510 U.S. 135, 137 (1994). 
218. Id. at 137-38. 
219. See supra notes 90, 182, 192 and accompanying text. 
220. There were others: Eskridge counts eighteen congressional overrides of Supreme 
Court decisions on federal criminal law between 1967 and 1990, about one-seventh of the 
total number of congressional overrides during that period. Eskridge, supra note 147, at 344 
tbl.4. 
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The normal, more acquiescent posture is well captured by a half­
dozen decisions the Court issued in 1997 and 1998. United States v. 
Wells found no materiality requirement in the federal crime of making 
false statements to federally insured banks.221 In Brogan v. United 
States, the Court overruled a long series of lower federal court deci­
sions establishing an exception to the federal false statements statute 
for1"exculpatory no's" - false denials of an embarrassing or incrimi­
nating fact.222 Bates v. United States declined to read a fraudulent in­
tent requirement into the federal statute barring misapplication of 
student loan receipts.223 Muscarello v. United States involved the fed­
eral mandatory minimum sentence for one who "carries a firearm" 
during a drug trafficking crime; the Court concluded that "carries" in­
cludes not just possession on the defendant's person but possession in 
a locked compartment of a nearby car as well.224 Bryan v. United States 
was a prosecution for selling unlicensed firearms; the Court permitted 
conviction without knowledge of the licensing requirement (though it 
did require proof that the defendant knew he was behaving illegally in 
some general sense).225 And in an inverted echo of McNally, O'Hagan 
v. United States sustained criminal insider trading prosecutions based 
on the defendant's breach of a fiduciary duty to the source of the in­
formation, whether or not the other transacting party was harmed.226 
Each of these cases involves its own statutory language, and the 
defendants' arguments were stronger in some cases than in others. 
Still, the pattern is fairly striking. These decisions cannot be squared 
with a strong rule of lenity. That is not surprising: when the Court does 
take the rule seriously (as in McNally and Ratz/a[) , Congress reacts, 
and the Court is likely to find the reaction embarrassing.227 
221. 519 U.S. 482, 495-99 (1997). 
222. 522 U.S. 398, 400-06 (1998). 
223. 522 U.S. 23, 29-33 (1997). 
224. 524 U.S. 125, 126-27 (1998). 
225. 524 U.S. 184, 191-96 (1998). 
226. 521 U.S. 642, 647 (1997). 
227. The Court's reaction is key. If legislative overruling is perceived as natural, even 
positive, it will not be a deterrent to narrowing judicial interpretations. This could happen if, 
for example, the Court invoked the rule of lenity as a prod to legislative clarification, in 
which case overruling would be seen as success, not failure. My colleague Einer Elhauge ar­
gues that this is precisely what the Court's rule-of-lenity decisions represent. See Einer 
Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Defaults 16-29 (Nov. 2001) (article draft, on file with 
author). 
Elhauge's argument is interesting and powerful. But I doubt it explains cases like 
McNally and Ratz/af There are cases in which courts explicitly invite congressional action, 
decisions whose authors expressly disapprove of the outcome they feel compelled to reach 
under the governing statutes. E.g., TV A v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (holding that Endan­
gered Species Act barred construction of a dam that risked endangering snail darters); see 
Elhauge, supra, at 40-42 (discussing Hill). McNally and Ratzlaf do not read like Hill; on the 
contrary, the Court's opinions in its rule-of-lenity cases defend their results as sound policy, 
which seems odd if the goal is to seek congressional reversal. See, e.g. , Ratz/af, 510 U.S. at 
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In such a system, doctrines like the rule of lenity are unlikely to 
have important consequences. In other areas, competing interest 
groups make legislative revision of court decisions hard to accomplish. 
Where that is so, judges enjoy substantial lawmaking power. The 
legislature-court dialogue is just that - a dialogue, with each side 
having a say in the composition of the relevant legal rules. In criminal 
law, the interest groups tend to be all on one side, making revision of 
court decisions that cut against that side relatively easy. That leaves 
judges with no good mechanism for forcing legislatures to internalize 
the judges' preferences. Legislatures, on the other hand, are well 
equipped to get the judges to act on their preferences. In this law­
making dialogue, only one side of the conversation need listen. 
3. Prosecutors and Judges 
Courts make criminal law, when they do .so, by interpreting crimi­
nal statutes in the context of criminal cases. Not all cases present in­
terpretive opportunities. Few criminal cases go to trial, and of those 
that do, few raise serious questions about the meaning of the relevant 
criminal act or intent, or of some criminal defense. (The most common 
defense argument at trial is that the government has the wrong defen­
dant, not that the defendant's behavior fails to satisfy the legal defini­
tion of the crime.) Courts' influence over the content of criminal law 
depends on the frequency and range of cases that do raise such issues. 
To see the point, imagine a criminal statute as a box. The cases in 
the middle of the box pose no interpretive problems - legally, they 
are easy cases. The cases on the box's borders, on the other hand, raise 
the question how, precisely, those borders are to be defined: How far 
does the actus reus extend? What does the mens rea standard encom­
pass? There will always be more cases in the middle than on the bor­
ders; in any area .of law, easy cases outnumber hard ones. But the hard 
cases still happen, and they provide the opportunity for fine-tuning of 
the relevant legal definitions. 
As we have already seen, one way legislators can make prosecu­
tors' job easier is to enlarge the box, to make boundary cases - cases 
that fall near the statute's borders - into interior cases, cases that fall 
in the middle of the box and hence raise no interpretive issues. One 
effect of this tactic is to remove boundary definition from the courts. 
Given a sufficiently large box, there will be no cases at the borders -
all cases will be in the interior, since the interior covers so much terri­
tory. 
144-46 (arguing that a contrary result would subject people to criminal liability for innocent 
mistakes). In short, if the Court was inviting congressional action in these decisions, the invi­
tation was exceptionally well hidden. 
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In one sense, criminal legislation does not fit this pattern, though 
in a larger sense it does. As I noted earlier, one effect of vagueness 
doctrine and the rule of lenity is to encourage the creation of relatively 
targeted crimes - of carjacking-type statutes, rather than RICO-style 
omnibus crimes. The expansion of criminal law has not been a matter 
of a few ever-expanding boxes; rather, the boxes have multiplied. In 
theory, this might mean more opportunities for judicial lawmaking: 
more crimes, with more boundary rules that courts must define. 
The actual effect is different. A criminal code with large numbers 
of fairly specific, overlapping crimes presents prosecutors with many 
options. A given violent criminal episode can easily satisfy the terms 
of a half-dozen or more felonies. Current double jeopardy doctrine 
permits the government to charge all such offenses, and to convict for 
as many as have at least one distinct element.228 Thus, prosecutors 
should generally be able to identify one or more charges that do not 
raise difficult legal issues. To return to the metaphor, if a given crimi­
nal episode falls close to the boundary of one box, it nevertheless 
likely fits in the interior of another. Prosecutors' incentive is to avoid 
the boundaries. Legislatures' incentive is to create the kinds of crimi­
nal codes that make avoiding the boundaries easy. 
This process is cumulative. Recall legislatures' tendency to add 
crimes but not to subtract them: new crimes are common; removal of 
old ones is rare. Over time, prosecutors' range of options only grows. 
With it grows prosecutors' ability to avoid giving courts the opportu­
nity to place a judicial gloss on criminal statutes. 
There is some rough evidence that this dynamic is at work, and 
powerfully so. Over the course of the past century the number of 
criminal charges filed has increased very substantially,229 and notwith­
standing a parallel increase in guilty plea rates,230 so has the number of 
228. See United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993). 
229. I cannot prove this proposition directly, because nationwide data on the number of 
criminal charges filed do not exist for most of the relevant period. But the size of the prison 
population tends to correlate with the number of criminal prosecutions, and there are na­
tionwide data on the number of prisoners, going back to the middle of the nineteenth cen­
tury. Unsurprisingly, that number has grown, steadily and substantially. From 1880 to 1980, 
the number of federal and state prisoners increased nearly ten-fold; from 30,659 to 302,377, 
with substantial increases in every decade except the 1960s. CAHALAN, supra note 125, at 29 
tbl.3-2. After 1980, we have more direct evidence of the number of criminal prosecutions; 
between the late 1970s and the early 1990s that number doubled. See infra note 231 .  
230. In  1962, a sample of twenty-eight counties found a guilty plea rate of  seventy-four 
percent for indigent defendants and forty-eight percent for defendants who retained counsel 
themselves. See 1 LEE SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN CRIMINAL CASES IN 
AMERICAN STATE COURTS: A FIELD STUDY AND REPORT 22-23 tbl.3 (1965). A dozen 
years later, the overall guilty plea rate had risen to slightly over eighty percent. See DAVID 
A. JONES, CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT 44 tbl.4-1 (1979). Another dozen years later, the 
rate for felonies alone exceeded ninety percent. See BARBARA BOLAND ET AL., U.S. DEP'T 
OF JUSTICE, THE PROSECUTION OF FELONY ARRESTS - 1987, at 3 (1990). It seems fair to 
assume that misdemeanors plead out at an even higher rate. 
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criminal trials.231 The number of criminal appeals has no doubt grown 
even more substantially, due in part to the expansion of defendants' 
right to appointed counsel on appeal. All of which ought to mean a 
large increase in judicial lawmaking opportunities. 
That hasn't happened. Instead, as the number of reported criminal 
cases has exploded, the number of reported decisions that take seri­
ously some argument about the definition of crimes or defenses ni.ay 
actually have shrunk, at least at the state level. Homicide and rape are 
exceptions; both continue to be the subject of frequent interpretive 
disputes. And federal criminal law is a special case, for reasons having 
to do with federal prosecutors' charging incentives. But for the bulk of 
state criminal law, the judicial role in crime definition has steadily 
faded during the course of a century when criminal appeals steadily 
grew. Appellate criminal litigation used to be primarily substantive; 
the focus was on either the sufficiency of the evidence or the definition 
of crimes or defenses. Today it is overwhelmingly procedural; Fourth, 
Fifth, and Sixth Amendment claims have taken the place of substan­
tive claims. Part of the explanation for this phenomenon lies in the ex­
plosion of constitutional criminal procedure in the 1960s and 1970s.232 
But part lies in the growing ease, in a world of expanding criminal 
codes, of filing charges that capture the defendant's conduct unambi­
guously. 
To some degree, this dynamic applies to a variety of non-criminal 
law regimes. Whenever an executive agency monopolizes enforcement 
of a regulatory statute, the legislature tends to delegate broad power 
to the agency, leaving the agency and legislature to handle the law­
making and cutting courts out of the process.233 In most regulatory set­
tings, though, courts can combat this tendency to deal them out. Ex-
231. I am not aware of good data on the nationwide number of criminal trials; that 
number must be inferred from other numbers. In that light, consider the following statistic: 
between 1978 and 1991, state court felony filings more than doubled. See NATIONAL CfR. 
FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT 1984, at 189-
90 tbl.35 (1986) (showing a thirty-six percent increase from 1978 to 1984); NATIONAL CTR. 
FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT 1991, at 37 
tbl.1.25 (1993) (showing a fifty-one percent increase in felony filings from 1985 to 1991). If 
filings were constant from 1984 to 1985, the cumulative increase was 105%. The actual in­
crease was almost certainly greater, since the number of filings was growing rapidly during 
the mid-1980s. 
Prior to 1978, the prison statistics cited at note 229 tell the story. Though it cannot be 
proved, the most natural conclusion is that everything - trials, guilty pleas, appeals, prison 
sentences - grew throughout the twentieth century. 
232. I have advanced this position elsewhere. See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Rela­
tionship Between Criminal Procedure and Crimina/Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1 (1997). 
233. This is a gross simplification of a complicated reaiity. For good discussions that em­
phasize the downsides of delegation to agencies, see THEODORE J. LOW!, THE END OF 
LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1979), and DAVID 
SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY (1993). For a more positive view of dele­
gation, see D. RODERICK K!EWET & MATTHEW MCCUBBINS, THE LOGIC OF DELEGATION: 
CONGRESSIONAL PARTIES AND THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS (1991). 
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ecutive agencies often exercise their power through some sort of ex­
plicit rulemaking.234 Courts can review those rules, and determine 
whether they conform to the authorizing statute and whether the 
agency adopted them in a reasoned manner.235 And courts can be 
fairly aggressive in reviewing all sorts of agency action, including rules, 
administrative adjudications, and decisions that do not fit neatly into 
either of those categories.236 Legislative overruling may be a risk, but it 
will often be a small risk, for powerful interest groups tend to be on 
both sides of regulatory disputes, making legislative inertia a powerful 
force. More to the point, those conflicting interest groups raise the 
likelihood that the authorizing legislation will itself present interpre­
tive opportunities - that key issues will be left unresolved, with op­
ponents agreeing to fight it out before the agency and the courts. 
Notice how different the executive-judicial relationship is in crimi­
nal law. Prosecutors rarely exercise their power through rulemaking; 
there is no incentive to do so in a system where criminal prosecution is 
as decentralized as in the United States.237 Criminal statutes are rarely 
the result of interest-group compromise, with important issues left for 
later judicial resolution.238 Since there are usually no interest groups 
on defendants' side, compromise is unnecessary. Legislatures' incen­
tive is not to leave issues unresolved but to resolve them in the gov­
ernment's favor. And if courts rewrite (translate: narrow) criminal 
statutes, legislatures will overturn their decisions. All of which serves 
to keep courts' role in criminal lawmaking to a minimum. 
234. See, e.g. , 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1996) (setting forth procedures for notice-and-comment 
rulemaking). 
235. The iconic cases are Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984), and Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). 
236. See, e.g. , 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994) (authorizing judicial review of agency action); 
Overton Park, 401 U.S. 402 (adopting broad view of agency action for purposes of judicial 
review); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Fann Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (affirm­
ing practice of judicial "hard look" at agency action); Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. 
N.L.R.B., 522 U.S. 359 (1998) (overturning agency adjudication on the ground that it was 
unsupported by substantial evidence). Chevron, 467 U.S. 837, is not at odds with this propo­
sition. Chevron requires deference to reasonable interpretations by the agency of its author­
izing statute, but only where the statute is ambiguous - and courts decide whether the stat­
ute is ambiguous. Id. at 842-43. 
237. Kahan, supra note 102, argues that such rulemaking would be a good thing, a 
means of promoting standardization in a sprawling federal criminal justice system. Whether 
or not that is true (I am skeptical), analogous sorts of rulemaking are inconceivable at the 
state level, if only because prosecutors and lawmakers work for different levels of govern­
ment - a large obstacle to any kind of centralized supervision. 
238. There are exceptions. See id. at 472-75 (discussing RICO in this connection). But 
the exceptions are just that. To see criminal law generally, or federal criminal law in par­
ticular, as fields involving a large-scale delegation of lawmaking from legislatures to courts is 
to miss the larger picture. The real delegation is not to courts, but to prosecutors. 
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D. The Consequences of Criminal Law's Breadth (Reprise) 
569 
The preceding sections explain why, given prosecutorial discretion, 
legislatures have a natural bias toward overcriminalizing, and why 
courts find it difficult to attack that bias. But criminal statutes are not 
ends in themselves; they are means of reaching a desired set of out­
comes. If the outcomes are good, it may be foolish to worry that. ithe 
legal rules that generate them are, in some abstract sense, too harsh. 
And perhaps the outcomes are good - or at least as good as can be 
expected given public preferences. To put the point another way, 
there are two keys to legislative incentives in this area - prosecutors' 
ability to decline to charge, and prosecutors' incentive to charge only 
those whom the public wishes to see charged. The question is whether 
those prosecutorial tendencies cure any ills that overcriminalization 
might otherwise produce. 
The answer is no. In the first place, enforcement discretion neces­
sarily undermines, and maybe destroys, criminal law's ability to send 
normatively attractive messages, to signal potential violators that this 
or that behavior is bad and ought to be condemned. A just pattern of 
prosecutions may be better than an unjust criminal statute, but it must 
be inferior, as a means of sending signals, to a just statute that is en­
forced as written.239 
Even if one rejects expressive theories of criminal law, the answer 
remains no. Legislatures' incentive to expand criminal liability has im­
portant procedural effects: it reduces prosecutors' incentive to sepa­
rate guilty defendants from innocent ones. It also has at least one im­
portant substantive effect: it lowers the cost to legislatures of 
criminalizing consensual behavior that some sizeable portion of the 
citizenry wants to engage in. 
1. . Sorting · 
Prosecutors have three major reasons for avoiding unjust prosecu­
tions. The first is conscience. Few prosecutors want to think of them­
selves as the kind of people who send undeserving men and women to 
prison. The second is politics. Were Kenneth Starr an elected district 
attorney he would have been out of a job by now; the public does not 
like prosecutorial overreaching. The third is litigation. One hopes that 
239. See supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text. This is true even if the statute itself 
sends no signal at all (because would-be violators do not read it). Enforcement of the crimi­
nal law as written means enforcement according to the same standards everywhere. Consis­
tency breeds salience; the sameness of the enforcement patterns across jurisdictional lines 
tends to reinforce the signal those patterns send. Even generally just enforcement patters 
will vary across jurisdictional lines if law enforcers are allowed to pick and choose which 
cases to prosecute and which to leave alone. Of course, the point in the text is still more true 
if, as Paul Robinson argues, statues send signals directly. See sources cited supra note 1 .  
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innocent defendants win at trial more often than guilty ones. The 
more true that is, the more costly it is for prosecutors to make sorting 
errors - doing so will lead to a rise in acquittals and, probably, a fall 
in the guilty plea rate. Broad criminal liability rules dilute that third 
incentive significantly, and in doing so undermine the first two incen­
tives as well. 
Begin with a more careful definition of that third incentive. De­
feats at trial are costly for prosecutors, both because trials are costly, 
and because defeats are salient - they are relatively rare (the gov­
ernment wins five-sixths of felony trials,240 and trials are less than one­
tenth of adjudicateq felony cases241) and hence vivid, both to prosecu­
tors and to the public. If innocence correlates with success at trial, 
prosecutors who charge more innocent defendants will lose more of­
ten. Their incentive to avoid losing will lead them to try harder to 
avoid bringing weak cases. That, in turn, should lead them to avoid 
prosecuting innocents. 
Two conditions must be satisfied for that sorting process to work. 
Criminal procedure must be structured to ensure that innocent defen­
dants are much more likely to win than guilty defendants. (It is not so 
much the odds that an innocent defendant will win that matter. 
Rather, it is the gap between those odds and the odds that a guilty de­
fendant will win - that gap defines the price prosecutors pay for mis­
takenly charging the wrong person.) And substantive criminal law 
must do a good job of defining innocence - of marking out the set of 
defendants whom it would be unjust to convict. I have elsewhere ar­
gued that the first condition is not satisfied; the criminal process as it is 
currently constructed tends to narrow the gap between the odds of 
convicting the guilty and the odds of convicting the innocent.242 The 
criminal lawmaking dynamic ensures that the second condition is not 
met either. Legislators have good reason to criminalize more than they 
(or the public) would want punished, in order to increase the likeli-
240. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS - 1993, at 546 tbl.5.73 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore 
eds., 1994). 
241. See, e.g. , id. at 536 tbl.5.57. 
242. More precisely, the interaction of criminal procedure and legislative funding of ap­
pointed defense counsel has this effect. The law of criminal procedure creates a range of 
claims defendants can raise at various points in the process, and those claims tend to be 
cheaper to investigate and litigate than claims bearing on defendants' factual guilt. Legisla­
tures, meanwhile, fund appointed defense counsel at levels that require an enormous 
amount of selectivity - counsel can contest only a very small fraction of the cases on their 
dockets, and can investigate only a small fraction of the claims their clients might have. This 
effect applies to the mass of criminal litigation, since roughly eighty percent of criminal de­
fendants receive appointed counsel. The consequence is to steer criminal litigation away 
from the facts, and toward more cheaply raised constitutional claims. Those claims tend not 
to correlate with innocence; or if they do, the correlation may be perverse. The argument is 
elaborated in Stuntz, supra note 232. 
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hood and reduce the cost of punishing the conduct they (and the pub­
lic) do want punished. There is no reason to believe criminal law, on 
its face, accurately captures the range of behavior the public thinks 
worthy of serious sanction. Indeed, there is good reason to believe the 
opposite. 
To put the point differently, by criminalizing more than it means to 
enforce, the system transfers adjudication from courts and juries to 
prosecutors. The real crime may be ABC; the nominal crime AB, with 
prosecutors adjudicating the presence or absence of C. This informal 
adjudication, this prosecutor's decision that separates the many 
"crimes" not worth prosecuting from the few that are, is grounded not 
in a legal or evidentiary process, but in a political one. Prosecutors' 
evidentiary sorting - their separation of homicide arrestees who are 
guilty of some form of homicide from those who aren't - is checked 
by the legal process that backs it up. If such decisions are made badly 
enough and if the process works as it should, the acquittal rate in 
homicide trials will be embarrassingly high. But when prosecutors sort 
based on unwritten elements rather than written ones, the legal proc­
ess offers almost no protection against screening errors.243 
The effect is to lower the cost of charging the wrong people. The 
real crime in Brogan involved fraud on Brogan's union, but the prose­
cutor did not need to establish that; it was enough to prove that 
Brogan denied something embarrassing in a brief conversation with a 
federal agent.244 That makes the prosecutor the effective adjudicator of 
the fraud offense - and if she adjudicates badly, the legal system will 
impose no penalty on her. 
Of course, prosecutors still have the other two reasons to sort well, 
to charge the people who ought to be charged and leave the rest alone. 
Political constraints still operate, as does conscience. But in a world 
where litigation is a poor check, political constraints will be also. The 
key effect of broadening liability is to ease the task of generating 
guilty pleas. Guilty pleas tend to be invisible, and invisibility makes it 
hard for political checks to operate effectively.245 A well-functioning 
system tends to generate lots of trials in hard cases. Where that is so, 
the public sees the kinds of hard cases prosecutors prosecute, and if it 
243. Juries may occasionally nullify, but the system is designed to minimize the chances 
that they will do so. They are not told that they may acquit for any reason - on the con­
trary, they may be told that if they find the elements of the crime proved, they "must con­
vict" - and the evidence and argument at criminal trials are usually limited to legally rele­
vant matters, meaning that many arguments for nonlegal acquittals cannot be made. 
244. See supra notes 168-174 and accompanying text. 
245. There is one major qualification to this statement: when defendants have access to 
the media, both guilty pleas and, for that matter, criminal investigations are visible to the 
public, and political checks do operate. That may describe a significant fraction of federal 
criminal litigation, at least in large cities. For an excellent, nuanced discussion, see Lynch, 
supra note 122. 
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disapproves, the public can ·bring its disapproval to bear. The existing 
system makes it fairly easy for prosecutors to generate pleas even in 
hard cases. The public never sees these cases, so no one knows what its 
reaction would be were they brought to light. 
Something similar may be true of prosecutorial conscience. It 
seems perfectly fair to assume that the large majority of prosecutors 
want to punish only those who deserve it. It also seems fair to assume 
that there will be more mistakes made in a system that allows prosecu­
tors to make those decisions quickly and invisibly. 
This is no small problem. Whether prosecutors sort well deter­
mines whether the system allocates punishment well, or even decently. 
Nationwide, twenty-eight percent of all felony arrestees are never 
convicted of anything, usually because prosecutors voluntarily dis­
missed charges (or failed to file charges in the first place ) .246 Another 
twenty-three percent are convicted but not incarcerated,247 again 
mostly because of favorable prosecutorial charging decisions. These 
numbers dwarf the tiriy cohort · of defendants who are charged, tried, 
and acquitted.248 The prime mechanism by' which undeserving def en:.. 
dants are cleared, or let off with only nominal punishment, is the 
prosecutor's screening process. Anything that dilutes prosecutors' in­
centive to screen well is likely to have seriously bad effects. 
Notice the nature of the problem. One standard line about broad 
prosecutorial discretion: is that it permits prosecutors to go off on 
larks, to prosecute people because the prosecutors don't like them, or 
for no understandable reason at all. For reasons explored earlier, that 
may be a significant problem in the federal system. But not for local 
prosecutors, who are constrained both politically and financially. For 
them, the problem is simpler: unless the trial system imposes costs on 
them for making mistakes, they will make too many. Broader liability 
rules are a way of evading the adjudication system, and therefore of 
making mistakes cheaper. 
2. Criminalizing Vice 
The other large effect of the way the system makes criminal law is 
substantive. Relative to other Western legal systems, America's crimi­
nal justice system has long had a strong focus on vice - prostitution 
and gambling a century ago, alcohol in the 1920s, and drugs more re-
246. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS - 1997, at 437 tbl.5.70 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore 
eds., 1998). 
247. See id. at 437 tbl.5.70, 439 tbl.5.72. 
248. The Justice Department's most recent annual report on outcomes for felony arres­
tees, nationwide, found that one percent were acquitted at trial. BARBARA BOLAND ET AL., 
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE PROSECUTION OF FELONY ARRESTS, 1988, at 3 (1992). 
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cently. That focus is usually attributed to America's moralism. It is 
also a consequence of the interacting incentives of law enforcers and 
legislators. 
Most criminal litigation deals with crimes that nearly all non­
offenders believe should be crimes. Prosecutors may make sorting er­
rors in burglary cases, and criminalizing the possession of burglars' 
tools may make those sorting errors more likely. But there will be no 
dispute about whether burglars should be punished. The huge major­
ity of the population thinks the relevant behavior wrong and, impor­
tantly, the huge majority of the population has no desire to engage in 
the relevant behavior themselves. For crimes like these, the lawmak­
ing dynamic yields broader liability rules but does not change the na-
ture of the behavior the system is seeking to punish. . 
With vice, the story is different.249 Gambling, sex for hire, and in­
toxicants are all things that a large portion of the public wants, and 
these goods and services are sufficiently cheap, at least in some forms, 
that people of all social classes can afford them. At the same time, 
these things generate both intense disapproval among another large 
slice of the population, and substantial social costs that tend to con­
centrate in poor communities. The result is complicated: anti-vice cru­
sades tend to have strong public support, but only . so long as the cru­
sades are targeted at a fairly small subset of the population. Our 
tradition of giving police and prosecutors basically unregulated en­
forcement discretion makes that targeting easy. Which in turn permits 
legislatures to define criminal liability in ways that might otherwise be 
politically impossible. 
One sees hints of this dynamic with each of the major vice crimes 
that have occupied the criminal justice system over the past century. 
Begin with prostitution. Before the late nineteenth century, most ju­
risdictions had no prostitution statutes; the relevant crime was running 
a "disorderly house," a more circumscribed offense.250 The period af­
ter about 1880 saw the growth of a powerful urban reform movement 
that led first to prostitution statutes, and then to broader solicitation 
and procurement statutes.251 But when some urban police forces tried 
to enforce those laws generally - when they actually tried to shut 
down prostitution, across neighborhoods and classes - they generated 
a significant backlash, in Lawrence Friedman's words, from the "silent 
army" of middle-class customers who frequented the more upscale 
249. The argument in the rest of this section is developed in more detail in William J. 
Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795 (1998). 
250. See THOMAS c. MACKEY, RED LIGHTS OUT: A LEGAL HISTORY OF 
PROSTITUTION, DISORDERLY HOUSES, AND VICE DISTRICTS, 1870-1917, at 93-118 (1987). 
251. See generally id.; MARK THOMAS CONNELLY, THE RESPONSE TO PROSTITUTION 
IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA (1980). 
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houses.252 There were two typical results: non-enforcement coupled 
with graft, with the police using the prostitution laws as devices for ex­
tracting payoffs,253 or enforcement targeted mostly at poor immigrant 
neighborhoods.254 
The story with respect to gambling is similar. For a long time the 
market for illegal games tended to segment by class, with numbers 
businesses dominating the · downscale market, and bookmaking and 
illegal casinos playing the same role in the upscale market.255 
Throughout this time, in most jurisdictions the criminal law of gam­
bling was all-encompassing. Enforcement was not. In those times and 
places when police and prosecutors took gambling seriously, they al­
most always targeted numbers operations, which were in turn concen­
trated in poor urban neighborhoods.256 
Prohibition was likewise legally all-encompassing, banning manu­
facture and sale of beer and wine as well as hard liquors. There, too, 
the illegal market tended to segment by class (there is some evidence 
that Prohibition made beer the working-class drink of choice, as liquor 
was priced out of reach for urban factory workers).257 And there, too, 
enforcement was largely class-based: contemporaneous accounts re­
port that blacks were the prime focus of alcohol enforcement and 
prosecution in the South;258 in Northern cities, it was working-class 
white ethnics.259 
Notice the pattern. For each of these three classic vice crimes, a 
majority of the population seems to have supported the ban, but a 
252. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 331 
(1993). 
253. Sometimes the graft was straightforward. In turn-of-the-century Atlanta, several 
houses of prostitution were owned by "a prominent police commissioner." Eugene J. Watts, 
The Police in Atlanta, 1890-1905, in 5 CRIME & JUSTICE IN AMERICAN HISTORY, pt. 3, at 
908, 917 (Eric H. Monkkonen ed., 1992). Sometimes it resembled taxation. In St. Paul, 
Minnesota, the leading house paid the city treasury thousands of dollars per year in ex­
change for lax enforcement. Best, supra note 103, at 73. 
254. See, e.g. , FRIEDMAN, supra note 252, at 226-28, 328-32; SIDNEY L. HARRING, 
POLICING A CLASS SOCIETY: THE EXPERIENCE OF AMERICAN CITIES, 1865-1915, at 191-95 
(1983). 
255. For the different ways this pattern played out in the late nineteenth and late twen­
tie�h centuries, see DAVID R. JOHNSON, POLICING THE URBAN UNDERWORLD: THE 
IMPACT OF CRIME ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN POLICE, 1800-1887, at 158-69 
(1979); FLOYD J. FOWLER, JR. ET AL., GAMBLING LAW ENFORCEMENT IN MAJOR 
AMERICAN CITIES 24-25 (1978). 
256. See FOWLER ET AL, supra note 255, at 24-25 tbl.2:4. 
257. See Stuntz, supra note 249, at 1805 & n.14, and sources cited therein. 
258. See, e.g. , MARTHA BENSLEY BRUERE, DOES PROHIBITION WORK? 112-13 (1927). 
259. The comments of a social worker in one Ohio city are typical: "In the foreign dis­
tricts there were raids and fines, but I never remember a single raid on an uptown cellar." Id. 
at 194 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also CLARK WARBURTON, THE ECONOMIC 
RESULTS OF PROHIBITION (1932) (concluding that Prohibition amounted to an attempt to 
"reduc[e] the consumption of beer by the wage-earning class"). 
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sizeable minority, cutting across classes and ethnic groups, wished to 
participate in the illegal market. Given the size of that minority -
and, consequently, the sheer number of illegal transactions - across­
the-board enforcement of the ban was unsustainable. The solution was 
enforcement aimed primarily at lower-class markets: street prostitutes, 
numbers operations, and working-class beer distribution networks. 
That tended to be a relatively popular solution, at least for a time, for 
two reasons. First, the social harms associated with these transactions 
- violence, impoverishment, disease - tended to correlate not only 
with the illegal transactions but with class as well. Second, lower-class 
neighborhoods were often politically convenient targets. Hostility to 
blacks in the South and to workingcclass immigrants in Northern cities 
were strong themes of turn-of-the-century American politics. 
Notice, too, how hard that solution would be to define legislatively. 
Had legislatures sought to capture the difference between downscale 
and upscale gambling, they probably would have banned some kinds 
of games but not others. But that strategy would have had limited ef­
fect, for the downscale market could simply have shifted from illegal 
games to legal ones. Had street solicitation but not prostitution been 
criminalized, prostitutes in poor neighborhoods could have retreated 
to fixed houses - as they did in most American cities through much of 
the nineteenth century.260 Had beer but not liquor been banned, 
working-class consumption would have moved, perversely, toward 
products with a higher alcohol content. That kind of flexibility is 
probably in the nature of markets for pleasurable-but-sometimes­
harmful goods and services. As a consequence, serious criminal en­
forcement of vice may depend on broad criminalization, coupled with 
equally broad law enforcement power to target particular neighbor­
hoods and, inevitably, particular racial or ethnic groups. Without en­
forcement discretion, criminalization might be impossible. 
Contemporary drug law and drug enforcement paint a complex 
picture, but one sees elements of the same pattern there as well. Not 
only are classically "hard" drugs like cocaine and heroin banned, but 
so are a wide variety of "softer" drugs like marijuana. Enforcement 
tends to be more aggressive than with past anti-vice crusades. Drug 
sentences are more severe than were sentences for gambling or illegal 
alcohol earlier this century, and the policing of upscale drug markets 
appears to be more persistent than policing of other upscale illegal 
markets over the course of the past hundred years. To that extent, the 
pattern breaks down; support for drug criminalization is probably both 
broader and deeper than support for earlier crusades against prosti­
tutes, gamblers, or saloonkeepers. Yet class-based, and hence to some 
degree race-based, enforcement remains common. Thus, crack mar-
260. See MACKEY, supra note 250, at 93-118. 
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kets in urban black neighborhoods are targeted, while more upscale, 
and whiter, drug markets receive less law enforcement attention.261 
Once again, that type of enforcement strategy, and that type of 
criminal law, would be much harder in a regime with limited police 
and prosecutorial discretion. Perhaps one reason support for drug 
criminalization remains so high - and surely one reason why the 
scope of drug criminalization remains so broad - lies in legislatures' 
ability to prohibit without fear · that the prohibition will be applied 
equally everywhere. 
E. Conclusion: Legislated Crimes and Common Law Crimes 
One of the bedrock principles of criminal law is that legislatures, 
not courts, should be the primary definers of crimes.262 The usual rea­
son given is that judicial crime creation carries too big a risk of non­
majoritarian crimes, which in tum creates too much of a risk that ordi­
nary people won't know what behavior can get them into trouble. The 
image is of legislatures that faithfully represent popular norms, and 
hence accurately define the universe of serious norm-breakers, while 
prudish old judges seek to impose their unrepresentative values on an 
unfortunate population. This image suggests not only that judges 
might, if allowed to do so, criminalize too much, but also that the "too 
much" might tend to be located in the spaces where popular norms are 
most likely to differ from the mores of old men in black robes: vice. It 
is no coincidence that in criminal law casebooks, the norm of legisla­
tive supremacy is taught with reference to two English cases involving 
consensual sex where judges stretched to impose criminal liability.263 
It turns out that both the argument and the image are backward. It 
is legislators who are likely to criminalize conduct ordinary people 
might innocently engage in - not in order to punish that conduct, but 
in order to take symbolic stands or to make punishment of other con­
duct easier. Courts' lawmaking tendencies are more balanced, less 
tilted in favor of broader liability. The places in criminal law where the 
scope of liability has expanded are almost all the product of legisla-
261. For an account of this phenomenon that emphasizes class rather than race, see 
Stuntz, supra note 249. For accounts that emphasize race, see DA YID COLE, NO EQUAL 
JUSTICE 141-46 (1999); MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT - RACE, CRIME, AND 
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 58-66 (1995). For an excellent discussion of the data on drug use 
and drug distribution, showing that law enforcement is even more racially tilted than is 
commonly thought, see Rudovsky, supra note 11, at 308-13. 
262. For the best defense of this norm, see Bilionis, supra note 96. 
263. The cases are Knuller v. Director of Public Prosecutions, (1973) A.C. 435, and Shaw 
v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1962) A.C. 220. For casebook discussions, see RICHARD 
J. BONNIE ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 34-35 (1997), and SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. 
SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 294-306 (6th ed. 1995). 
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tion. The few places where liability has contracted find their source in 
judicial opinions. 
· . 
And it is legislators who have given American criminal law its 
strong and sustained focus on vice. The Mann Act and other anti­
prostitution laws of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
Prohibition, and the plethora of drug bans - each of which, in turn, 
has occupied a substantial fraction of the criminal justice system's time 
and energy - all came from legislatures, not courts. Meanwhile, the 
real-world risk of inappropriate criminal liability for consensual sex 
comes from legislatures' tendency, once crimes are on the books, to 
leave them there. 
All this is true because of enforcement discretion. Police and 
prosecutors can choose whom to . target from among the universe of 
potential offenders. That reduces the cost to legislatures of expanding 
criminal law's scope. It also raises the threshold level of both law­
breaking and political opposition needed to defeat the criminalization 
of a given kind of behavior. 
There is no reason to believe anyone planned it this way. Legisla­
tive crime definition and prosecutorial discretion entered the system 
roughly contemporaneously (both over .the course of the nineteenth 
century).264 No one thought about the latter in connection with the 
former. Criminal codes were perceived as ·a means of rationalizing the 
law, a way to provide greater clarity than was possible from a cacoph­
ony of judicial voices.265 So far as one can tell from the relevant his­
torical literature, criminal codification was meant neither to expand 
nor to contract criminal liability. Codifiers were concerned with crimi­
nal law's indefiniteness, not with its narrowness or breadth.266 
But criminal law's codifiers did not see how their work would 
change character when combined with the parallel growth in prosecu­
tors' power. The move from common law to criminal statutes ap­
peared to (and did) shift power from judges to legislators. But its 
larger and more lasting effect was to shift power from judges to prose� 
cutors. The anti-vice statutes of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
264. The best history of the rise of prosecutorial discretion is also the best history of the 
rise of plea bargaining. See George Fisher, Plea Bargaining's Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857 
(2000). The best account of the rise of criminal codes in nineteenth-century America (and in 
the British Empire) remains Sanford Kadish, Codifiers of the Criminal Law: Wechsler's 
Predecessors, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1098 (1978). 
265. See generally Kadish, supra note 264 at 1099-106 (discussing the Livingston Code in 
Louisiana); id. at 1130-38 (discussing the Field Code and its adoption in much of the western 
United States). 
266. Certainly the statement in the text is true of Bentham, the codifiers' patron saint. 
See, e.g. , JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION 13-14 n.l (Hafner Publishing Co., 1948) (complaining that common law deci­
sions are based on no discernible principle); 3 JEREMY BENTHAM, THE COLLECTED WORKS 
OF JEREMY BENTHAM 206 (John Bowring, ed., 1843) ("[T]he grand utility of the law is cer­
tainty: unwritten law does not - it cannot - possess this quality."). 
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centuries made police and prosecutors not just enforcers of criminal 
statutes, but makers of vice policy, with the ability to target some 
vices, and some groups, more than others. The cumulation of criminal 
prohibitions that we have seen over the past half-century has made it 
ever easier for prosecutors to generate guilty pleas in street crime 
cases, making prosecutors the system's prime adjudicators in such 
cases. When it comes to vice - today, drugs - prosecutors are the 
system's real lawmakers. When it comes to a range of ordinary street 
crimes, prosecutors often function as judge and jury; they are the sys­
tem's real adjudicators. That is how enforcement discretion changed 
criminal law: legislators took control, but could not keep it; the legisla­
tive (and judicial) power have increasingly passed into the hands of 
law enforcers. 
All this sounds like the antithesis of the rule of law. Yet, oddly, 
these developments coincided with the triumph of rule of law norms, 
at least at a formal level. Still more oddly, that triumph has only ag­
gravated the system's tendency to dissolve into lawlessness. In the 
criminal justice system, the rule of law produces three key norms: 
crimes must be defined legislatively, prospectively, and specifically.267 
For reasons explained earlier, the first norm is backward. Legislative 
crime definition has a natural tendency to become, in practice, prose­
cutorial crime definition, as legislatures define broad nominal liability 
rules, leaving prosecutors to determine what behavior actually leads to 
conviction and punishment. The second norm is just a way of restating 
the first. In our system, courts are (mostly) retroactive lawmakers; 
legislatures act prospectively. A strong ban on ex post facto criminali­
zation just forces criminal lawmaking back to the legislature, which in 
turn delegates it to prosecutors.268 
And the third norm - specificity - is perverse. To see why, return 
to the fraud example discussed in Part II. The legislature presumably 
267. For the best (by far) discussion of the meaning of the "rule of law" for criminal law, 
see Jeffries, supra note 89. Jeffries identifies the same three rules or norms, but he discusses 
prospectivity under the guise of the rule of lenity. That rule is one of the primary means by 
which the system guards against retroactive lawmaking, since it disables courts from ex­
panding criminal liability rules by requiring that interpretive doubts be resolved in defen­
dants' favor. See supra notes 210-227 and accompanying text. 
268. Thus, Rogers v. Tennessee, 121 S. Ct. 1693 (2001), which tends to undermine the 
ban on retroactive lawmaking, actually makes criminal law more lawlike, not less. In Rogers, 
the victim of the defendant's assault died fifteen months after that assault. Under the tradi­
tional "year and a day" rule, which applied in Tennessee prior to Rogers, these facts would 
not permit a murder conviction. The Tennessee Supreme Court overturned the year-and-a­
day rule and applied its decision to Rogers. The United States Supreme Court held that the 
Tennessee court's actions did not violate due process. 
Rogers expands, slightly, courts' ability to make pro-government decisions in cases in­
volving the construction of criminal statutes. That in turn reduces, again slightly, legislatures' 
incentive to define offenses as broadly as possible. And that raises the likelihood that the 
formal definition of crimes will bear a reasonable relationship to the prosecutors' charging 
decisions. 
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intends to ban seriously wrongful or seriously harmful dishonesty, no 
more and no less. But it cannot define "seriously wrongful" (nor "dis­
honesty," for that matter). A ban on vague crimes thus forces the leg­
islature to criminalize either more or less than it wishes to punish. The 
predictable choice is more. This choice does not do away with the 
vague criminal liability rule. Prosecutors, one can safely expect, will 
tend to seek out (mostly) cases of serious wrong and serious harm. 
Law enforcers will draw the line that vagueness doctrine forbids leg­
islators to draw. But courts will not. That is the real effect of a ban on 
vague crimes: instead of two dedsionmakers deciding whether the de­
fendant's conduct was bad enough to justify criminal punishment - a 
prosecutor and a judge - we have one, the prosecutor, who chooses 
whether to prosecute (and thereby generate a guilty plea) or not. 
In the guise of protecting the rule of law, we have generated its 
opposite. Criminal law is nominally legislative, prospective, and spe­
cific. In practice, it is none of those things. Oddly, part of the reason 
why is that courts have required those things, and in the process dis­
abled themselves from participating in the definition of crimes. 
III. SOLUTIONS 
American criminal law is the product of a tacit partnership. Legis­
lators and law enforcers have common interests. Pursuit of those 
common interests leads naturally to the strange regime we now have, a 
regime that suffers from both too much law and too much discretion 
- indeed, a system in which too much law produces too much discre­
tion. If there is a way out of this box, it must begin by breaking up the 
partnership. · 
There are two possible ways to do that. The first is to end prosecu­
tors' monopoly on enforcement: to abolish, or at least severely limit, 
prosecutorial discretion. The second is to end legislators' monopoly on 
crime definition. This second option in turn might take either of two 
forms. Criminal law could be depoliticized, with lawmaking assigned 
to institutions that are substantially less accountable to the electorate 
(and hence substantially less inclined to overcriminalize, at least in 
theory) than legislators. Or criminal law could be constitutionalized, 
with much more lawmaking power assigned to courts. For reasons ex­
plored below - in brief outline - the only one of these solutions that 
has any chance of working is the last. 
A. Abolishing Discretion 
The most obvious way to separate law enforcers from lawmakers is 
to regulate the former. Enforcement discretion permits overcriminali­
zation, which in turn encourages more discretion. The result is an un­
written criminal "law" that consists only of enforcers' discretionary 
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decisions. Why not simply do away with the unwritten law and make 
police and prosecutors enforce the written one? That would go far to­
ward eliminating not just discretion but discriminatory law enforce­
ment as well. And it would, at a stroke, compel legislators to define 
crimes well: to criminalize only that which the citizenry is prepared to 
punish consistently. 
But discretion is not so easily abolished, or even cabined. First, po­
lice and prosecutors are necessarily in the business of rough pre­
adjudication screening, of separating the probably guilty from the 
probably innocent. That screening is bound to be unreviewable, or 
close to it. Unreviewable screening for probable guilt creates the op­
portunity for unreviewable screening on other grounds - perhaps be­
cause this law should be enforced more vigorously than that one. Sec­
ond, some crimes - think of drugs - require law enforcers to look 
for the crime rather than wait for reports and investigate them. One 
cannot look everywhere, and the decision to look in some places but 
not others is, in effect, discretionary enforcement. Thus, any system 
that takes drug crime seriously must tolerate a lot of discretion. 
Take these points one at a time. Police can arrest, and prosecutors 
can prosecute, only if they have probable cause to believe the arrestee 
or defendant has committed a crime.269 One could imagine a different 
standard, but some such limit is essential. Even in a world where all 
crimes are to be enforced across the board, across-the-board enforce­
ment cannot mean that everyone is arrested. Someone must identify 
the system's targets, and the identification must involve a kind of ini­
tial adjudication, a determination that the person targeted has likely 
committed the .crime for which he is being arrested or charged. 
In the nature of things, that initial "adjudication" must receive lit­
tle or no review; the frontline decisionmaker must have the final say, 
at least in most cases. Anything else would cause the system to grind 
to a halt. (Consider: there are more than fifteen million arrests per 
year in the United States.270 Imagine what careful review of each of 
those arrests would cost.) But if police officers and prosecutors can 
decide that a case is not strong enough to prosecute, and if no one can 
second-guess that decision, what is to stop them from deciding that, 
though legally strong enough, the case does not deserve prosecution? 
Discretion to screen cases out on the merits (i.e. ,  because the evidence 
does not justify going forward) must be present in any system. And 
that discretion can all too easily morph into the kind of discretion the 
system tolerates now: decisions to let some cases slide because police 
269. The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that this limit does not distinguish among 
crimes. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001). 
270. See 1997 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 246, at 324 tbl.4.1 (showing a total of 15.2 mil­
lion arrests for 1996). 
December 2001) Criminal Law's Politics 581 
officers and prosecutors believe some laws deserve less enforcement 
than others. Which in turn means law enforcers become lawmakers. 
Even if the cost were not prohibitive, judicial review of charging 
decisions is probably unworkable,271 because police and prosecutors 
could so easily evade it. At any given time, the great majority of the 
population is not being arrested or prosecuted. These non-arrests and 
non-prosecutions are overwhelmingly the result of non-decisions - it 
does not occur to anyone to arrest or prosecute most people. Non­
decisions are unreviewable, because there is nothing to report to the 
reviewing authority; there is no event to trigger judicial scrutiny. 
Which gets to the key reason why decisions not to seek criminal pun­
ishment - even when they are genuine decisions - are inevitably 
made in conditions of low visibility, with little or no input from higher­
ups. The higher-ups can intervene only when they know of a decision; 
they can only review when there is something to review. With choices 
not to arrest or prosecute, that can happen only if the frontline official 
volunteers that he has decided not to act. People rarely volunteer ac­
tions (much less omissions) that may lead to legal sanctions. Thus, no 
matter what rules we establish, it seems likely that most decisions not 
to go forward will be made quietly; without any attention from the 
formal legal system. So much for judicial review.272 
This is not to say that the kind of prosecutorial discretion we have 
now is inevitable. Rather, the point is that reining in discretion re­
quires tools that the legal system does not have. The most important 
factor in determining how law enforcers exercise their discretion is 
neither the law nor the existence of formal review mechanisms. The 
legal culture and police culture matter much more. A culture in which 
prosecutors are taught that it is unprofessional to decline to charge 
based. on anything other than lack of evidence will lead to different 
charging patterns than one in which prosecutors are taught that they 
are czars of their dockets, dispensing justice as they see fit. American 
prosecutors, by and large, see themselves as czars. 
Changing that self-perception is much harder than changing a few 
rules. Which leads to the second problem with reining in discretion: 
victimless crime. Any society that seeks to stamp out drugs, or gam-
271 . Needless to say, such review does not exist now. For the leading case, and still the 
best judicial discussion of the issue, see Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 
477 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1973). 
272. To be sure, judicial review would matter in cases that have some public visibility, 
cases where action and inaction alike will attract public attention. Inmates of Attica, cited in 
the preceding note, was such a case. When prison guards murder inmates, or for that matter 
when prison inmates murder guards, prosecutors cannot quietly dispose of the case. The 
larger public will know. The same is true in cases in which crime victims have access either to 
the media or to the kind of legal assistance needed to bring lawsuits to force prosecution -
like the suit in Inmates of Attica. My point is only that all the above-described cases taken 
together constitute a tiny fraction of potential criminal cases. Judicial review in those cases 
would therefore be little more than window dressing. 
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bling, or alcohol, or any other sort of behavior that involves consen­
sual transactions, requires law enforcement that is proactive. The ille­
gal transactions do not report themselves, so the police must go look­
ing for them. Where they look determines what kinds of arrests they 
make, which in turn determines what kinds of cases prosecutors 
charge. Even if prosecutors had to charge everyone whom the police 
arrest, drug-type crime would involve an enormous amount of en­
forcement discretion by the police. That discretion cannot be dis­
pensed with; it is a necessary consequence of the nature of the crime. 
A natural response is to want someone other than the police to 
make those discretionary judgments. Enter prosecutors.273 But as soon 
as prosecutors begin second-guessing the police decisions (by going 
forward with some cases but not others), prosecutors become policy­
makers, deciding which drug laws should be enforced where; That 
kind of power is hard to cabin. So our society's desire to criminally 
punish the sale and possession of narcotics leads naturally to a kind of 
czarism among prosecutors, to the practice of substituting their own 
discretionary enforcement decisions for the decisions legislatures en­
shrine in criminal codes. Once prosecutors take that view of their job 
with respect to drug crime, it is hard to prevent them from taking a 
similar view of their job across the rest of their dockets. 
It is not clear that we could seriously limit enforcement discretion 
even if we decriminalized the sale and use of drugs. It is clear that un­
less we do so, we are stuck with enforcement discretion. And we are 
not about to decriminalize drugs. 
B. Abolishing Legislative Supremacy 
The better way to curb prosecutors' power is indirect - to do so 
by curbing legislators' power. As is always true, power taken from one 
place must flow someplace else. With the power of crime definition, 
there are two basic possibilities. One is to shift crime definition from 
elected legislators to unelected experts or bureaucrats. The second is 
to shift crime definition from legislators to courts. 
1. Depoliticizing Criminal Law 
The first possibility is one we have already tried, both with the 
Model Penal Code ("MPC") and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 
The first of those experiments, or rather its conclusion, shows why de-
273. Not that prosecutors are the only possible mechanism for reining in police discre­
tion. On the contrary, doing a good job of policing the police may mean relying more on in­
stitutions other than prosecutors and courts. For two excellent discussions that emphasize a 
combination of political controls and administrative review of police misconduct, see 
Livingston, supra note 138, at 650-67; Luna, Principled Enforcement, supra note 4, at 590-
623. 
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politicization is not a stable equilibrium. Politicians may delegate 
criminalization to experts for awhile, but the delegation will not last. 
The Guidelines, meanwhile, show why depoliticization may tend to 
produce bad outcomes. 
Before looking at why these experiments failed, consider why they 
were undertaken in the first place. The history of American criminal 
law is a history of haphazard addition, with new offenses joined 
piecemeal to existing criminal codes. That is natural: for all the rea­
sons explored in Part II, one should expect criminal lawmaking to 
have a bias toward too much liability, and one should not expect 
criminal legislation to follow any coherent theory. Hence the appeal of 
the Model Penal Code project to a generation of law reformers. 
Herbert Wechsler and company offered the promise of leaner, more 
coherent criminal codes - of a body of law that combined the speci­
ficity of legislation and the rationality of the common law.274 
It is easy to understand why law professors and other reformers 
embraced that enterprise. Why did legislators? Nearly half of 
America's criminal codes were remodeled along the lines of the 
MPC.275 This seems more than a bit strange. Why would elected politi­
cians defer to Wechsler's expertise? 
There is no good answer in the existing literature, and I can offer 
only two partial responses. First, the premise of the question is wrong. 
No state adopted the Model Penal Code wholesale. Many of the states 
that copied it did so very partially, modifying some of its central ele­
ments.276 And, crucially, adoption of the MPC in no way restricted 
legislators' ability to add crimes later. They have continued to do so.277 
274. Putting the same thought in slightly different terms, Herbert Packer extolled the 
Model Penal Code's "principled pragmatism," a description Wechsler enthusiastically em­
braced. Herbert L. Packer, The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 594, 594 
(1963); Herbert Wechsler, Foreword: Symposium on the Model Penal Code, 63 COLUM. L. 
REV. 589, 590 (1963). 
275. The Foreword to the Model Penal Code lists thirty-four states that revised their 
criminal codes between 1962 and 1983, MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, at xi 
(Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985), a number that substantially overstates the 
MPC's influence. A better gauge is this: as of a few years ago, twenty-two states had adopted 
the MPC's basic culpability structure, and twenty states had adopted the MPC's rule with 
respect to mistakes of fact. Dannye Holley, The Influence of the Model Penal Code's Culpa­
bility Provisions on State Legislatures: A Study of Lost Opportunities, Including Abolishing 
the Mistake of Fact Doctrine, 27 Sw. U. L. REV. 229, 236, 247 (1997). 
276. Consider one telling example. By most accounts, the single most important rule in 
the MPC is the establishment of recklessness - a culpability level that involves subjective 
fault - as the default mens rea, the intent standard that applies when the relevant criminal 
statute is silent as to intent. Of the twenty-two states that adopt the MPC's culpability struc­
ture, see Holley, supra note 275, at 236, only eleven adopt this recklessness default rule. Id. 
at 243 & n.40. Six of the twenty-two states make negligence their default mens rea term. See 
id. at 243-44 & n.41. 
277. See, e.g., Model Penal Code Conference Banquet Remarks and Responses, 19 
RUTGERS L.J. 855, 864 (1988) (remarks of Herbert Wechsler) (complaining that the New 
York criminal code, "which in 1965 I think was a really quite distinguished integrated code, 
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At most, the MPC offered a convenient focal point for reform efforts, 
a means of temporarily paring down criminal codes. But it did nothing 
to ensure that the paring down would last, that the underbrush, once 
cleared away, would not grow back. In short, legislators did not cede 
control over criminal law to the experts at the American Law Insti­
tute. It would be more accurate to say that they (or some of them) 
adopted the ALI's terminology and a few of its substantive definitions 
and then returned to the same legislative patterns they had followed 
before. 
Second, even that limited cession of power occurred at, or soon af­
ter, an historically unique moment. Crime rates dropped steadily and 
substantially from the late 1930s to the mid-1950s.278 By the end of that 
period, crime was probably less of a political issue - a smaller source 
of political returns for elected legislators - than at any time in the 
past century and a half. A little deference to experts must not have 
seemed terribly costly; in 1960, criminal law's political returns were 
probably no greater than the returns from tinkering with the commer­
cial code, another area where expert-driven reform swept state legisla­
tures. To be sure, the MPC's legislative victories came not in the 
1950s, when crime was at its low point, but in the late 1960s and early 
1970s.279 Yet there is often a lag time between important social devel­
opments and politicians' adaptation to those developments. Consider 
the crime drop of the 1990s, and the way politicians continued, until 
quite recently, to talk and act as though crime were still rising. More­
over, the crime rise of the 1960s was steep and unexpected; politicians 
may have assumed that they were seeing a temporary spike, not a 
permanent increase - much like what America saw several times in 
the nineteenth century, when murder rates both rose and declined 
suddenly.280 If so, it probably took some time for that belief to disap­
pear. Finally, the civil rights movement of the 1960s may have pre­
vented some politicians from embracing tough-on-crime politics for 
has been slopped up. That's going to happen in every state in the union."). Wechsler went on 
to discuss the need for "protective organizations in the legislature" to prevent creeping over­
criminalization. See id. at 864-65. But it is not obvious what such organizations would look 
like, or how they can defeat the political incentives to add crimes. 
278. Changes in homicide rates are generally taken as a reasonable surrogate for 
changes in overall crime rates. For a good, brief discussion of homicide rates over the course 
of American history, along with a showing that homicides fell sharply between the 1930s and 
the 1950s, see Eric Monkkonen, Homicide Over the Centuries, in THE CRIME CONUNDRUM 
163, 166-69 (Lawrence M. Friedman & George Fisher eds., 1997). 
279. Of the state code revisions mentioned in the MPC's Foreword, twenty-four oc­
curred between 1962 and 1976. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, at xi (Official 
Draft and Revised Comments 1985). Of the twenty-two states Holley, supra note 275, identi­
fies as having enacted the MPC's basic culpability structure, seventeen revised their codes in 
the same period. See id. at 236 n.21 for the list of states. 
280. See Monkkonen, supra note 278, at 166 fig. 1 (showing a number of sharp spikes in 
homicides in New York City between 1800 and 1875). 
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awhile, lest they find themselves in league with segregationists. For all 
these reasons, a decade-long time lag is not terribly surprising in this 
context. In any event, by 1980 the time lag was over, and the MPC's 
victories had basically ceased.281 
That last phrase will still hold true decades from now. Certainly 
there is no sign in legislative halls of a renewed interest in criminal 
code revision. Nor should that surprise anyone: though the nation's 
crime rate has fallen substantially in the last decade, it remains more 
than two and a half times as high as the crime rate of the early 1960s.282 
Crime would thus have to fall a great deal farther to reach the levels 
that led legislators to permit MPC-style experimentation. And in or­
der for that legislative flexibility to reappear, crime would not only 
need to fall; it would need to stay low for a considerable period of 
time. The post-1960 crime waves have taught two generations of poli­
ticians that criminal legislation is politically valuable. Before another 
MPC-like project can take off, those same politicians or their succes­
sors will have to unlearn the lesson. That would take some time: at 
least a generation, and perhaps more. Only the most optimistic fore­
casters would predict crime rates that are both low and stable for that 
long.zs3 
That much explains why expert-driven criminal law is a practical 
impossibility. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines show why expert­
driven criminal law is also unattractive. Like the Model Penal Code, 
the Guidelines emerged out of chaos; they offered coherence where 
the existing system seemed arbitrary. Prior to the rise of guidelines 
systems, sentencing was little more than the exercise of case-specific, 
consider-all-the-circumstances judgment by trial judges. Law had al-
281. By 1980, thirty-three of the thirty-four code revisions noted in the MPC's Foreword 
had occurred. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, at xi (Official Draft and Revised 
Comments 1985). By 1997, only two more state code revisions had taken place. Holley, supra 
note 275, at 229-30 n.2. 
· 
282. According to FBI figures, the number of index crimes per 100,000 population in 
1960 was 1,126. FBI, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 1972: UNIFORM 
CRIME REPORTS 61 tbl.2 (1973). In the 1970s, the method used for calculating the number of 
index crimes was changed, FBI, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 
1973: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1 (1974); if one adjusts the 1960 figure accordingly, the 
rate rises to 1 ,614. In 1999, after a decade in which index crimes had fallen by more than a 
quarter, the figure was 4,267. FBI, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 
1999: UNIFOR� CRIME REPORTS 64 tbl.1 (2000). 
283. Current reports indicate that the crime drop of the 1990s has ended. See Fox 
Butterfield, U.S. Crime Figures Were Stable in '00 After 8-Year Drop, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 
2001, at Al (reporting on preliminary FBI index crime numbers for 2000). The open ques­
tion now, according to Alfred Blumstein, perhaps the leading criminologist in America, is: 
"Is this just a flattening out of crime, or is it turning upward?" Id. (quoting Blumstein). For a 
pessimistic answer to that question, see John J. Donohue, Understanding the Time Path of 
Crime, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1423 (1998). 
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most nothing to do with it.284 Which produced all the complaints that 
lawless systems naturally generate. The Guidelines seemed an attrac­
tive way to fix things. And though the Guidelines were not crafted by 
an organization like the ALI, they were written by experts - a mix of 
judges and academics, the latter including a mix of social science and 
legal backgrounds.285 
The results were not satisfying. This is not the place to explore the 
few pros and many cons of the Guidelines; a large body of literature is 
devoted to the subject. For now, it is enough to note that this literature 
is nearly unanimous on one point: the Guidelines have produced bad 
outcomes.286 The bad outcomes take two forms. First, the Guidelines 
are arbitrary; morally similar cases yield very different sentences.287 
Second, the Guidelines are too harsh: they have contributed to a 
ratcheting up of sentencing levels that has gone much too far.288 These 
propositions are, of course, contestable; they depend on what cases 
one sees as morally similar, or. on what sentencing levels seem fair. But 
it is surely significant that these twin criticisms - arbitrariness and se­
verity - are made by almost everyone familiar with the subject, with 
very little dissent and by people of quite different ideological stripes. · 
Likewise, it seems significant that these two problems are the natu­
ral consequence of an expert-driven sentencing code. Expert lawmak­
ers are, almost by definition, separated both from electoral politics 
and from the world of live cases. The absence of political checks 
means there is no assurance that the lawmakers will share the norms 
of the populace. This is a built-in problem with technocracy: it may be 
expert, but it is not likely to be democratic. To the extent that criminal 
law deals with contestable, and contested, moral questions, one might 
imagine trading a good deal of expertise for a little democracy. The 
284. The most influential critique of pre-guidelines sentencing proceeded along pre­
cisely these lines. See Marvin Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 
(1972). 
285. The initial seven Commissioners were three Court of Appeals judges (the chair, 
Judge William Wilkins, was a District Judge when the Commission was established, but was 
soon appointed to the Fourth Circuit), a member of the U.S. Parole Commission, and three 
professors. The professors included an economist and a sociologist. This information is taken 
from the Sentencing Commission's website, http://www.ussc.gov/oldcomms.htm (last visited 
Nov. 8, 2001). 
It bears noting that only one of the three judges, Judge Wilkins, had served as a trial 
judge. In other words, only one member of the original Sentencing Commission had ever 
sentenced anyone; another of the judges - then-Judge, now-Justice Stephen Breyer -· was 
a career academic before going on the bench. In short, the initial Sentencing Commission 
was heavy on academic expertise, and light on relevant experience. 
286. Again, the relevant literature is too large to cite. For the most thorough treatment, 
see STITH & CABRANES, supra note 13. 
287. For the best version of this argument, see Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sen­
tencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901 (1991). 
288. See, e.g., STITH & CABRANES, supra note 13, at 59-66; Michael Tonry, The Failure 
of the U.S. Sentencing Commission's Guidelines, 39 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 131 (1993). 
December 2001) Criminal Law's Politics 587 
absence of familiarity with live cases - though the Commission has 
more recently included a healthy number of trial judges,289 the initial 
Commission consisted mostly of academics290 - means lawmakers 
may not understand the practical effect of the rules they make. A 
given sentencing rule, or a given rule for crime definition, may have a 
good deal of logical force; its appeal in the abstract may be quite 
strong. The same rule, in the context of a particular defendant's con­
duct and history, may look very different. It hardly seems surprising 
that sentencing rules devised in the abstract lead to "tougher" sen­
tencing practices. The abstraction means those devising the rules need 
not look hard at the individuals they are sending to prison. 
These may be surmountable problems. Abstraction has virtues as 
well as vices, and it is always possible to leaven an expert commission 
with a few trial judges, to give it the benefit of some case-by-case deci­
sionmaking experience. And electoral accountability is, after all, a 
mixed bag: after all, both legislators and prosecutors - the two groups 
that have made American criminal law what it is today - are elected. 
Finally, sentencing may be different from crime definition. Expertise 
and political detachment may be more useful in the latter enterprise 
than in the former. 
Yet even if the built-in problems with technocracy can be over­
come, the political obstacles seem insurmountable. Depoliticizing 
criminal law depends on legislative self-restraint. It can work only if 
legislatures voluntarily cede the authority they now have, and the ces­
sion has to be long-lasting. That will happen only if the relevant 
authority offers legislators no political benefit. Which will be true only 
if crime rates are, and remain, very low - vastly lower than they are 
now. The past forty years offer little hope that these conditions will 
ever be satisfied. 
2. Constitutionalizing Criminal Law 
The last, and probably best, solution is to increase judicial power 
over criminal law. The most obvious way to do that would be to recre­
ate the system of criminal lawmaking that existed when courts, not 
legislatures, defined crimes. Though it is intellectual heresy to say so, 
that might be an improvement over the current regime. The common 
law of crimes was much more sensible than its Benthamite critics 
thought, and probably more sensible than any current American 
289. For example, as of November 1999, four of the seven Commissioners were federal 
district judges, and a fifth had served for fourteen years as a district judge. This information 
is taken from the Sentencing Commission's website, http://www.ussc.gov/commbios99.htm 
(last visited Nov. 8, 2001). 
290. If one counts then-Judge Breyer, four of the seven initial Commissioners were ca­
reer academics; three were appellate judges (Breyer fits in both categories), and one was a 
member of the federal Parole Commission. See supra note 285. 
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criminal code.291 But the common law of crimes cannot be recreated. 
More to the point, it cannot be recreated as common law.  Criminal 
legislation - lots of it - exists. For judges to displace that legislation, 
they must have some constitutional warrant. Any increase in judicial 
power over criminal law means an increase in constitutional power 
over criminal law. 
Which leads to a variant of the common-law-of-crimes solution. 
Perhaps courts could create the judicial equivalent of new criminal 
codes, and insulate them from legislative override by pegging them to 
due process. This possibility seems absurd, but it does no more than 
replicate what the judiciary has done with criminal procedure, where 
federal constitutional law occupied whole fields that had previously 
been left to the states. Still, absurd or not, wholesale constitutionaliza­
tion is impossible to imagine. What American appellate court would 
be willing to abolish its jurisdiction's criminal code?292 And, even for 
one who embraces the virtues of common law crimes, it is probably in­
advisable: some crime definition requires specialized information that 
courts cannot easily get. 
But aggressive constitutional regulation of criminal law need not 
be so radical, or so bizarre. Courts could exert substantial control over 
criminal law's boundaries without overturning whole criminal codes or 
reestablishing a common law of crimes. Consider three hypothetical 
constitutional rules that, taken together, might go far toward reining in 
excessive criminal liability (and toward removing the incentive for 
legislatures to overcriminalize ). 
a. Notice. The first rule is one we already have, at least nominally: 
no one may be convicted of a crime without fair notice. The core idea 
is simple. A necessary condition of any free society is the ability to 
avoid going to prison; one has that ability only if one can know what 
behavior will lead to prosecution and punishment.293 More than forty 
years ago, the Supreme Court (apparently) read this notice principle 
into the due process clause in Lambert v. California.294 There, the 
Court overturned a conviction under a Los Angeles ordinance that re-
291. Not in all its details, of course. The common law definition of rape was famously, or 
infamously, narrow. For the classic critique, see SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 27-56 (1987). 
292. This highlights an underrated feature of the constitutional revolution in criminal 
procedure. The vast bodies of constitutional law that attach to the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth 
Amendments did not, for the most part, displace developed bodies of state law. In most ar­
eas, there was little state law to displace. Rather, constitutional law entered fields where, 
again for the most part, no law applied, where local police and prosecutors had previously 
done as they pleased, or where local custom governed. Perhaps that is why the criminal pro­
cedure revolution succeeded. It would be a very different enterprise to constitutionalize 
criminal law, where huge and elaborate bodies of nonconstitutional law already exist. 
293. For much the best discussion of the notice principle in the literature, see Jeffries, 
supra note 89, at 205-12. 
294. 355 U.S. 225 (195'/). 
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quired felons residing in the area to register with the police.295 As the 
Court noted, it was impossible for persons covered by the ordinance to 
comply with it unless they knew about it, and there was no reason to 
assume that such knowledge was widespread - at the least, there was 
no reason to assume that Lambert had it.296 
Interestingly, Lambert's notice principle has never taken off. Few 
decisions rest on it, and the principle itself remains an unenforced 
norm, not a genuine constitutional rule. The likely reason is the 
seeming impossibility of enforcing the norm. At first blush, Lambert 
seems to require knowledge of the relevant criminal statute as a pre­
condition to punishing any criminal defendant.297 Such a blanket 
knowledge-of-the-law requirement would disable any criminal justice 
system. Like the rest of us, criminals do not read criminal codes,298 so 
there must be many cases in which a criminal defendant could truth­
fully testify that he knew nothing about the particular statute under 
which he was charged. Yet that ignorance would hardly be exculpatory 
- most of the defendants who could so testify knew perfectly well 
that they were engaging in conduct that might get them in trouble with 
the law.299 Which points up the central practical problem with imple-
295. Id. at 226-30. 
296. See id. at 226, 228-30. As those familiar with the case will recognize, the description 
in the text is misleadingly clear - at best, Justice Douglas's majority opinion in Lambert was 
translucent; at worst, it was opaque. For a good, rich discussion (albeit one that underem­
phasizes the notice argument), see Alan C. Michaels, Constitutional Innocence, 112 HARV. 
L. REV. 828, 856-67 (1999). 
297. The Court expressly requires "the probability of such knowledge" in Lambert itself. 
355 U.S. at 229-30. Absent that requirement, the Court reasoned, punishment "would be too 
severe for [the] community to bear." Id. at 229 (internal quotation omitted). This unbearable 
severity, in tum, stemmed from "the absence of an opportunity either to avoid the conse­
quences of the law or to defend any prosecution brought under it." Id. The same logic would 
- again, at first blush - seem to apply to any criminal case, and any criminal statute. 
298. Paul Robinson insists that, if the codes were better structured and drafted, they 
would be read, or - what amounts to the same thing - their contents would become widely 
known. See ROBINSON, supra note 3, at 185-95. Robinson acknowledges that, on this point, 
he is a voice in the wilderness; the conventional view is the one expressed in the text. See 
Robinson, Structuring Criminal Codes, supra note 1 ,  at 7 ("Frankly, I think we have given up 
on expecting a criminal code to educate the public."). 
299. For a classic example of this problem, see Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 
(1985). The defendant in Liparota was charged with food stamp fraud. He argued, success­
fully, that the crime was of the sort that might be committed innocently unless the govern­
ment were required to prove knowledge of the law as an element of the offense. See id. at 
426 ("[T]o interpret the statute otherwise would be to criminalize a broad range of appar­
ently innocent conduct."). On its own terms, the defense argument in Liparota was powerful: 
the statute criminalized any knowing violations of Department of Agriculture regulations, 
id. at 420, and it was more than plausible that any given defendant might be unaware of any 
given regulation. 
Regardless of the state of his knowledge of the law, however, Liparota had notice. The 
owner of a sandwich shop in Chicago, he bought food stamps from an undercover agent for 
seventy percent of their face value. Id. at 421. Since the food stamps were, when used legally, 
the equivalent of cash, the mark-down only makes sense as compensation for the risk of 
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menting Lambert: the kind ·of notice that matters is functional, not 
formal; the question is not whether the defendant knew he was vio­
lating this particular statute, but rather whether the defendant knew 
that his behavior was, in some more general sense, out of line.300 
Yet the law can protect this more functional kind of notice. In fact, 
it already does so, patchily. The defendant in Bryan v. United States 
was charged with selling firearms without a license and registration; he 
claimed he was, like Lambert, unaware of the registration requirement 
he had violated.301 The Supreme Court rejected Bryan's claim, but in a 
way that protected the notice principle. The Court noted that Bryan's 
conduct demonstrated that he knew he was engaging in legally ques­
tionable behav,ior. Bryan used "straw purchasers" to buy guns that he 
could not have legally bought himself, and he promised these middle­
men that he would shave off the guns' serial numbers.302 As long as the 
government proved that kind of knowledge of generalized illegality, 
the Court held, it need not prove knowledge of any particular crime in 
order to convict.303 
Bryan amounts to a requirement that the government prove func­
tional notice where notice is not inherent in the crime charged. This is 
no more, and no less, than a faithful application of Lambert. With one 
critical qualification: Bryan is framed as an interpretation of the fed­
eral gun laws. It has no legal force in any state criminal prosecution. 
And if Congress wishes to overrule it - as Congress has done in the 
past when the Court has read knowledge-of-the-law requirements into 
federal crimes304 - the Court must bow to the congressional will. 
Suppose that qualification were abandoned. The Court could eas­
ily enough hold that Bryan was required not by statutory language, 
but by the due process clause. If it did so, . the Court would go a sub­
stantial distance toward reining in the government's ability to prose­
cute people for trivial wrongs. Brogan, the defendant charged under 
the federal false statements statute for a simple exculpatory "no,"305 
would have a strong claim. Who hasn't denied some piece of embar-
government intervention of some sort. Liparota may not have known which regulations he 
was violating, but he clearly knew he was doing something that might get him in trouble. 
300. Hence the attraction of Lord Bramwell's definition of mens rea as the intention to 
do an immoral (not illegal) act. See Regina v. Prince, 2 L.R. - Cr. Cas. Res. 154 (1875). For 
the classic discussion of Bramwell's position and the classic explanation of its appeal, see 
Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal 
Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 652-58 (1984). 
301. 524 U.S. 184, 189-90 (1998). 
302. Id. at 189. 
303. Id. at 191-99. The preceding discussion of Bryan draws on Wiley, supra note 191, at 
1133-36. 
304. See supra notes 192, 217-219 and accompanying text (discussing the decision in, and 
overruling of, Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994)). 
305. See supra notes 168-172 and accompanying text. 
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rassing behavior, and who assumes that such denials, out of court and 
without any oaths or signatures, carry criminal penalties? So might a 
good many other white-collar defendants whom the government sus­
pects of serious wrongdoing but who are charged with technical viola­
tions like Brogan's. Without the ability to threaten prosecution for 
trivial and unexpected crimes, the government would have to charge, 
and prove, the more serious crimes that prompted its investigations in 
such cases. 
That would have two large benefits. First, it would mean that de­
fendants like Brogan would have access to the regular, formal adjudi­
cation process. The ability to charge for the false denial permits the 
prosecutor to avoid trial on the more serious charge. Do away with the 
strategic charging power, and the power to avoid trial would disappear 
as well. Second, and equally important, it would add to courts' ability 
to define the boundaries of those more serious crimes. As things stand 
now, prosecutors can avoid judicial boundary definition by piling on 
enough charges to induce a guilty plea. The more such charges are 
barred by a Bryan-style notice requirement, the harder it would be to 
end-run the court system. All of which would introduce a little more 
law into the process by which crimes are defined. 
b. Desuetude. The second constitutional rule follows naturally 
from the first. One of the pathologies of criminal lawmaking is the dif­
ficulty of repealing criminal statutes that once represented community 
norms but no longer do. There is good reason to believe that the level 
of legislative inertia in such cases - the cost of undoing that which 
would not be done today - is higher for criminal statutes than for 
other sorts of legislation.306 Which means that the statute books con­
tain a host of crimes that are not crimes at all in terms of popular un­
derstandings. Prosecutors' incentives being what they are, these crimes 
are likely to go largely unenforced. But they can still be useful in the 
way that any overbroad crimes can be useful: as means of inducing 
guilty pleas for other, more serious transgressions. The paradigmatic 
example is sodomy laws, which are sometimes used as fodder for plea 
bargains in sexual assault cases where the government may fear going 
to trial on the more serious assault charge.307 And these no-longer­
enforced crimes can also be used more straightforwardly, as means of 
harassing opponents or discriminated-against groups. Michael 
Hardwick's arrest, which led to the Supreme Court's decision in 
Bowers v. Hardwick,308 is a fairly obvious instance. 
306. See supra notes 184-190 and accompanying text. 
307. See supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
308. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). For a chilling account of the arrest, see Kendall Thomas, Be­
yond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1437-40 (1992). 
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These used-to-be-real-crimes that remain on the books create ob­
vious notice problems. In the oral argument in Hardwick, Georgia's 
representative admitted that the state never prosecuted cases of pri­
vate sex between consenting adults.309 That being so, Hardwick had no 
reason to assume that his sexual conduct would be the cause of any 
state intervention. And that notice problem exists even if Hardwick 
knew about Georgia's sodomy statute. Just as functional notice 
(knowledge that one's conduct is outside accepted boundaries) can 
exist without formal notice (knowledge that a particular criminal stat­
ute covers one's particular behavior), formal notice can exist without 
the functional kind. 
The solution is familiar. Crimes that go unenforced for a substan­
tial period of time should no longer be treated as crimes. Lack of en­
forcement constitutes fairly strong evidence for the proposition that 
the crime would not be a crime if the issue were to be resolved by 
majoritarian politics today. (If the prediction proved wrong, the legis­
lature could always re-pass the statute; if prosecutors then enforced it 
regularly, courts could give way. Desuetude need not be a constitu­
tional straightjacket.) And the unenforced crime's continued existence 
gives the government the same strategic power that all overbroad 
crimes give: the power to induce guilty pleas for other, more serious 
crimes that the government cannot prove. A constitutionalized desue­
tude doctrine would thus serve the same purposes as a constitutional­
ized notice requirement. Both doctrines would make criminal law and 
criminal adjudication more transparent ___..:_ crimes the government 
prosecutes would more closely resemble crimes the government actu­
ally wishes to punish - and hence more lawlike. 
There are of course complications and counter-arguments; this is 
not the place for a detailed discussion of them.310 One objection, 
though, deserves comment here, if only because it highlights one of 
the central ironies of American criminal law. Just as more law has 
produced a fundamentally lawless system, re-imposing the rule of law 
on that system may require courts to behave in an un-lawlike fashion. 
Consider how a desuetude doctrine might function in practice. 
Suppose a defendant is prosecuted for marijuana possession, under a 
statute that requires mandatory jail time for that offense. The defen­
dant claims that the relevant jurisdiction hasn't enforced that crime for 
years, notwithstanding regular marijuana use by a sizeable fraction of 
the local population. Assume the defendant's claim is correct. The 
government can nevertheless rebut it, or appear to, by showing a sig-
309. See 478 U.S. at 198 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring). 
310. For a (slightly) more extended argument, see Stuntz, supra note 72, at 34-38. For 
the most thorough and best argument for the proposition that obsolete statutes should be 
ignored more generally, not just in the criminal sphere, see GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON 
LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982). 
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nificant number of marijuana possession. prosecutions - all, or almost 
all, in cases in which the marijuana offense was a stand-in for some 
other crime that, for one reason or another, the government did not 
wish to charge. The marijuana prosecutions will all be part of the pub­
lic record. Their pretextual nature will not. If the government's re­
sponse stands, desuetude doctrine does no work. It rules out only 
those stale criminal statutes the government never uses. 
The only possible response to the government's argument involves 
a heavy dose of judicial intuition. Does the local population expect 
marijuana possession to be treated as a real crime, with jail time at­
tached? If not, the possession statute no longer applies. But the ques­
tion has no objectively verifiable answer (polling on such questions is 
too expensive if done well, and too manipulable if not). So a judge 
facing the issue would likely convert that question into another: Does 
marijuana possession merit jail time? Lacking hard information about 
what the public thinks, judges are likely to go with .their own opinions 
about desert and proportionality. Those opinions will not seem terri­
bly lawlike. If the Supreme Court's proportionality cases teach any­
thing, they teach the impossibility of applying something that looks 
and feels like legal analysis to the question whether a given crime de­
serves a given sentence.311 So it would be with the hypothetical mari­
juana case - or with Michael Hardwick's claim - in a world where a 
constitutional desuetude rule existed. 
The same thing is · true of a constitutional notice requirement. 
Some crimes (robbery, murder) are obviously crimes; other crimes 
(Lambert's registration requirement) aren't. In a world where notice is 
a rule and not merely an aspiration, courts would have to distinguish 
the two. And the distinction would sometimes be hard. Some crimes 
- fraud, for example - include both obviously criminal behavior and 
behavior for which few people would expect to go to prison. The dis­
tinction can only be drawn by courts making open-ended, ungrounded 
value judgments: this behavior merits punishment; that behavior 
doesn't, for no better reason than because I think so (and because I 
think and hope most of the local population will agree). It sounds like 
the antithesis of the rule of law. 
Perhaps it is. But the alternative to this un-lawlike judging is even 
less lawlike prosecution. Under the current regime, the marijuana case 
is resolved as foilows. Police arrest if and when they choose. Perhaps 
the local police believe in enforcing the ban on marijuana possession 
but only in some parts of town, or perhaps they believe in enforcing it 
only against people they don't like. The reasons are legally irrelevant. 
Because the ban exists in the statute books, the arrest will be legally 
311. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991); Solem v. Helm, 463 u:s. 277 (1983); 
Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980). 
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valid.312 Likewise, prosecutors prosecute if and when they choose. Per­
haps the local district attorney's office is enforcing some narrower ver­
sion of the marijuana ban (e.g., punishing public use), or perhaps it 
uses the ban in cases where some other crime is suspected but unpro­
vable. All these judgments are both invisible and unreviewable. The 
result is that police and prosecutors both define the crime and adjudi­
cate violations, all outside the formal legal system. Open-ended consti­
tutional review of the merits of criminal statutes would be a good deal 
more lawlike, and a good deal better, than that. 
c. Sentencing Discretion. Constitutional notice and desuetude doc­
trines would make it harder to charge and convict for trivial miscon­
duct. But they would not do much to rein in another, equally danger­
ous prosecutorial power: the power to stack charges, to charge a large 
number of overlapping crimes for a single course of conduct. Even if 
each of these offenses is narrowly defined to cover only serious mis­
conduct, combining crimes enables prosecutors to get convictions in 
cases where there may be no misconduct at all. When deciding 
whether to plead guilty, any rational defendant (more to the point, any 
rational defense lawyer) takes account of the sentence the defendant 
may receive if he goes to trial and loses. That sentence is, always in 
part and sometimes in very large part, a function of the number and 
severity of the crimes charged. By stacking enough charges, prosecu­
tors can jack up the threat value of trial and thereby induce a guilty 
plea, even if the government's case is weak. Thus, the ability to 
charge-stack seriously reduces the value of the defendant's right to 
force the government to prove its case. As with prosecutors' decisions 
to charge overbroad crimes, charge-stacking tends to transfer adjudi­
cation from the courthouse to the district attorney's office. 
One could solve this problem in a variety of ways. The most obvi­
ous would be to reconfigure double jeopardy law or the nonconstitu­
tional law of joinder to limit the power to pile on separate offenses. 
That task would not be easy. At the least, it would require courts to 
generate a body of common law devoted to defining a single course of 
criminal conduct, something that defies easy definition. Still, difficult 
is one thing; impossible is another - courts draw hard-to-define lines 
all the time. 
A less obvious but perhaps better way to address charge-stacking is 
indirect. Suppose judges had the power - under the Eighth Amend­
ment, the Due Process Clause, or both - to decline to impose any 
sentence that seemed unduly harsh. Prosecutors could still charge five 
or six offenses for a single criminal incident, but the added charges 
would not necessarily yield a higher sentence. If, in the judge's eyes, a 
given fact pattern merited no more than five years, the defendant 
312. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001). 
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would receive no more than five years, regardless of how the charges 
were packaged. Of course, he still might receive less. Statutory 
maxima would still apply, and prosecutors and defense lawyers could 
still strike bargains for less than the judicially favored sentence. But 
not for more. Judges, deciding case-by-case, would define maximum 
sentences; within these maxima legislatures and prosecutors would be 
free to determine the actual sentence. Charge-stacking would still be 
possible, but prosecutors would gain much less from it.313 
This hypothetical rule is more radical than doctrines like desue­
tude or notice. Yet it is not quite so radical as it seems. Constitution­
alized sentencing discretion would not mean the abolition of sentenc­
ing guidelines, much less the wholesale invalidation of the 
nonconstitutional law of sentencing. In that sense, it may be less radi­
cal than the path the Supreme Court is charting witli respect to the 
burden of proving sentencing facts.314 Constitutionally required sen­
tencing discretion would mean the abolition of mandatory minimum 
sentences; guidelines could define ceilings but not floors. Yet abolish­
ing mandatory minima would be a great gain, for all the same reasons 
that doing away with overbroad crimes would be a great gain. There is 
no more reason to believe mandatory minima accurately capture ma­
joritarian sensibilities than there is to believe that Congress's defini­
tion of mail fraud accurately captures the range of deceptive conduct 
the public wishes to see punished. Just as crimes are defined against 
the backdrop of enforcement discretion, sentencing minima are fixed 
with the knowledge that some (most?) of those eligible for the mini­
mum will not receive it, either because police fail to arrest or because 
prosecutors fail to charge the qualifying crime. And just as overbroad 
crimes give prosecutors the power to define a low-visibility law-on­
the-street, harsh sentencing statutes give prosecutors the ability to de­
fine their own sentencing rules. The case for doing away with the sec­
ond power is the same as the case for doing away with the first. 
To be sure, the legal case is not as strong. There is no sentencing 
equivalent to Lambert, no line of cases that lays the doctrinal founda­
tion for constitutionalizing judges' opportunity to show mercy to those 
313. The source of the basic idea is Nancy J. King, Portioning Punishment: Constitu­
tional Limits on Successive and Excessive Penalties, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 101 (1995). King first 
explained why the traditional debate about double jeopardy limits on prosecutors' charging 
power was misplaced - the key issue is not what charges the defendant faces, but what con­
sequences flow from those charges. Limit the power to increase the defendant's sentence, 
and the manipulation of charges will cease to be attractive. 
314. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 266 (2000). In Apprendi, the Court required 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of any fact necessary to define the maximum sentence for 
the crime. Depending on how the Court defines "maximum sentence" (the statutory maxi­
mum? the top of the relevant guidelines range?), Apprendi could render a number of guide­
lines systems unconstitutional. For an early attempt by two scholars to give some meaning to 
the Court's decision without undoing sentencing guidelines, see Nancy J. King & Susan R. 
Klein, Essential Elements, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1467 (2001). 
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defendants who, in the judges' eyes, deserve it.315 Still, constitutional­
ized sentencing discretion does have some roots in existing law. Juries 
are allowed to acquit in the teeth of overwhelming evidence of guilt, 
for no better reason than because they think the defendant does not 
deserve punishment, and the acquittals are final.316 Nor is that power 
limited to juries: judges, too, can acquit for any reason or for no rea­
son at all, and their acquittals are likewise unappealable.317 Whatever 
principle underlies these rules, it applies equally to sentencing. It is 
hard to understand why constitutional law should make it impossible 
for legislatures to command that a given course of conduct be pun­
ished (the power to acquit for any reason does away with that legisla­
tive power, at least in theory), and yet leave legislatures free to require 
that, if behavior is to be punished, it should be punished at least so 
much. Logically, the greater mercy ought to include within it the 
lesser. 
The real downside to constitutionally required sentencing discre­
tion is neither its radicalism nor its weak doctrinal pedigree. The 
problem lies in the opposite direction: restoring judges' power to re­
vise statutory or bargained-for sentences downward (though not up­
ward) might not accomplish much in practice. Even when sentencing 
was everywhere discretionary, judges tended to defer to bargained-for 
sentencing recommendations.318 And judges rarely use their power to 
acquit in the teeth of adverse law and adverse facts. Similar power 
over sentences might be used with similar infrequency. 
In short, two changes are needed: a change in constitutional law, to 
grant judges the power to undo too-harsh sentencing decisions by leg­
islatures and prosecutors, and a change in judicial culture, so that 
judges will exercise that power once they have it. Perhaps the first 
change would produce the second. But even if not - even if judges 
continue to defer to prosecutors, save for a few exceptional cases -
we will be no worse off than we are now. At the least, the most ex­
treme examples of overcharging, and the worst injustices that manda­
tory minima now produce, might be remedied. 
315. Something close exists in the body of Eighth Amendment law that restricts imposi­
tion of the death penalty: defendants are entitled to present, and to have the sentencer con­
sider, any mitigating evidence. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Lockett v. 
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). Needless to say, there is no reason to assume any court would 
apply these cases outside the death penalty context. 
316. For an excellent, though highly critical, discussion of this power, see Andrew D. 
Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullification, 82 VA. L. REV. 253 (1996). 
317. See Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962). 
318. See, e.g. , HEUMANN, supra note 130, at 93-107. 
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* * * * 
There are other ways to skin this particular cat, other means of 
giving courts substantial control over the bounds of criminal liability 
without overturning criminal codes wholesale. The three hypothetical 
rules discussed above are meant to be suggestive, not exhaustive. 
It is worth noting a feature the three proposals share, for it is 
probably a necessary feature of any means of reasserting judicial 
power over criminal law. In each instance, discretion is used to check 
discretion. Notice and desuetude are probably not susceptible to de­
tailed legal analysis. These doctrines, if they ever exist, will likely be 
little more than an accumulation of seat-of-the-pants judgments by 
particular trial judges and appellate panels. The same is still more true 
of a constitutional right to mercy in the discretion of the sentencing 
judge. These proposals do not so much put legal bounds on a discre­
tionary system; rather, they make an already discretionary system 
more discretionary still. It seems an odd way to go about fixing a sys­
tem suffering from a kind of lawlessness. 
Yet it is not so odd as it seems. The existing system rests on open­
ended, unbounded, essentially non-legal judgments about who de­
serves to go to prison and who doesn't. Law enforcers make those 
judgments. Courts review them only for their compliance with legal 
doctrine. Since the doctrine is designed to give law enforcers a great 
deal of flexibility, in practice the review is forgiving. The open-ended, 
non-legal judgments are, again in practice, both final and invisible. 
And those are the judgments that count. 
If the hypothetical rules discussed above existed, the open-ended 
judgments would still be made, but they would be made by two deci­
sionmakers, not one. And they would be made, at least sometimes, in 
open court, with adversarial argument, and with at least the possibility 
of public attention. Whether or not these changes would advance the 
rule of law as it is commonly defined, they would surely advance the 
values the rule of law is supposed to protect. 
They would also make the formal doctrine a good deal more im­
portant than it is now. If notice and desuetude were constitutional 
claims with bite, stale crimes would cease to exist and overbroad 
crimes would, over time, acquire narrower definitions. The govern­
ment would have to prove the elements of those narrower definitions; 
defendants could appeal convictions under them, and appellate courts 
would have the opportunity (where clearer definition is possible) to 
define them with greater precision. Judicial discretion to depart 
downward from legislative minimum sentences would reduce prosecu­
tors' incentive to stack charges. With less charge-stacking, there might 
be more trials, where the boundaries of crimes might be the subject of 
litigation. Criminal law might again have something to do with who 
goes to prison, and for how long. 
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This may be the key to solving the system's problem with defining 
crimes. The current regime uses law to produce discretion. We need to 
reverse the process, to use discretion to produce better law. The rever­
sal might work, as long as the discretion is exercised by someone other 
than police and prosecutors. 
CONCLUSION 
The study of American criminal law is and always has been the 
study of the merits of different definitions of crimes and defenses. 
What kinds of threats should give rise to claims of self-defense?319 
What sorts of provocation should reduce the grade of homicides from 
murder to manslaughter?320 Should the law of rape require force, or 
only the absence of consent?321 Should the law of mens rea focus on 
cognition, or on something else?322 
These questions matter. How they are answered has huge conse­
quences for the lives of real people. But they matter less than lawyers 
tend to think, because the number of such people is fairly small - and 
even those few cases exist largely at the sufferance of prosecutors. A 
prosecutor who is willing to take a plea to involuntary manslaughter or 
assault has little to fear from a self-defense claim and nothing to fear 
from a claim of provocation. The growth of lesser-included sexual as­
sault crimes means the boundaries of rape will matter only when 
prosecutors insist on going for the toughest possible sentence. The 
finer points of mens rea doctrine make no difference to a defendant 
facing a half-dozen felony counts, with an offer to dismiss the other 
five if the defendant will plead to one. In other words, even for the 
most serious crimes, criminal law matters less than one would think -
and it is a bit of a mystery why it matters as often as it does.323 
Aside from homicide, rape, and a few other crimes (and only par­
tially there), criminal law serves not as a means of separating those 
who are to be punished from those who are not, but as a grant of 
319. For provocative discussions, see GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF 
DEFENSE: BERNHARD GOETZ AND THE LAW ON TRIAL 18-38 (1988); Kahan, Secret Ambi­
tion, supra note 73, at 428-35. 
320. For the most interesting discussion, see Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress: Mod­
ern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331 (1997). 
321. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 3 (arguing for nonconsent alone); Dripps, supra note 
97 (arguing for force). 
322. For the best case to date for "something else," see SAMUEL H. PILLSBURY, 
JUDGING EVIL: RETHINKING THE LAW OF MURDER AND MANSLAUGHTER (1998). 
323. Part of the explanation must be that prosecutors are not simply maximizing convic­
tions. This stands to reason, given that trial experience enhances prosecutors' career pros­
pects, see Glaeser et al., supra note 151, and given that trials are more fun than plea bargains. 
If prosecutors were maximizing convictions, they would take better advantage of the menu 
of charging options criminal law gives them; we would then see many fewer trials, and guilty 
plea rates approaching one-hundred percent. 
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authority to prosecutors to do the separating. Criminal law is, in other 
words, not law at all, but a veil that hides a system that allocates 
criminal punishment discretionarily. Not quite - defendants can still 
go to trial, and sometimes win at trial, by arguing that someone else 
committed the crime charged, that the police arrested and the prose­
cution charged the wrong man. But rarely do defendants prevail, at 
trial or in any other setting, because the law does not criminalize their 
conduct. Prosecutors decide what is a crime, though juries occasionally 
- and only occasionally - get to decide whether defendants did the 
things prosecutors believe they did. 
If that is the best that can be said of the existing system, it isn't 
good enough. Prosecutors are by and large reasonable and decent 
people, but even reasonable and decent people should not be given 
the power both to define the law and to adjudicate violations. Power is 
too concentrated. Which highlights another irony of criminal law­
making. Both horizontally and vertically, our system of lawmaking and 
law enforcement seems to do a remarkably good job of diffusing 
power. States make criminal law, localities enforce it; the federal gov­
ernment does both, but only in a supplemental way. Legislatures write 
criminal statutes, but courts construe them (and enforce constitutional 
standards of specificity), and prosecutors have the discretion not to en­
force when the laws are too harsh. It sounds like a perfect image of 
checks and balances in action. Giving judges the kind of power I sug­
gest above would undo these checks and balances, and would create a 
kind of concentrated judicial power that seems dangerous. 
Yet the dangerous power already exists in other hands, and the 
checks and balances are an illusion. The criminal justice system seems 
characterized by diffused power, but its real difficulty is that it concen­
trates power in prosecutors. Legislatures are no check on prosecuto­
rial power, because legislators and prosecutors mostly share the same 
interests. Courts are no check, because they can do nothing that legis­
latures and prosecutors cannot together undo. Lastly, federal officials 
are no check on their local counterparts; on the contrary, federal 
criminal law and federal sentencing guidelines give local law enforcers 
even more leverage over the suspects with whom they deal. 
The system by which we make criminal law has produced not the 
rule of law but its opposite. And the doctrines that aim to reinforce 
the rule of law only add to the lawlessness. Vagueness doctrine, the 
rule of lenity, and the ban on retroactive crime definition - the trio of 
doctrines that aim to ensure that criminal law is truly lawlike - all 
keep courts from exercising real power over crime definition. Ostensi­
bly, this guards legislative supremacy. Actually, it protects prosecuto­
rial discretion. Not only is the current system lawless, but the doctrines 
that aim to prevent that state of affairs instead ensure that it will con­
tinue to exist. 
600 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 100:505 
What is needed is genuine rule of law protection: a countervailing 
power, something that can check legislators' and prosecutors' power 
to define crimes and sentences as they wish. That point deserves em­
phasis. The conventional wisdom in the literature is that criminal law 
suffers from poor drafting, that the solution to bad criminal codes is 
for legislatures to write better ones. It would no doubt be a good thing 
if legislatures were to improve their drafting, even more so if they 
would make better normative judgments. But there is no reason to as­
sume they will do so, given that it is in their interest to behave as they 
do now. Generally speaking, legislatures pass the kinds of criminal 
statutes we should expect, given the lawmaking system in which they 
act. In order to have better criminal law, we need to change that sys­
tem. And the key to better lawmaking lies in some lawmaker other 
than legislatures or prosecutors. 
The most plausible lawmakers are the courts. The most plausible 
vehicle is the federal constitution. And the lawmaking power itself 
must, in the nature of things, be fairly open-ended. It sounds radical, 
and in some ways it is. And there is no great public demand for this 
countervailing power. On the contrary, the way the system has 
evolved is, while certainly not dictated by public opinion, at least con­
sistent with it. Criminal law is not democratic, but criminal law 
enforcement probably is. Never in our history has constitutional law 
taken so dramatic a step with so little support. Which suggests that 
criminal law will probably get worse before it gets better. 
